[MD] Moral Responsibility

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Craig,

> [Derek Parfit]
> "For some act
> of ours to be wrong, because we ought to have acted differently, it
> must be true that we could have acted differently.  But the relevant
> sense of ‘could’ is the hypothetical, motivational sense.  And this
> sense of ‘could’ is compatible with determinism.  Even if our acts are
> causally determined, we could have the kind of freedom morality
> requires." To clarify, "...for it to be relevantly true that we could
> have acted differently, it need only be true that we would have acted
> differently if we had wanted to, and had chosen to do so. We can call
> this the hypothetical, motivational sense of ‘could’.  This sense of
> ‘could’ is compatible with determinism.  You could have helped the
> blind man cross the street in the sense that you would have done so if
> you had chosen to do so.  It is irrelevant whether, given your actual
> desires and other mental states, it was causally inevitable that you
> did not choose to act in this way."

Craig:
> Parfit's argument shows only that a "causally inevitable" act can be
> morally wrong, not that the actor is morally responsible for the act.

Steve:
What does "morally responsible" mean to you?