[MD] "Could have acted differently" v. "the extent to which we, perceive DQ"

[Ham Priday]

Dan, Ron, DMB, Steve, Andre, Marsha, Mark, All --

I have the distinction of being on the "ignore list" of someone you know who 
derides me for saying that the MoQ is incomprehensible.  So I thought it 
would be interesting to wander through the week's posts on Free Will and 
Determinism to see just how you folks "comprehend" it.

Here's a random sampling:

[Ron on 9/7]:
> Experience is illusion. Therefore all wisdom is illusional.
> Quality is illusion, every last bit.

[DMB on 9/10]:
> You could have acted differently if you weren't controlled by
> static patterns.  You have free will to the extent that you follow DQ,
> which means to the extent that you're attuned to and engaged with
> the concrete particulars of your own experience. That's the particular
> sort of free will you get in the MOQ.

[Steve on 9/11]:
> If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the individual
> "making choices" is a figure of speech about a figure of speech.
> At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that the
> individual possesses or does not possess "free will."  We literally are
> our value choices.

[Andre on 9/13]:
> There isn't any 'man' independent of the patterns.  Man is the patterns.
> This fictitious 'man' has many synonyms; 'mankind', 'people', 'the public'
> and even such pronouns as 'I', 'he', and 'they'. Our language is so
> organized around them and they are so convenient to use it is
> impossible to get rid of them.

[Mark on 9/15]:
> All evidence points to the presence of a sensible agent as Ham calls it.
> To deny that is to put your head in the sand!

[Marsha on 9/15]:
> I deny the existence of an independent, autonomous self.  The
> "self" is a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and
> impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and
> intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality.

[Mark on 9/16]:
> If everything is ever changing, then what is static?
> Why did Pirsig use that specific word?

[Steve on 9/16]:
> The problem with this definition is that the MOQ agrees that "our
> actions are not REALLY chosen by us" since "us" doesn't have any
> REAL metaphysical status. Lila doesn't REALLY have the patterns,
> the patterns have Lila.

[Dan and Ron on 9/16]:
> Dan:
> As long as there are preferences, there are desires. As long as there
> are desires, Dynamic Quality cannot emerge.
>
> Ron:
> One must add that what allows DQ to "emerge" in our lives lies in
> the kinds of preferences we make. One prefers to eliminate desires
> because one prefers betterness.

[Dmb on 9/16]:
> As I see it, the debate has always been about what views the MOQ
> does and does not support. We aren't talking about anything so fancy
> as the ultimate truth, whatever that is, we are simply talking about what
> Pirsig means. That is something we can determine with a reasonable
> amount of certainty, especially if we have a record of explicit statements
> from the author. ...Look, Steve, this guy named Hugo said what you
> have been saying about "will" and "free will" and Pirsig shot him down.
> Bang, you're dead.  Checkmate.  It's over. Why can't you see that?

Perfectly comprehensible, right?

--Ham