[MD] Indeterminism

[Ham Priday]

Steve, dmb, and All --

On Mon. 9/26/11 at 8:27 AM, "Steven Peterson" <peterson.steve at gmail.com> 
wrote:

> Hi dmb,
>
> A pragmaticized version of free will is simply to say that we make
> choices, and a pragmaticized version of determinism is just "it
> depends." Then compatiblism is just the position that "choices
> depend." If you jump all over that claim with your usual claim that
> that means that we aren't really in control, you are trying to pull me
> back into an SOM appearance-reality conundrum about what
> in this picture is REALLY real--whether causality makes choice
> a mere illusion. That's a game we pragmatists aren't playing.
>
> dmb:
> The resistences felt in experience are the real thing and causality -
> not to mention substance- is a metaphysical posit that is supposed
> to explain that empirical fact. And it's not that causal explanations
> make our choices illusory. That idea works if you're talking about
> billiard balls or rocket science. The problem is using causality to
> deny human freedom, which is exactly what the causal determinist
> does.  And it's no accident that both our favorite pragmatists -
> James, Dewey and Pirsig - all reject this idea because, pragmatically
> speaking, that is one of the worst ideas in the history of ideas.

Indeterminism is just a sophisticated term for "whatever happens, happens," 
which, when you think about it, is really Fatalism.  Compatilibilism, on the 
other hand, is the idea that without a cause-and-effect universe your 
freedom to choose would be meaningless.

I'm running a 2003 interview by Reason magazine's science editor with Daniel 
Dennett on my Values Page this week.  The interview was a promotion for the 
atheist philosopher's book 'Freedom Evolves' which was published that year. 
In it, Dennett defends his concept of Compatilibilism with these statements, 
culled from the interview . . .

"To have freedom, you need the capacity to make reliable judgments about 
what's going to happen next, so you can base your action on it.  Imagine 
that you've got to cross a field and there's lightning about.  If it's 
deterministic, then there's some hope of knowing when the lightning's going 
to strike.  You can get information in advance, and then you can time your 
run.  That's much better than having to rely on a completely random process. 
If it's random, you're at the mercy of it.

"A more telling example is when people worry about genetic determinism, 
which they completely don't understand.  If the effect of our genes on our 
likely history of disease were chaotic, let alone random, that would mean 
that there'd be nothing we could do about it.  Nothing.  It would be like 
Russian roulette.  You would just sit and wait.  But if there are reliable 
patterns-if there's a degree of determinism-then we can take steps to 
protect ourselves.

[In answer to the interviewer's question: "Would a deterministic world mean 
that, say, the assassination of John F. Kennedy was going to happen ever 
since the Big Bang?]

"Going to happen" is a very misleading phrase.  Say somebody throws a 
baseball at your head and you see it.  That baseball was "going to" hit you 
until you saw it and ducked, and then it didn't hit you, even though it was 
"going to."  In that sense of "going to," Kennedy's assassination was by no 
means going to happen.  There were no trajectories which guaranteed that it 
was going to happen independently of what people might have done about it. 
If he had overslept or if somebody else had done this or that, then it 
wouldn't have happened the way it did.  People confuse determinism with 
fatalism.  They're two completely different notions.

"Fatalism is the idea that something's going to happen no matter what you 
do.  Determinism is the idea that what you do depends.  What happens depends 
on what you do, what you do depends on what you know, what you know depends 
on what you're caused to know, and so forth - but still, what you do 
matters.  There's a big difference between that and fatalism.  Fatalism is 
determinism with you left out."

Now, a question for you MoQers who reject the subjective Self:
Is Fatalism DQ's deterministic "movement to betterness" with you left out?

I suggest you consider your answer carefully.  Thanks, folks.

In support of Individual Freedom,
Ham