[MD] Indeterminism

[Ham Priday]

Back to you, Mark --


> Hi Ham,
> Compatibilism?  In your opinion, where does free will begin and
> where does it end?  Think carefully and reductionally about this
> before answering.
>
> And, of course the self exists otherwise MoQ or Buddhism
> would not work.  That is the conclusion of free will at all levels.

I ask a question and you return with another one.  That's a new dialectical 
twist, isn't it, Mark?  But at least we agree on the "reality" of the self.

You are asking me to define the limits of free will.  I could respond by 
saying that, since it is experience that brings being into existence, will 
has NO limit.  But that would be stretching what you mean by "free will". 
And it's Freedom that really is in question here.

So let me start, as experience starts, with the precept of a pluralistic 
otherness whose components emerge and relate in an orderly fashion according 
to what we are told are the Laws of Nature.  The physical parameters of this 
objective otherness--the energy, mass, and forces by which its constituents 
function--are intrinsic to the differentiation of its source.  By this, I 
mean that the (absolute) source doesn't just fragment randomly into so many 
finite entities, but instead negates ("excludes") some of its Sensibility to 
create a self/other dichotomy.  This dichotomy establishes the primary 
Difference from which the value-sensible agent and its experience of 
differentiated otherness are derived.

So much for my cosmology.  Now, to answer your question, I would say that 
Free Will begins with the free agent's realization of Value within this 
co-dependent relationship.  It ends when the sensible agent has reclaimed 
the full complement of Value from which it had been estranged as an 
individuated self.  In epistemological terms, this means that one's 
apperception, understanding, knowledge, appreciation, sense of meaning, and 
moral judgment of experiential reality are all manifested expressions of 
Free Will.  More explicitly, the "qualitative" aspects of the physical world 
are actualized--I would even venture to say "determined" in this context--by 
the will of the individual subject.

I'm aware that my epistemology invokes "volition" and "intention", along 
with the "actions" or behavior typically associated with Free Will.  But, as 
I stated in a post on Moral Responsibility two weeks ago, "We all have the 
freedom to act (or not act) within the limitations of our physical being. 
Volitional acts are motivated by one's sense of value.  Whether a particular 
action is moral or not is determined by both the actor's value system and 
the mores of his/her society."

Hopefully, this valuistic analysis will not be viewed as another "Ham 
attack" on Pirsig's Quality thesis.  As you can see, Value (Quality) factors 
prominently in my philosophy of Essence.  Where I differ with Pirsig 
involves a metaphysical issue.  He posits Quality as the fundamental reality 
of experience, while explaining away subjects and objects.  I maintain that 
sensible subjects are necessary for the free realization of Value in 
objective existence, but that Absolute Essence, not Dynamic Quality, is the 
fundamental Reality.

Have I been "reductive" enough in answering your question, Mark?  If so, you 
still owe me a response to my question: Is the MoQ a deterministic 
philosophy?

Essentially yours,
Ham