[MD] "Could have acted differently" v. "the extent to which we perceive DQ"

david buchanan dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Sun Sep 11 07:25:26 PDT 2011


dmb said:
Please notice that Steve has characterized my position as exactly the opposite of what I plainly and explicitly said. If anyone knows how to communicate effectively with someone like that, please step up and show me how because I don't see how it can be done.



Steve replied:
Is this your way of saying that you've changed your mind, and you now see Parfit as having given sufficient support for moral responsibility?


dmb says: 

No, I'm saying that you have distorted and misconstrued things so badly and the result is a failure to communicate. Since I have said nothing at all about Parfit or moral responsibility, your reply is just one more piece of evidence of this conceptual distortion.


Steve continued:
...You now see "I could have acted differently if I had wanted to" as free will _even if_ "what I want" is causally determined? That still counts as free will in your book?

dmb says:
No, the idea that causally determined act count as free will is probably one of the stupidest things I ever heard. Free will is exactly NOT a causally determined will. And, on top of that, causality does not even factor into the sort of free will I'm talking about because the MOQ takes causality out of the equation altogether and replaces with preferences. (That's why Parfit's causal determinism is irrelevant.) 


Steve continued:
If someone says, "I am free to choose whatever I want, but what I want is causally determined," that counts as free will to you?


dmb says:
No, as a matter of fact, I think anyone who says that does not understand the meaning of the terms "free" and "determined". The person who says that is using the terms improperly or he doesn't mind making a fool of himself. It's a blatant contradiction. It's like saying I'm a married bachelor. That claim can be defeated by any dictionary and it should play no part in an intelligent conversation. 


Steve said:
Are you sure there is no "something extra" that you need to add to "the ability to do you you want" to count as sufficient for free will in your view? No "something extra" you insist on adding???

dmb says:
Nope. I never asked for something extra. Quite the opposite, in fact. It was YOU who kept talking about the will to will and wanting our wants and all I ever did was ask about this weird redundancy. I keep insisting that there's NO good reason for this extra stuff and "free will" just means a will that is not determined. 


Steve said:
Ok, then what was all that business about "value determinism"?



dmb says:

"Value determinism" is the label I applied to YOUR incoherent position. It's incoherent because you're adding the causal determinism of Harris and Parfit to the MOQ's reformulation. Adding these together is a conceptual train wreck. There is no possible way that move could ever make sense. 




 		 	   		  


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