[MD] Nagarjuna and the MOQ

[Ham Priday]

Dear Marsha --

Since you went to the trouble of quoting generously from Ant's doctoral 
thesis, I thought it might provide a useful reference for squaring some of 
my differences and agreements with the Quality thesis.  In this way you, 
Arlo, and others may see that I am not here to condemn the MoQ, nor am I 
"totally antagonistic" toward Pirsig's tenets.

-------------

"This formulation is a tool towards understanding concepts such as the 
not-self (or anatta) doctrine that is not handled particularly well by 
binary logic. So, as with every static value pattern, the notion of the 
‘self’ in Buddhist philosophy is not simply considered an ‘illusion’ or an 
entity (as claimed by some Christian understandings of the ‘soul’) with an 
inherent self-existence.

     "That is, everything exists by being related to everything else 
(‘dependent co-
   origination’ is the usual term), but does not exist by itself. There is 
no way to
   state this in a way that conforms to Aristotelian logic. Hence the need 
for the
   logic of contradictory identity. The self exists by negating itself, as 
Nishida puts
    it. So, the phrase ‘the self is an illusion’ is just as much an error in 
Buddhist
   philosophy as ‘the self exists’. The traditional Buddhist formulation is 
the
   tetralemma:

                                          One cannot say that the self 
exists.
                                    One cannot say that the self does not 
exist.
                              One cannot say that self both exists and does 
not exist.
                         One cannot say that the self neither exists nor 
does not exist.
                                                            (Roberts, 2004)"

-------------

Except for the Tetralemma (which exploits contradiction for poetic purposes) 
and the notion of self-negation (only Essence can negate itself), I have no 
problem with this analysis of Buddhist ontology.  I particularly like the 
first sentence: "everything exists by being related to everything else 
(‘dependent co-origination is the usual term), but does not exist by 
itself."  Indeed, existence is the relational mode of being in which finite 
things and temporal events are presented to the self for evaluation and 
cognitive (logical) interpretation.

As for "the existence/non-existence of self" paradox, this can be resolved 
simply by recognizing that, unlike objects and events which constitute the 
phenomena of experience, selfness is the conscious locus of what exists. 
That is why the self is designated as the 'subject' of existence rather than 
as an 'existent' per se.  For the sake of clarity, I use the term 
"sensibility" to describe the conscious self and "phenomena" to define the 
physical objects of its experience.

-------------

"Though he doesn’t knowingly employ the logic of the tetralemma, Pirsig does 
share numerous ontological beliefs with Buddhist philosophy such as 
Nagarjuna’s (c.300a, p.251) perception that the unconditioned (or Dynamic) 
is the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static):

     In their ultimate nature things are devoid of conditionedness and 
contingency
   belongs to this level. This very truth is revealed by also saying that 
all things
   ultimately enter the indeterminate dharma or that within the heart of 
every
   conditioned entity (as its core, as its true essence, as its very real 
nature) there is
   the indeterminate dharma. While the one expresses the transcendence of 
the
   ultimate reality, the other speaks of its immanence. The one says that 
the
   ultimate reality is not an entity apart and wholly removed from the 
determinate,
   but is the real nature of the determinate itself.
                                                           (Cooper,2002)

     (McWatt, A Critical Analysis of Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of 
Quality,pp.55-56)

-------------

Although these two pages deal specifically with Nagarjuna's ontology, I 
assume the Cooper excerpt was included to demonstrate its metaphysical 
parallel or commonality with Pirsig's philosophy.  If so, what Cooper 
describes as "the ultimate nature of things" represents Pirsig's Dynamic 
Quality, while "conditionedness and contingency" are the experienced aspects 
of static quality.

I was pleased to note Cooper's choice of words in describing the 
"indeterminate dharma" which expresses the transcendence of ULTIMATE 
REALITY.  "As its core, as its true ESSENCE, as its very real nature there 
is the indeterminate dharma" [which] "speaks of its immanence."  He goes on 
to explain that "the one ...is not an entity apart and wholly removed from 
the determinate, but is the real nature of the determinate itself."  This 
is, in fact, the fundamental  fundamental premise of Essentialism. 
Unfortunately, it is missing (possibly hidden?) in Pirsig's exposition.

Thanks for this opportuity, Marsha.  I hope I have not misconstrued the 
metaphysics that Ant (and Cooper) outlined above.

Essentially speaking,
Ham