[MD] Indeterminism

[MarshaV]

Ian, 

What is this WE?  How do WE get anything right or wrong?  


Marsha





On Sep 23, 2011, at 4:31 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:

> Steve,
> 
> Saying our free-will is "part random" is not the same as saying it's "by its
> very nature unpredictable" is it ! By its very nature it's free will, ...
> but ...
> 
> It's just honest to recognise that our will is subject to chance too - and
> it's beneficial two ways - we can take account of the unpredictability in
> our willed choices and actions, through guesses, percentages, margins for
> error, plan-B fallbacks, etc  - AND - when we get it wrong we learn
> something from what we didn't expect, and evolve our will.
> 
> Not complicated.
> Ian
> 
> On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 5:02 PM, Steven Peterson
> <peterson.steve at gmail.com>wrote:
> 
>> Hi Ian,
>> 
>> Ian:
>>> For example Steve,
>>> 
>>> You said here
>>> I can't see why saying that the will is part determined and part random
>> can
>>> add up to a sort of freedom worth wanting.
>>> 
>>> I however, can't see any other kind.
>> 
>> 
>> Steve:
>> What I am asking is what is gained as freedom by saying that the will
>> is part random? What is gained by positing that our will by its very
>> nature is unpredictable even to ourselves? Why would you see that as a
>> good thing? I can see freedom in increasing our power to predict so we
>> can make better and more meaningful choices. Why would
>> _unpredictablity_ be something in which to take comfort?
>> 
>> 
>> Ian:
>>> It would be nice (but scary) if I was omnipotent, but a pretty
>> unrealistic
>>> expectation - It would be equally depressing if chance determined
>>> everything, despite my will.
>>> 
>>> ie I'm not particularly agreeing with you and disagreeing with dmb, I
>> simply
>>> can't see the point of your (your as in you) disagreement.
>> 
>> Steve:
>> The point in this thread I think is to discuss James's essay on
>> indeterminism. My point is that I don't think his argument gets us
>> anywhere.
>> 
>> Personally, if the terms free will and determinism are worth keeping
>> at all, then I would think of them as compatible intellectual
>> patterns.
>> 
>> I explained my position to Jan Anders recently. Unfortunely. I get the
>> impression that you'll read it and then say "yeah, but what is your
>> POINT?" But here it is anyway...
>> 
>> I see determinism and free will as terms that have strong association
>> with theories about the way things really are and are attempts to
>> distinguish certain experiences as either real or illusory. In the MOQ
>> experience is reality, so we ought not be worried about such questions
>> as do people REALLY make choices or do they only SEEM to?
>> 
>> If we drop the appearance/reality metaphysical baggage from both free
>> will and determinism, we are left with free will as the fact that we
>> make choices and an entirely compatible notion of determinism which
>> just says that everything "depends." We can always look deeper and
>> deeper for more and more patterns of dependency between actions, but
>> whatever we learn about such relationships between experiences is no
>> threat to the fact that choices are made all the time.
>> 
>> That's "compatiblism." It is not the idea that we have SOME free will
>> but we are also SOMEWHAT controlled. Compatiblism says that free will
>> and determinism are both true. It says that the serpent of causation
>> is thus over everything. By this I mean that if you go looking for
>> explanations in terms of causes, there is no necessary point at which
>> we must stop and say "this is or that, say, 'the will,' is the _final_
>> cause"). But at the same time, though everything can be thought of as
>> having a cause, "everything" is a collection of value choices. (Notice
>> that I did _not_ say that everything only ever pought to be thought of
>> in terms of causes. This is analogous to the Matt K pragmatic version
>> of materialism as "everything _can_ have a material description," as
>> opposed to the metaphysical version, "everything only ever ought to be
>> described in material terms because those are the terms the universe
>> demands we use to talk about it.")
>> 
>> Choices are part of experience, and so are intellectual explanations
>> for choices in terms of causation (understood in the MOQ as patterns
>> of preferences). Explaining a choice is not to explain it away. It is
>> still a choice even if we can give reasons for it. In fact, if we
>> can't give reasons for our choices, or even go so far as to say that
>> there _are_ no reasons for them--if _that_ is what we mean by free
>> will--then those choices would be just random. That wouldn't be the
>> sort of freedom that anyone would want anyway.
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