[MD] "Could have acted differently" v. "the extent to which we perceive DQ"

[Ham Priday]

Hi Steve and All --

On Sat., 9/10/2011 at 3:01 PM, "Steven Peterson" <peterson.steve at gmail.com> 
said to dmb:

> In the recent past you called that minimalist view of free will
> (that we can do what we want, we choose based on our values)
> merely "value determinism."  I keep saying that that is all that
> we need for moral responsibility (that morally responsibility
> only depends on the fact that we do what we want rather than
> on the separate question of whether or not what we want is
> causally determined). ...

My compliments, Steve!  This is the most intelligent statement on the 
subject of Free Will that I have seen here since mid-April.

What we want is indeed based on our values.  Our response to Value is not a 
"choice" but a preference.  Therefore, it is WE who determine our own wants, 
desires and choices, and it is WE who are held accountable for the morality 
of our value-based actions.  Human beings are value-sensible creatures.  No 
extracorporeal condition or restriction -- biological, social, intellectual, 
or causal -- is necessary for the individual's exercise of Free Will.

That, I submit, is the very purpose of the cognizant agent in an amoral 
universe.

Valuistically speaking,
Ham