[MD] The use-mention distinction - correction

MarshaV valkyr at att.net
Thu Oct 20 09:52:13 PDT 2011


 
Ooops, the previous post ha a bit of the MoQ Textbook quote missing...  
 

Hi Ron, Steve & dmb,

I'm not sure if this falls into your mention/use distinction, but I've always thought of the MoQ in two ways: The MoQ as the social/intellectual explanation that RMP has given us in ZAMM, LILA and various other letters and papers, and as the MoQ = REALITY = QUALITY(unpatterned experience(DQ)/patterned experience(sq)).  I see a parallel in Buddhism in the doctrine of the Two Truths.  From Wiki:

     "The Buddhist doctrine of the two truths differentiates between 
      two levels of truth (Sanskrit: satya) in Buddhist discourse: a "relative" 
      or commonsense truth (Pāli: sammuti sacca), and an "ultimate" or 
      absolute, spiritual truth (Pāli: paramattha sacca)."
                     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_truths  

From the MoQ textbook:

     "Nagarjuna and Pirsig also have a similar recognition of two types 
      of truth; the ‘static’ conventional truth (_sammuti-sacca_) and the 
     'Dynamic' ultimate truth (_paramattha-sacca_).    


Thanks,

Marsha 


On Oct 20, 2011, at 11:32 AM, david buchanan wrote:

> 
> Ron wrote to Steve:
> The fact that you reference Bo for an arguement, sigh, you really lost me. That guy is about as clueless as they come..sorry.
> 
> 
> 
> Steve replied:
> You've misunderstood my intention. I wasn't making an argument let alone using Bo's words to help make one for me. I was referencing Bo to highlight a problem that most of us have with Bo's thinking and asking if anyone has enough knowledge of the use-mention distinction to say whether that is a good way to describe the problem.
> 
> 
> 
> dmb says:
> I'd say the mention/use distinction is not relevant to Bo's problem.
> 
> 
> It's a handy distinction if you're an analytic philosopher because their task is to analyze language and they have to use language to do that. The liar's paradox, for example, is a case of using language while at the same time making a claim about that language use; "Everything I say is a lie."  The paradox is produced by the sentence's ability to preform at two levels simultaneously. But normally it's not at all a big deal. Sometimes we talk and sometimes we talk about talking. Analytic philosophers talk about talking as a profession so they might make good use of the distinction in subtle ways, but I think most people can easily understand the difference.
> 
> 
> 
> This distinction cannot in any way be equated with the MOQ's distinction between concepts and reality, however. Since the primary empirical reality is pre-verbal and pre-conceptual, there is as yet no term to use or mention. Reality (DQ) is outside of language but the mention/use distinction is entirely within language, is entirely conceptual. The MOQ and analytic philosophy go together like peanut butter and jealousy. There's your category error.
> 
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