[MD] Moral Responsibility and Free Will

[david buchanan]

dmb said to Steve:
To deny that there is a logical necessity is very different from saying morality is in no way predicated on free will.



Steve replied:
I thought that pretty much means the same thing. Isn't saying that responsibility is predicated on free will the same as saying that it is based on free will? That we logically can't have responsibility without it? Please explain if you mean something "very different."


dmb says:

They are so different that I can say both at the same time without contradiction. Morality responsibility is so commonly and usually predicated on the notion of free will that dictionaries will include this linkage as part of the definition of free will and any decent encyclopedia of philosophy entry on the topic will mention these moral implications in the opening paragraph but some philosophers do not think this is logical necessity. Shorter version: Moral responsibility is almost always predicated on some kind of free will. According to the Oxford companion, by the way, there are two kinds of philosophers who do NOT think morality depends on free will; the kind that conflate two different kinds of will and the other kind are strictly hypothetical and but logically could exist. Okay, it's not a logical necessity or at least there is not universal agreement on that point. But the connection between freedom and morality is still quite compelling, powerful and obvious to me. 


Steve said:
...The point is that it just ain't such a crazy thing to say that moral responsibility is not predicated on free will if such a mainstream thinker as Parfit is saying it. Your accusations of me defying basic rules of logic or being radical in my use of language or being "wildly incoherent" are off base unless you'd have me believe that Parfit is just as wildly incoherent.


dmb says:

But Steve, earlier I found myself explaining the difference between getting specific and adding another thing. Here I had to explain the difference between always and almost always. There is no shortage of reasons to complain and Parfit does no such thing. He simply defines the relevant form of "could have acted differently" in a strange way. But that's what morality hinges upon and he still has some version of that "could have". I don't think it's a legitimate version, but logically speaking he is still predicating morality on freedom. The logic is still pretty bad here, Steve. 


Steve said:
I would take a look at yourself here. Just maybe when something doesn't make sense to you it isn't because it is "wildly incoherent." It could be that you are the one who is missing out on something.

dmb says:
Yea, that's totally possible. Obviously. But when it doesn't make sense, I do tell you exactly why. If I were missing something that would be the perfect time to set me straight. But that never happens. Most of the time, in fact, it seems that the complaints just don't register, the point is missed and so the complaint goes completely unanswered. This whole page is basically about one simple question that you never did answer; How can a person be held responsible for their actions if they are not free to act? I never wanted to establish the absolute truth or any logical necessity as such, you know? I only ever wanted you to see the logic of that question. I wanted you to try to articulate an answer with your own words and your own ideas. And in the process of trying to work that out, you'd see that it's pretty much impossible to have morality without freedom. There may be some who think otherwise, but that's only important to you for personal reasons unrelated to the substance of the matter. Do we have any reason to think that Pirsig endorses some version of morality without free will? Is that what you're saying? You think the MOQ is morality all the way down but there is no free will?


Steve:
Free will is not free will plus something else. ... I've been saying that free will is not merely will. Choice is not the same thing as free choice. Will is not the same thing as free will.


dmb says:
Yea, and I keep asking you WHY you keep saying that. See, if ALL THE FUSS about free will is about the PARTICULAR SORT of free will, then why do you get to define the terms at the starting line? Why can't free will mean just that; a will that is not determined, a will that's free. Then we can each qualify and further specify what we mean. How do you figure you get to be in charge of the central terms? Isn't it fair to everyone if we begin with normal, common sense definitions like dictionaries and encyclopedia? Yea, of course it is. That was a rhetorical question. 
free willnounthe power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.


If you want "free will" to mean more than this simple definition, then go right ahead, but please understand that you are only speaking for yourself. I think your additions are quite incoherent, strange, in fact, and have nothing but unanswered questions about them. Choice is not the same as free choice? Huh? The ability to make a choice IS the freedom, Steve. That's simply what the term means. The ability, capacity, right to make a selection is itself the freedom we are talking about. Period. That's it. If you want to add a spare tire or a back system or whatever, that's your business. But please understand that I am NOT adding this stuff and I don't see any reason for it either.