[MD] "Could have acted differently" v. "the extent to which we, perceive DQ"

Andre Broersen andrebroersen at gmail.com
Tue Sep 13 11:12:14 PDT 2011


Steve:
Nice job digging up those quotes and tying them together.

dmb:
Thanks, Andre. Nice work, as usual.

Andre:
Thank you Steve and dmb for your kind words in response to my last post. 
I had hoped however that it would clarify some issues and perhaps (one 
could only hope) that it would 'settle' the seemingly months long debate 
between you two but...it seems not. Excuse my own intellectual 
shortcomings but I am confused.

At some stage in the debate, very early on, I had thrown in the idea 
that Lila is after something:
"Biologically she's fine, socially she's pretty far down the scale, 
intellectually [as an intellectual] she is nowhere. But 
Dynamically...Ah! That's the one to watch. There is something 
ferociously Dynamic going on with her. All that aggression, that tough 
talk, those strange bewildered eyes."

The way I interpret this (and correct me if I'm wrong) is that Lila, 
from the biological point of view struggles to follow Dynamic Quality. 
She knows she's 'over the hill'. She wants some sort of social 
recognition/security. In this way she is acting morally, what I would 
term responsibly.

Place this in the context of the evolutionary value continuum, the 
struggle between preference and probability (Lila's stay with Phaedrus 
but eventual return to Rigel)"As such, it's apparent that this 'value' 
continuum (of freedom) stretches between largely determined sub-atomic 
particles to complete artistic freedom. This is important 
(metaphysically) as this continuum facilitates, in a largely 
deterministic physical world, a notion of moral responsibility and a 
considerable intellectual freedom for an individual regarding aesthetic 
decisions."( Anthony's PhD, P 137).

So what is a morally responsible action then?

Given Pirsig's moral framework as the static levels being the 
fundamental grounding of moral organization, moral action (i.e. to act 
morally responsible) is simply 'one where a higher level takes 
precedence over the lower one (e.g. where the social takes precedence 
over the inorganic [ or in Lila's case where her social patterns take 
over from her biological/organic patterns] while an immoral action is 
one where a lower evolutionary level of reality takes precedence over a 
higher one (e.g. where the biological level takes precedence over the 
intellectual)." (ibid pp 93-4)

Lila's patterns act morally because she wants to 'become part of' a 
higher level of quality, the social level. But why did she blow it, in 
Pirsig's way of thinking, given the surname he's given her?

I think this is so because the MOQ posits that the evolutionary process 
is a process where all static patterns of value are moving towards 
Dynamic Quality. "Lila, individually, herself, is in an evolutionary 
battle against the static patterns of her own life"(LILA, p 367)

Can we still speak of determinism or free will here?

Of course I argue No. Preferences and probabilities. Will Lila go all 
the way towards DQ? No. That is why she blew it. "She wasn't ready to 
emerge from her static patterns. She was still locked into them"( AHP 
tape 4). And from within that level her patterns would be socially 
'determined' or rather 'dominated'.

Was Lila's action somehow 'caused'. Are preferences 'caused'? Could she 
have acted differently? Yes and no. Thing is that from Lila's point of 
view this was probably the best (!) she could manage. Is her social path 
therefore 'determined? Yes and no. That depends on what happens. The 
answer to this is left open, but we can guess...as Phaedrus does.

Lila was free to the extent that she followed DQ. She attemps to 
'migrate' from the biologically 'determined' level to higher up: the 
socially 'determined' level.

My confusion comes in when the debate still involves 'causation' and 
'determinism' because somehow Lila 'could have acted differently'.

Let me use a different example which may sound silly but I hope it gets 
my confusion across. The would be sage following DQ. He is after 
'enlightenment. She is after DQ. Could s/he have acted differently?  The 
sage would say, to make my pursuit successful I HAVE TO weaken/reject my 
links with the biological, social and intellectual static levels. I MUST 
reject them because I WANT to follow DQ.

Is the life of the would be sage, the person who seeks DQ/ Enlightenment 
predetermined by expressing this preference? Are these values caught in 
spiral of causation/determinism? I somehow get the feeling that this is 
still playing in the debate.

Am I wrong or is my confusion unfounded?






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