[MD] The Hero's journey

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Dan,

Matt said:
The point, I think, of distinguishing "rejecting of past-evil" from 
"rejecting of now-good" is that the true Dynamic leap forward without 
a net--for the leap must produce its _own net_ (i.e. static latch)--is a 
rejection of something we perceive _rightly_ as a current good, a 
static latch that works, but it is rejected for as-yet not completely 
understood reasons and, more importantly, possibilities.  Dimly 
perceiving Dynamic Quality, I think, must be at the same time a 
concession that the future of this perception is unsure, as it is by its 
nature the leaving-behind of the sure/static/stable/known.

Dan said:
I am unsure where you're going by equating rejecting now-good with 
Dynamic Quality. I understand it is best to say Dynamic Quality is not 
this, not that, and the reason for that is to avoid pigeon-holing 
Dynamic Quality into compartments. Dynamic Quality isn't about 
rejection, however, though I can see how the static quality sense of 
negation does lend itself to that connotation.

Matt:
The first time I wrote the formulation I said that these were 
_implicit_ rejections, and this was lost in the later extrapolation, and 
that was regrettable.  It's important to understand them as at 
minimum implicit rejections, and it's on the model of "every choice is 
implicitly a rejection of all the other possibilities you did not choose."  
Because I think you're right that DQ isn't really about rejection, but 
our static conceptual understanding of what is happening, I think, 
must include not just our individual perceptions of what we do, but 
their meaning when fit into a larger network.

I'm not sure how that relates to your further connection of your point 
above to our earlier conversation about DQ being neither negative 
nor positive.  I'm still not sure I understand how this is possible, 
without draining all the purpose out of Pirsig's original move of 
making Quality synonymous with Reality.  Maybe it's that I still don't 
understand what difference that makes a difference there is 
between "negative" (which is a static term in your view) and "low" 
(which you approve for use in describing a DQ-perception).

Matt said:
The "human," in this case, stands in for a different set of patterns, 
one that _enables_ greater facility with problems.  So: is it indeed 
the case that some intellectual patterns better _enable_ Dynamic 
Quality?

I think we have to answer yes, despite my initial formulation of "no 
intellectual pattern could get in the way of your ability to be in touch 
with reality."  For, is it not also a consequence of Pirsig's 
understanding of evolution that, e.g., _some_ biological patterns and 
_not others_ enabled the creation of an entirely new kind of static 
patterns (i.e., social)?

Dan said:
I would say Dynamic Quality enables intellectual patterns towards 
betterness, not the other way around.

Matt:
Well, that's true enough insofar as the whole train of static patterns 
follows in the wake of DQ.  And I can see how it might be desirable 
to reverse my formulation, but what I'm after is how two sets of 
Pirsigian ideas hook up to each other.  What I don't see in your wish 
to reverse my formulation is an attempt to tackle the problem that 
seems to lie in connecting (what we might call) evolutionary-DQ and 
experiential-DQ.  (The former is just DQ in the context of evolution 
and history; the latter is DQ in the context of the first-person point 
of view.)  For I don't find very convincing your response of "not 
exactly" to the point that some biological patterns and not others 
produced the social level.  I can't cite Pirsig passages, but I can't 
imagine Pirsig denying the point that mammalian biological patterns 
enabled social patterns whereas (as of yet) reptilian patterns did 
not, let alone plant biological patterns.

The problem I was attempting to elucidate is whether or not a 
_particular_ set of intellectual patterns can get in the way of 
Reality/DQ better or worse than another.  For example, it might be 
thought that SOM is worse than the MoQ because the SOM gets in 
the way of DQ.  (I have no idea if this _has_ been thought, or 
assumed or elaborated, but it still might be important to reveal why 
this may or may not be the case.)  _All_ static patterns are, in the 
same way, _not_ DQ, and thus a distance from it, which is the point 
you pressed with "Intellectual patterns always get in the way of 
reality. That is the nature of ideas."  (I won't take up the rhetoric of 
"getting in the way of" and distance that I usually avoid, but simply 
concede the point as you make it.)  And thus Enlightenment is a 
waking up from static patterns.  Sure.  But doesn't Pirsig also 
elaborate an evolutionary understanding of DQ, such that history is 
a march toward betterness and freedom?  Your point about 
intellectual patterns always getting in the way because of the nature 
of ideas flattens them out, and suggests that their worth is all 
equidistant from DQ, and thus there's no point in distinguishing 
between better and worse ideas.  But this is the idea that Pirsig 
reacted to at Benares University, and caused him to storm out.  His 
manner of correcting that approach to Enlightenment, I believe, is 
by the evolutionary stance in Lila, by clearing the conceptual way for 
us to be able to claim that, e.g., capitalism is better than communism 
_for DQ_.  It is in _that_ sense that I say "some intellectual patterns 
better enable Dynamic Quality."

Matt