[MD] Awareness and consciousness in the MOQ

[118]

Hi Arlo,
I will do my best to answer with my opinions.  You can take them with
a grain of salt.

On 4/9/12, Arlo Bensinger <ajb102 at psu.edu> wrote:
> Ant/Mark,
>
> Greetings. Since some of this touches on ideas I am interested in, I am
> interjecting a few comments/questions.
>
> [Mark]
> This whole concept of "faith" is also one that tends towards
> distortion.  People have faith in science as well, to the point where
> they believe what scientists tell them.
>
> [Arlo]
> Is there anything we believe that, in your view, is not faith-based? If
> "science" is a religion, is there anything you could offer that is not a
> religion?  (I assume your argument is not that 'science' can become a
> religion for some, but that science is always and everywhere a religion.)

Mark: Here we try to separate "belief" from "faith".  "Belief" would
be something that we continually need to justify, whereas "faith" we
do not.  Therefore, I have faith that the sun will rise tomorrow and
never have to think about it.  I also have faith that my body will
continue to breath.  If I only "believed" in the continuity of breath,
I would be an extreme hypochondriac always resorting to doctors to
bolster my belief.  If one needs to go to church for "faith", it is
instead "belief".

We have science, which is done when one puts his hand in the shower to
see if it is hot enough.  Then there is Scientism which is a religion.
 Scientism is not based on direct experience, but on reading from a
book.  This is no different from biblical reading.  That policies are
made based on such book readings in order to control human behavior is
not different from the inquisitions of old.
>
> [Mark]
> People have faith in science as well, to the point where they believe
> what scientists tell them.
>
> [Arlo]
> Peirce formulated four distinct processes by which we "fix" belief. The
> first he called 'tenacity', the stubborn clinging to a belief because we
> want or otherwise 'need' it to be true. The second he called
> 'authority', that is we derive our belief from what others tell us to be
> true. The third he called 'a priori', which is like contemplative
> reflection, where we sit and rationally try to reach that which is
> 'true'. And finally, scientific methodology, which he held as a process
> of direct experimentation (I don't think I need to explain the
> methodology to you).
>
> Personally, I think we often 'fix' our beliefs by a range of these
> methods. I've never been to the moon, or personally conducted
> experiments to inquire into the makeup of the earth's core, so the
> beliefs I hold on these are unavoidably (to some extent)
> authority-derived. Of course, we select 'authority' along a similar
> spectrum from tenacity to science-methodology (I'd argue), and that
> creates an added component to this.
>
> My question is, you seem to indicate above that 'faith' is a function of
> 'authority' (and possibly tenacity) based fixing processes. If faith
> underscores them all, do you see any value distinction among them (or
> any other belief-categorizations, not necessarily Peirce), and if so how
> does that relate to 'faith'? In other words, if tenacity/authority/a
> priori/scientific methodology are all equally and fundamentally
> faith-based, how would you (or even, do you) differentiate among them
> with regards to value?

I have no problem with the manner in which Pierce uses his scalpel.
You are correct that my statement about people and faith is a bit
construed.  As I explained above, faith is never questioned.  Until
perhaps a crisis is upon one.  Therefore in terms of authoritative
abuses, there are those who utilize this faith in science towards
their own ends.  This is no different from the church controlling the
faithful, and must be seen for what it is.  Scientism is a bewitchment
of our day and age.

What you term the "scientific method" is no more than trial/error and
learning.  We do it every day.  This method has been elaborated and
extrapolated to bring great good (and bad) to humanity.  But there is
nothing special about it.  We add salt to taste.  Adding salt is the
experiment, taste is gathering the data.

I would say, in answer to your question, that faith is a result not an
underlying premise.  We certainly have faith that knowledge derived
from direct experience is real (otherwise we would be considered
insane).  However I am not sure this can be turned around and stated
that faith is the bedrock of everything we are.  This would make the
concept of faith useless (and perhaps this is also what you are
saying).

In terms of Value, we tend to divide it up into little values.  This
is the same thing we do with Quality, that is dividing it up into
little qualities.  In fact, this world of appearances is simply those
qualities that we have differentiated.  Therefore the whole thing is
Quality.  I would put the three principles in the following order of
importance: Tenacity>science>authority.  I am using tenacity in the
positive sense of Will.  As you know, I cannot stand authority, but it
is sometimes necessary.
>
> [Ant]
> Though Pirsig doesn’t like to interchange the words (because the former
> term has a lot of distortive, traditional connotations from established
> religions), “God” can be used as a synonym for “Dynamic Quality”.
>
> [Arlo]
> I think Pirsig uses the term "Godhead" in ZMM explicitly in one passage.
> And his substitution exercise regarding the Tao Te Ching enforces this
> idea. My question is, apart from the 'traditional connotations of
> established religions', what would be the value of using 'God' instead
> of 'Dynamic Quality'?

