[MD] "Could have acted differently" v. "the extent to which we perceive DQ"

[david buchanan]

Howdy MOQers:

dmb said:
...Free will is just another way to say that you could have acted differently. Free will is, as my dictionary puts it, "the ability to act one's own discretion". As I have already said many times, that is all I mean by free will. Every dictionary and encyclopedia backs this claim and I don't see any reason why the MOQ would defy the english language. ...

Steve replied:
...I think dmb is asserting a conception of free will when he says that "could have acted differently" is the same as Pirsig's formulation of freedom as the extent to which we follow DQ. He is trying to slip the old "free will" in the back door of the MOQ, but I could be wrong. I see "could have acted differently" and following DQ as very different ideas. One is Pirsig's description of freedom. The other is free will as it is usually defined. dmb thinks these concepts cash out to the same thing, but I don't see how that works. What I think would help me most would be to understand what the past conditional "could" refers to in this context. "Could" if only _what_ were true? ... I just can't make sense of "could have acted differently" without a "could if _what_ were true?"



dmb says:
I think you've muddled and confused things quite badly here, Steve. There are two basic ideas here, two basic questions. The first sticking point, sadly and very frustratingly, is simply finding agreement as to the meaning of the central term, namely "free will". This is why I keep quoting the dictionary. Whatever position you might care to adopt with regard to free will, and there have been many different positions in the history of the debate, you simply can't get started unless and until there is agreement as to what you're even talking about. To say that Pirsig's re-formulation of freedom is something other than a re-formulation of free will is to confuse the basic meaning of the term "free will" with some particular position with respect to the idea of free will. In that sense, the dictionary definition (above) of free will and the introductory descriptions of free will found in the encyclopedia are NEUTRAL. To put this in terms of your question, Steve, this basic definition does not include any conditions or qualifications because those will narrow the basic concept in one direction or another. At that point you're no longer talking about the basic meaning of the term, you're staking out a position on the issue and otherwise making a case for a particular sort of free will or denying free will with a particular kind of determinism.

If Parfit is asking about the conditions of "could have acted differently", then he is asking for the conditions of "the ability to act at one's discretion" (as my dictionary puts it) or the conditions that allow "one's behavior" to be free (as Pirsig puts it.) I think it's abundantly obvious that Parfit, Pirsig and the dictionary are all in agreement as to the basic meaning of free will. One is neutral and the other two have very different views about it but they are all talking about the same thing; a person's ability to act freely, as opposed to not being able to act freely. It's like any other debate. An empiricist doesn't have to be a rationalist in order to debate rationalism. He simply has to understand the meaning of the term, regardless of the position he takes toward it and regardless of the specific form of rationalism held by his rival. The subtle details of the debate can come out only if they first agree on the basic terms. Otherwise, they aren't really even on the same topic and the result will be a steamy, hot mess. 

Then it's simple. Free will is simply the ability to act without the constraints of fate or necessity. In the MOQ, this freedom is construed as the capacity to perceive and follow Dynamic Quality. You say this is not the same as free will, Steve, and yet you also confess that you don't know what it means to follow DQ, that you don't understand why the MOQ's freedom is a matter of perception. How is it possible to conclude that I've slipped something inappropriate into this formulation if you don't understand this formulation? 

You could have acted differently if you weren't controlled by static patterns. You have free will to the extent that you follow DQ, which means to the extent that you're attuned to and engaged with the concrete particulars of your own experience. That's the particular sort of free will you get in the MOQ. It is some kind of capacity to act freely so that it agrees with the dictionaries and encyclopedia and yet it doesn't destroy science or morality, as the traditional dilemma construed it. That the problem solved by this compatabilist reformulation. Pirsig gets rid of causality without doing any damage to science and he saves science without destroying moral responsibility. And of course we want both!