[MD] Metaphysical Baggage

[david buchanan]

dmb said to Steve:
If the dictionary defines one term as the opposite of the other and you use those terms as if they were equal to each other, for example, then you have misused the terms. You do that a lot.


Steve replied:
If someone says "free will is the extent to which we follow DQ," and the dictionary says something different, is this "improper use"? If the dictionary says that determinism/free will is about external versus internal causes for human action, and if the MOQ starts with an entirely different picture of the situation, is using these terms not "improper use" by your own definition?

dmb says:
As I already explained several times, you are conflating two different things. There is the meaning of term "free will" and then there is taking a particular position with respect to that term. The MOQ takes a position on our capacity to make choices and act freely and that's just what the term means regardless of whether you're denying it, endorsing it or qualifying it. Whatever else you want to say about it, you first have to agree what "it" is that you're talking about. 



dmb said to Steve:
To say that indeterminism is a form of determinism is very like like saying cold is a form of hot. It's like saying up is a form of down.


Steve:
Only in the sense that "hot" is just "cold" with some hot in it. As I explained and justified with quotes, James's "indeterminism" is just determinism with some randomness thrown in. It does not mean "free will." It is just what most post quantum mechanics folks today mean by determinism in the free will/determinism debate. 

dmb says:
Thanks, that's a perfect example. That's exactly the kind of confusing nonsense I'm talking about. To say that "hot" is just "cold" with some "hot" in it. It's silly sophistry. It's drivel. It's a transparently ridiculous attempt to deny the obvious. The meaning of those terms is defined in relation to each other so that "cold" MEANS that it is not "hot" and vice versa. We also have terms like "warm" and "cool" to express the fact that the temperature isn't so extreme, of course. These terms mean what they mean in relation to each other, they used to define each other. If you want to talk about the temperature, no matter what you want to say about the temperature, you have to use these terms properly. If you use "hot" when you are talking about the temperature of "ice" and "snow", then you'll never be able to say anything worth hearing about temperature. If you do that, then the only thing you're going to convince anyone of is that you've got some kind of short-circuit between the ears. 

And how could post quantum mechanics have anything to do with what James was saying? That's wildly anachronistic AND, more importantly, you are totally misconstruing what James actually said. He was obviously NOT presenting indeterminism as a form of determinism at all. They are opposed terms with opposite meanings. They mean what they mean by virtue of NOT being the other, like hot and cold. James explains exactly why he has to use "chance" instead of "freedom" and the reason is that determinists were abusing the term "freedom" by applying it to their determinism. He dismisses terms like "free-will determinism" as coming out of a "quagmire of evasion" and that's exactly what I'm saying about you and your use of these terms. He's saying - in relatively polite Victorian terms - that his opponents have created a big mess in their effort to weasel out of the moral implications of their determinism. This is exactly what you have done. The fact that you're quoting this at me is way too rich with irony. To defend your thinking by saying that "hot is just cold with some hot in it" shows very clearly what a "quagmire of evasion" looks like. 

Steve said:Otherwise, if we think of indeterminism and determinism as mutually exclusive and exhaustive we would have to think of free will itself as a form of determinism (i.e., determined by internal rather than external causes)...

dmb says:
That is hair-brained nonsense. Free will is defined in opposition to determinism. If it is determined by anything, whether it be causal, internal or external, then you can not rightly call it free will. On top of that, the MOQ's position on free will is not going to be qualified in terms of causes or in terms of what is external or internal. 


Steven Pinker:
...a random event does not fit the concept of free will any more than a lawful one does, and could not serve as the long-sought locus of moral responsibility.

dmb says:
Right. Exactly. Random chance doesn't fit the concept of free will any better than causal determinism does and without free will there can be no moral responsibility. Pinker is affirming the logical connection between freedom and morality, a connection that should be obvious to anyone. Russell makes the same obvious point, one you have denied many times - for no apparent reason.


Paul Russell:
 ...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it. In other words, if our actions are caused, then we cannot be responsible for them; if they are not caused, we cannot be responsible for them. Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.

dmb says:
Yep, as long as the issue is framed around randomness and causality you can't have moral responsibility. The ideas of freedom and responsibility do not fit with either them. They would both preclude human agency. But in the MOQ, there is no such framing. A chosen act isn't a random act or a caused act. Choice is denied either way.

dmb said:
If the dictionary says free will is the ability to make choices but you say making choices has nothing to do with freewill, then you are misusing the terms "free will" and "choice". You do that a lot.



Steve repled:
As I have said many times, both free will and determinism acknowledge the fact that we make choices. The traditional dilemma is about whether choices are only somewhat or completely determined by external factors.

dmb says:
There you go again. I suppose that what you really means to say - or what you should be saying - is that determinism acknowledges that we SEEM to make choices, but they say that appearance is an illusion because we are in fact determined whether we see past that illusion or not. The dilemma here is that one has to give up scientific laws in order to have moral responsibility or you have to give up morality and freedom to save science. 
You second sentence commits the same sin. It makes no sense to ask if our choice are determined or not. If you can rightly call it a "choice" then, by definition, it was NOT determined. What you're probably trying to say is that the traditional dilemma is about whether or not our acts are determined or chosen, caused or free, random or responsible.  You've only offered two little sentences there but both of them are tangled and confused and you're offering nonsense ideas that are very badly put. 
If Pirsig's conception of free will or human agency is framed outside of causality and scientific laws, does it make any sense to push back with Einstein's belief that "god does not play dice". Doesn't such a move just re-assert the old framing under causality and scientific laws? Yes, of course it does. Stephen Hawking rejects free will for the same sort of scientific reasons. Turning to the physicalists and the reductionist to defend your thinking on the issue obviously and blatantly re-asserts the very thing Pirsig rejects in his reformulation. It's no better than quoting theologians on the soul in order to defend the "one" whose behavior is both free and controlled to some extent. It's like quoting the Pope to defend atheism. It just shows that you're fundamentally mixed up.