[MD] [Tuukka] the object of philosophy

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Ron,

> Tuukka,
>   I am truly sorry for mispelling your name. You are the first Tuukka I've ever met.

Tuukka:
No problem. People do that every now and then. I didn't bother to point 
it out this time, because I thought you'd eventually notice.

> Ron:
> I thought you would benefit from these quotes.
>
> Wittgenstein in his tractatus logico:
> "The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.
> A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of
> `philosophical propositions,' but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit
> sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred''.


Tuukka:
Like I said on "A problem with the MOQ.", the SOQ is not a closed system 
of logic. It is not a logical tautology, because although the existence 
of romantic quality can be perceived, it cannot be logically proven. If 
romantic quality did not exist, the SOQ would be false, and that's why 
it's not a purely formal theory which only contains abstract 
propositions that have no relation to experience.

Earlier, we discussed nonrelativizably used predicates. Proposition 5.6 
of Tractatus is relevant in that context.



"5.61

Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, 
that there is not.

For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain 
possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must 
get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these 
limits from the other side also.

What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what 
we cannot think.


5.62

This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is 
a truth.

In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, 
but it shows itself.

That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of 
the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world.


5.63

I am the world. (The microcosm.)


5.64

Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure 
realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there 
remains the reality co-ordinated with it."



The I in solipsism is a nonrelativizably used predicate, and that's what 
Wittgenstein is trying to say, albeit with informal language.


>   Ron:
> "The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. Given the syntax of language, the meaning of
> a sentence is determined as soon as the meaning of the component words is known. In order that a certain
> sentence should assert a certain fact there must, however the language may be constructed, be something in
> common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most
> fundamental thesis of Mr Wittgenstein's theory. That which has to be in common between the sentence and
> the fact cannot, he contends, be itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said,
> for whatever we may say will still need to have the same structure."
> -Bertram Russel (foreword)


Tuukka:
Yes. I am already aware of this, and require no reminders, but of course 
it's good to check that I know the basics. I hope it is not 
inappropriate that I cite my own work:

"Formal language is classic quality, not romantic quality. It cannot 
express the assumption, that a certain symbol corresponds to a certain 
romantic quality, let alone provide a proof for a theorem, according to 
which it does.

[...]

The assertion, that the SOQ is a metaphysical theory, is contingent — 
that is, it can be either true or false. The SOQ cannot have 
metaphysical content, if romantic quality is an empty set, because that 
would mean its formalisms do not correspond with anything people 
actually experience. The SOQ also has no metaphysical content, if 
romantic quality cannot be divided to subsets, as that would mean 
dividing romantic quality into patterns is just a theoretical 
fabrication, which cannot actually happen. Consequently, the classic 
levels would not correspond to actual experience in the way they are 
intended to.

Neither of these necessary conditions for the truth of the SOQ can be 
proven or disproven, but both can be considred cogent. If romantic 
quality were an empty set, we would, for example, be blind and have no 
emotions. If romantic quality could not be divided to subsets, we could 
not tell the difference between hearing and seeing, or needs and emotions.

However, humans are not necessarily able to perceive infinitely many 
forms of romantic quality. Therefore, even though we can use the formal 
SOQ to define a very high romantic pattern, humans are not necessarily 
able to experience that pattern, but only process it as a theoretical 
construct. It is possible that some organisms are already unable to 
experience certain forms of romantic quality in the SOQ so that (4,4)C*. 
For example, it seems difficult to argue that rabbits would understand 
metaphysics, or that ants would understand mathematics."


* (4,4)C is the denotation for my standard formulation of SOQ. Many 
others are possible - they will have a different amount of patterns.

Best regards,
Tuukka