[MD] "Could have acted differently" v. "the extent to, which we perceive DQ"

Andre Broersen andrebroersen at gmail.com
Tue Sep 13 03:14:26 PDT 2011


 From Lila's Child:

Hugo: "In my view, "free will" is a term that can only be used of 
self-conscious (self reflective) creatures. "Will" is a term we may use 
of any organism- of any autonomous entity- describing the goal involved 
in autonomy. And "free will" is the ability to change that goal; the 
ability of the autonomous entity to chose between more than one 
predetermined (as for that entity) goal" (p 216)

Pirsig's response:"Traditionally, this is the meaning of free will. But 
the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing 
freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels. At the lowest 
inorganic level, the freedom is so small that it can be said that nature 
follows laws but the quantum theory shows that within the laws the 
freedom is still there..." (Annotn 75)

Andre:
The same can be said of the freedom existing at the organic level(Law of 
the Jungle) the social level (the Law) and the intellectual level ( 
'...nearly complete choice, e.g. what I believe to be true) and to 
complete freedom at the Dynamic 'Code of Art' level. (Anthony's PhD, p 137)

It seems to me that Pirsig has 're-contextualized' the expression of 
freedom or the will to be free in terms of preference and probability. 
In this way one can argue that "The MOQ puts an end to this ancient 
freewill vs. determinism controversy by showing that both preference and 
probability are subsets of value..."(ibid)

On p222 of Lila's Child, Bodvar asks: "If the world is composed of 
values, then who is doing the valuing?

Let me re-phrase this and place it in this debate: to what extent is 
_our_ behavior free/determined? Do we have '_individual_' freedom?(this 
is Ham's catch cry) or as Steve (to Arlo) would put it:"... but I wonder 
if you'd agree with me that in your second way of understanding free 
will as a useful or not useful concept, it no longer makes much sense to 
wonder if _we_ _have_ it.".

Pirsig's response to Bodvar: "This is a subtle slip back into 
subject-object thinking. Values have bee converted to a kind of object 
in this sentence, and then the question is asked, "If values are an 
object,then where is the subject?" The answer is found in the MOQ 
sentence,"It is not Lila who has values, it is values that have 
Lila."Both the subject and the object are patterns of value."( Annotn 76).

To further clarify:
"It's important to remember that both science and Eastern religions 
regard "the individual" as an empty concept. It is literally a figure of 
speech. If you start assigning concrete reality to it, you will find 
yourself in a philosophic quandary".( Annotn 77)

"There isn't any 'man' independent of the patterns. Man is the patterns.
This fictitious 'man' has many synonyms; 'mankind', 'people', 'the 
public' and even such pronouns as 'I', 'he', and 'they'. Our language is 
so organized around them and they are so convenient to use it is 
impossible to get rid of them. There is really no need to. Like 
'substance' they can be used as long as it is remembered that they are 
terms for collections of patterns and not some independent primary 
reality of their own". (LILA, p158) (Sorry Ham)

The freewill vs determinism debate can better be restated in terms of 
preference and probability (which, as Pirsig says, are subsets of 
value). This makes much more sense, also from an evolutionary 
perspective where "...Pirsig's particular perception of the universe's 
evolution [is seen] as being primarily an evolution of values...". ( 
Anthony's PhD p 87)

This process is the interplay/struggle of preferences and probabilities 
as laid out in the MOQ. In other words: DQ/sq. It is the dance of 'Lila'.

Imho.









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