[MD] Awareness and consciousness in the MOQ

[Arlo Bensinger]

[Arlo asked]
Can Pirsig be wrong about the MOQ?

[Craig]
Consider 3 different points of reference: a) inconsistencies b) logical 
consequences c) undecidables

[Arlo]
Hi Craig. Note that I didn't ask "Can Pirsig be wrong?", the question I 
asked is a fulcrum point whose answer is based is on how you define the 
term "the MOQ".

If you interpret "the MOQ" as "Pirsig's ideas", then asking "Can Pirsig 
be wrong about Pirsig's ideas?" is a ridiculous question (note, again, 
this does not read "Can Pirsig's ideas be wrong?", which is a valid 
question.)

If you interpret "the MOQ" as "that which Pirsig was trying to 
describe", then asking "Can Pirsig be wrong about the MOQ?" puts "the 
MOQ" as the observable, or describable, 'thing', and Pirsig's words were 
his attempt to describe this.

As I see it, the 'thing' Pirsig described is Quality. His description is 
"the MOQ". I can say his description is wrong, to be sure, I wouldn't 
say "he described the Metaphysics of Quality incorrectly", I'd say "he 
described Quality incorrectly". Do you see the difference?

By making "the MOQ" not the description but the thing-being-described 
itself, one changes the entire game. It, in effect, conflates 'Quality' 
with 'the Metaphysics of Quality'.

Also, as Ant suggests, of course, there are many 'metaphysics of 
Quality', including 'SOM', and Pirsig's metaphysics is one of many 
possible "metaphysics of Quality". The textual marking of this has been 
to capitalize 'metaphysics' when we are speaking directly of Pirsig's 
ideas (again, as Ant pointed out), so we would say "The Metaphysics of 
Quality is Pirsig's metaphysics of Quality", which is cumbersome but 
accurate. Although Peirce changed the word slightly, this is the same as 
saying "Pragmaticism is Peirce's pragmatism".

Let me quickly address your points.

[Craig]
a) What if Pirsig says 2 inconsistent things about the MoQ?

[Arlo]
This is worded wrong. It should read "what if Pirsig says two 
inconsistent things in his MOQ".  As is, it translates "What if Pirsig 
says two inconsistent things about Pirsig's ideas?" Do you see the 
difference? You are making "the MOQ" the thing-being-described rather 
than "the MOQ" being the description itself (of Quality). You answer to 
this "Then either the Pirsig's view embraces inconsistencies or Pirsig 
has changed his mind" address the latter.

Indeed, if we substitute the word "description" for "metaphysics", this 
is pretty visible. It makes his ideas "a description of The Description 
of Quality". Your question (a) becomes "What if Pirsig's description of 
Quality says two inconsistent things about the Description of Quality". 
Instead, I think its much more coherent to ask "What if Pirsig says in 
his MOQ two inconsistent things about Quality?"

[Craig]
b) What if one draws a logical consequence of what they take Pirsig's 
view to be, but Pirsig himself didn't draw that same consequence?  If 
instead Pirsig denies that consequence, then the two don't have the same 
understanding.

[Arlo]
Right, we have two opposing "descriptions of Quality". We have Pirsig's 
description, and we have the other person's description. I'm not sure 
what is problematic here, it is perfectly coherent to say "Pirsig's MOQ 
and Arlo's MOQ vary on Point A".

The problem arises if the description becomes the thing-described. Then 
the conflict becomes not over two competing descriptions, but who is 
describing the description correctly.

[Craig]
c) What if there is a statement that is relevant to the MoQ, but neither 
follows from Pirsig's views nor is denied by them?

[Arlo]
That reads "What if there is a statement that is relevant to Pirsig's 
description, but neither follows from Pirsig's description nor is denied 
by them". Certainly, this is how fields of though evolve. Peirce, a 
student of James, felt that the ideas of pragmatism should be expanded, 
and he attempted to do so. Others are now expanding from Peirce's ideas. 
In other words, what you are bringing to the table as 'relevant' does 
not alter Pirsig's description, it creates a new description (yours).

The underlying question you seem to be asking is do these ideas that are 
added become "the MOQ". Again, this is decided by how you define "the 
MOQ". To me, they are YOUR ideas and any way you extend Pirsig's ideas 
are no longer Pirsig's ideas but your own. And someone will one day 
extend your ideas.

So I'd rephrase the question, "What if there is a statement that is 
relevant to a metaphysics of Quality (or a Quality-based metaphysics), 
but neither follows from Pirsig's views (The Metaphysics of Quality) nor 
is denied by them?" Perfectly coherent question.