[MD] Indeterminism

david buchanan dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Thu Sep 22 09:23:52 PDT 2011


Steve said to dmb:
I could very well be wrong about what James means by "chance," and I appreciate you bringing James scholars into the conversation. But perhaps you can be forgiving and understand why I might have interpreted James to mean chance when he uses the word "chance" and put this usage up against your "proper use of the terms" attacks.

dmb says:
There is nothing mysterious about James's use of these terms. He tells us how he is using the terms and why he has selected those terms. James was a true artist, a master of the language who coined all kinds of terms. People used to joke that he was a better writer than his brother Henry, the novelist. And since YOU brought James's essay to the table AND I've explained his usage of "chance" several times already (at least four times), I find it very difficult to understanding why you don't understand. Do you generally "forgive" people for doing things that they are still doing? That would be premature, at best.  



Steve said:
Can you please explain in your own words in terms that, with hope, even I can under stand what James's two-stage model of free will is? I can't see how denying determinism in favor of indeterminism is at all helpful in making room for free will.

dmb says:
At this point it seems unreasonable to hope that you can understand. You read the essay. You brought it to the table. And now you're admitting that you don't understand what James is saying?!? In poker, bluffing is a normal part of the game. In a conversation, however, it's totally inappropriate. Even further, the particular point that baffles you should be perfectly clear to anyone who understands the meaning of the terms "determinism" and "free will". You're asking how the denial of determinism is helpful in making room for free will?!? Are you really that lost? Do you really not understand that determinism leaves no room for freedom, that it denies any such freedom? After all this time, apparently, you're still confused about all the basic concepts involved in this issue. Your thickness is just incredible. It's unbelievable.


Steve said: 
Do you see his two-stage model of free will as related to Pirsig's formulation of freedom?

dmb says:
Their views align pretty well if we compare Pirsig to James's latter views, but the essay you brought was written before his pragmatism and radical empiricism were explicitly developed. At that point, they agree that freedom and restraint are both real empirical realities. In that sense, they are both compatibilists. Under determinism these restraining elements are total so that there is NO freedom to act whatsoever but under compatibilism these restraining elements give you a stable platform in which freedom can be exercised. In fact, Dennet is one of those who basically follows James to some extent.  Like I said, James's indeterminism simply refutes the assertion that everything is determined. It means, "There are undetermined alternatives FOLLOWED by adequately determined choices." Two stages: first free, then will.


Steve replied:
So the choices actually ARE determined after all? Is this an issue of choices being determined by one thing that is good rather than another thing that is bad? Internal versus external determination?


dmb says:

Wow. You are totally lost. Again, determinism says we have no choice, that our acts are determined by mechanical laws and therefore they are not chosen. In order for there to be choices, there first has to be undetermined alternative possibilities. To assert freedom, you have to deny determinism. If your act is determined by your choice, then you aren't just being pushed around by mechanical laws, which can be conceived as external if you're a causal determinist or internal if you're a neurological determinist. Either way, you are denying that our acts are the result of choice. If you say that our actions are determined or decided by choice, then you are denying determinism. You might have reasons for making that choice, but reasons are not "causes" in the sense of law-like cause and effect. You're also equating "determined by choice" with "determinism", which totally denies that we can make choices. Once again, you have equated positions that are opposite from each other. (At this point, I'm only responding for the benefit of those who might be following our conversation but I have no hope of convincing you, Steve. Like I said, you've already been defeated in about five different ways. The fact that you're too lost to see this doesn't really matter to me anymore.)


dmb quoted Doyle:
... "James was the first to overcome the standard two-part argument against free will, i.e., that the will is either determined or random. James gave it elements of both, to establish freedom but preserve responsibility."



Steve replied:
Again, I can't see why saying that the will is part determined and part random can add up to a sort of freedom worth wanting. Why did he think he needed to first deny determinism to assert "determined choice by the will"? How are we to think this will determines choices? If it chooses on some basis, then we have somewhere deeper than the will to look for determining factors. If it chooses on no basis whatsoever, then all we have is meaningless opting that is indistinguishable from randomness.



dmb says:

You are such an unbelievable hack. If you want to assert freedom, you have to deny determinism. Determinism says you are not responsible for your actions precisely because they were not determined by you, because you were not free to do otherwise. All you questions and objections are predicated on your inability to grasp the basic meaning of concepts in dispute. You equate opposed terms and then wonder why it doesn't add up. Of course it's not going to make any sense if you do that. One cannot reason or think intelligently unless and until you get that straight. Get a dictionary. Take some reading lessons. Until you get ahold of these concepts, talking to you is utterly futile. 

See, I told you it was foolish to try again.







 		 	   		  


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