[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[Ant McWatt]

Tuukka stated April 13th 2012:

My project, SOQ, is not an LS project. It's the project of me and a 

friend of mine. It obviously cannot compete with the ordinary, 

non-formal way of discussing the MOQ, because the language is too 

technical. By virtue of its approach, it's no more and no less the true 

MOQ than what you're used to. The MOQ may be expressed with English, 

Finnish, Chinese et cetera, so it may also be expressed with formal 

language.

 

But maybe my work isn't needed. If I'm really going wrong here, could 

you solve these two problems for me, and set me on the right track?

 

http://www.moq.fi/sets-of-quality/introduction/IInconsistent-Usage-of-Subjectivity

http://www.moq.fi/sets-of-quality/introduction/IIncluding-Mathematics-in-the-Intellectual-Level



Ant McWatt comments: 


Tuukka,

I’ve had a look at the first problem that you mention here (and also in your post from today). 


You said:

“If logos (objective quality) is like a tree, and mythos (subjective 

quality) is like a little shrub the tree once was, objective quality 

should emerge from subjective quality. But later, Pirsig published the 

SODV paper, in which he makes a contrary statement: that subjective 

quality (social, intellectual) emerges from objective quality 

(inorganic, biological).”


Ant comments:

The logos and mythos are both intellectual static patterns.  In the MOQ of LILA, they are therefore both “subjective” in the ontological sense.  And it is this ontological sense of mind & matter; subject & object that Pirsig uses post-LILA (e.g. in the Copleston Annotations and the SODV paper) when talking about relating SOM to the MOQ.  By the way, its usage was only introduced in the 1995  “Einstein Magritte” Conference so the audience (largely unfamiliar with Pirsig’s work) could get a better handle on what he was saying.  For anyone already familiar with LILA, it’s really not necessary (or even ideal) to use this correlation between the four levels of static value patterns with SOM's ideas of mind and matter.

The logos is only “objective” in the epistemological sense of the term (as Pirsig states in ZMM:  The term logos, the root word of “logic,” refers to the sum total of our rational understanding of the world).  


Tuukka stated April 19th 2012:

‘In his commentary on Frederick Copleston (http://robertpirsig.org/Copleston.htm)
Pirsig uses the SODV interpretation in the first paragraph: "In the MOQ
the term, "objective," is reserved for inorganic and biological
patterns and cannot include "idealism." But later in the same text,
he says: "Objective reality is the most valued intellectual construction."’


Ant comments:

Firstly, it's worth keeping in mind that when you see above sentence in context, 
you see Pirsig is using Copleston’s terminology i.e. in the relevant section:

Copleston states: “For the world of ordinary experience is interpreted as a mental
construction out of discrete impressions; and we have no way of knowing that
the construction represents objective reality at all.”

Then Pirsig comments: “Objective reality is the most valued intellectual construction.”

And it becomes apparent from these two sentences that Pirsig is therefore talking about 
“objective reality” here in the epistemological sense of the term i.e. the best idea 
we can have to operate in the world effectively is to presume reality is largely independent 
from our control rather than a solipsistic figment of our imagination.

In other words, you have conflated Pirsig's distinct epistemological and ontological uses of
the terms “subjects” and “objects” and confused yourself!  This is a good example of why I 
said to you before that it’s usually better to avoid SOM terminology all together when talking 
about the MOQ.  It use nearly always leads to a metaphysical mess.

Hopefully, someone else can deal with the second problem (re: mathematics and empirical 
science) that you mention and so "set you on the right track"!

Best wishes,

Ant



.