[MD] Tuukka's letter to Robert Pirsig

[craigerb at comcast.net]

[Tuukka]
> In this case, the error can be found in the materialist's assumption, 
> that he is speaking of the same thing as the idealist.

Berkeley says the rock is a mental object.
Samuel Johnson kicks the rock.
Did Johnson kick a mental object?
Berkeley says "Yes"; Johnson says "No".
Are they talking about the same object?
Yes, the rock.  No, a mental object v. a physical object. 
In the above scenario, where is relativizably/nonrelativizably involved? 

[Tuukka]
> If the materialist did not make that assumption, but instead, perceived himself 
> as only mindlessly repeating concepts used by the idealist, his behavior 
> might be a bit silly, but he would not be making a logical error.

I'm not certain one can "perceive oneself as only mindlessly repeating concepts".
As soon as one "perceives oneself repeating concepts", it is no longer "mindless"
(though one may "perceive oneself mindlessly repeating words", i.e., using words
without regard to their meaning.  Is this what you mean?) 


[Tuukka]
> I am fairly certain, that when small children begin learning language, 
> they initially use predicates nonrelativizably. This is not yet a 
> logical error. As their grasp of language improves, they intuitively 
> relativize predicates to each other. By doing so, they obtain the 
> ability to form a static network of interrelated dialectical truths. But 
> this network makes it possible for them to use predicates 
> nonrelativizably with the erroneous assumption that they have 
> relativized those predicates to the dialectical truths they already have.

Language acquisition:
Step 1: use predicates nonrelativizably.
Step 2: relativize predicates to each other.
Step 3: form a static network of interrelated dialectical truths.
Step 4: use predicates nonrelativizably with the erroneous assumption that
those predicates have been relativized to the dialectical truths [static network
of interrelated dialectical truths].
Do you have an example where our learning language goes through these steps?

[Tuukka]
> The problem of induction has been broken down to two constituent problems,
> one of which could be called the problem of relevance. In the problem of relevance,
> we suppose our original objective is to arrive at true and/or rational predictions, 
> and we are to deem the conclusions of inductive arguments true, if they 
> are relevant for achieving that objective, and false, if they are not.

Before I consider the problem of induction, what is the other of its constituent problems?
Craig