I would simply say that by doing so, we get a better understanding of
what others think of in terms of God.  This is tricky since we do not
want to succumb to the dogmatic religions.  However, when reading many
texts that deal with the subject of God, and converting that term to
DQ, we can learn from the past.  Doesn't work all the time though.  I
prefer DQ to God.
>
> We use specific words to reference or 'mean' certain things. We mostly
> adopt different words when at least some slight or differential
> implication of that term has important value we are trying to
> foreground. If we insist of using 'God', and say we are dropping all
> that other stuff, then why use 'God' instead at all? Why not, as Pirsig
> suggests, simply drop the term entirely? What is the 'value-add' of
> saying 'God' rather than 'Quality'?

The term God has been abused.  Gone is the original intent of the
term, and it is replaced with some kind of dogmatic religion's "man
with a beard".  Again, I would see the value added when we try to
interpret older texts (such as the Gnostic Gospels) and think in terms
of Quality.  It is hard to drop a term which is the basis for many
metaphysical arguments, and mystical thoughts.  We cannot erase the
past, nor should be attempting to rewrite history.  It would seem to
be closed minded to disregard any writings that use such a term
because of personal prejudice.  Having said that, I do not believe it
appropriate to use the term God as part of MoQ except where we can
draw similarities in terms.
>
> [Ant]
> That's a difficult issue as the MOQ is just going to be incompatible on
> some level with other philosophies and belief systems.
>
> [Arlo]
> This is a problem I have with the literary technique of saying "the
> MOQ". I think this has come to, fundamentally, mean different things to
> different people. I see some using it as analogous to "Pirsig says" (as
> Pirsig implies in describing this technique) and others using it as
> something independent of what Pirsig wrote, of which Pirsig was simply
> trying to describe, and may be right or wrong about.
>
> Think about it this way, if I ask "Can Pirsig be wrong about the MOQ?",
> how would you interpret that? Do you see it as "Can Pirsig be wrong
> about Pirsig?" or "Can Pirsig be wrong about how he's described the MOQ,
> which exists as something for him to describe?"
>
> Are Pirsig's writings "the MOQ" or are they simply a description (one of
> possibly many) of "the MOQ"? This is not to argue that fields of inquiry
> do not, or should not, or can not, evolve. They most certainly do
> (whether we want them to or not). But, as the theory evolves, do we
> argue that competing views are about 'which MOQ is the one-true MOQ', or
> that 'my ideas are better than your ideas'?
>
> In other words, if we broadly consider "the MOQ" akin to a categorical
> label such as 'pragmatism' or 'existentialism', then we can come down
> and talk about more specific variants such as Jame's Pragmatism or
> Kierkegaard's Existentialism. We could talk about Pirsig's MOQ and
> Arlo's MOQ, under an umbrella of core-similarities that does not deny
> variance.
>
> Or do we talk about 'the MOQ' as as single belief structure, akin to
> saying that the only valid expression of pragmatism is James', and all
> others are either 'wrong' or 'not pragmatism'? In this case, we would be
> arguing for the validity of calling our beliefs "The MOQ" while variance
> would be treated as 'not The MOQ'.

In answer to that, I would say the following:  A metaphysics is an
objectification of a subjective awareness.  It must be objectified so
that it can be exchanged in discussion.  Therefore, MoQ is a thing
which imparts a "no thing".  I would see MoQ more as a trend.  It has
direction and guidance.  One hundred years from now it may appear
different, but it is still about Quality.

Any belief structure is simply a landscape.  How one travels that
landscape is different from everyone.  Since we like to talk about
these things we point out different scenes from the landscape.  This
MoQ landscape is very different from the hellish landscape that would
would find in a Bosch painting.
>
> Going back to your question, if I rephrase it as "That's a difficult
> issue as Pirsig's ideas are just going to be incompatible on some level
> with other philosophies and belief systems", that sounds almost banal in
> its truism, no? But if the MOQ is something Pirsig merely described
> (sometimes correctly and sometimes incorrectly), then you can't really
> make this claim, as the argument would be that incompatibility could be
> seen as simply the current interpreter of the MOQ interpretting
> incorrectly. In other words, it would not be that the MOQ is
> incompatible with 'existentialism', but that Pirsig misinterpretted the
> MOQ to describe it as such, and a 'correct' interpretation of the MOQ
> could relieve this incompatibility. No?

In my opinion, much more can be achieved through harmonization.  All
philosophies and belief systems are the same thing, the difference
lies in the words used to express these systems.  We get caught up in
the words used, and think we are talking about completely different
things.  As I see it, bringing other belief systems into the
vernacular of MoQ is doable.  There is no need to create
incompatibilities.

Of course MoQ belongs to Pirsig, he made it up.  However, by
distributing it, he relinquished control over how it would evolve from
personal pressures.  This is not to say that it does not have some
fundamental ground which Pirsig is working from.  We all stand on that
fundamental ground.
>
Thanks for the opportunity Arlo,

Mark>
>
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