[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[craigerb at comcast.net]

[Tuukka]
> Predicates can be determined to be 
> used relativizably or nonrelativizably. A nonrelativizably used 
> predicate is used as if it were to not belong to any particular theory. 
> For example, let us form a concept, whose intension is: “a number whose 
> successor is 0″.

> If the predicate “a number whose successor is 0″ is used relativizably, 
> its usage is such, that in some way or the other, it’s clear to us, in 
> what context should we place it. If the context is the theory of natural 
> numbers, we determine the predicate to have an empty extension, because 
> that theory does not contain negative numbers. But if the context is the 
> theory of integers, we determine the extension of the predicate to be 
> the number -1.

> However, if the predicate is used nonrelativizably, we do not know, 
> which theory should be used as context. As a result, we might end up 
> making one argument as if “a number whose successor is 0″ refers to -1, 
> and another argument as if “a number whose successor is 0″ refers to 
> nothing, and treat them as if they were to belong to the same theory. 
> Consequently, we might argue that theory to be inconsistent, even if it 
> weren’t.

A much better example than the predicate 'problem of induction' or
'everything that exists'.
 
[Tuukka]
> If a nonrelativizably used predicate is introduced to a theory, the 
> result is superficially similar to that theory being inconsistent. But 
> on a closer look, something different takes place.

> In an inconsistent theory, the statement “The Moon is made of cheese” is 
> both true and false...

But see
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-relevance/
for a different view.
Craig