[MD] Tweaking the emergence

Tuukka Virtaperko mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Tue Feb 28 18:37:43 PST 2012


Mark,

> Mark:
> In my opinion as a scientist, science is as much a metaphysics as MoQ.

Tuukka:
Any form of science is a primitive form of metaphysics. For example, 
Physics is a primitive form of the MOQ, which focuses, or intends to 
focus, only on inorganic quality. But what I'm saying is this:

1. Metaphysics, in order to be useful, has to be broader in the scope of 
subject matter than any empirical or normative theory.

2. Scientific theories are subordinate to metaphysics, because 
metaphysics is used to define, what is true. Metaphysical statements are 
not true of false in and of themselves. But within a certain 
metaphysical context, scientific statements can be deemed true or false. 
In order to evaluate, whether a metaphysical theory is true, we would 
need a "meta-metaphysics", which would defeat the purpose of having 
metaphysics in the first place. Do you see where I'm going at?


> Mark:
>   For it gives us a paradigm from which to understand reality.  The
> reality of science is no more real than the reality of MoQ.

Tuukka:
The reality of science is less real than the MOQ. I am only using 
science to fine-tune an attribute of the MOQ. Pirsig couldn't have 
written LILA unless Darwin had invented the theory of evolution, yet 
that theory is science, not metaphysics. At least it is not 
metaphysically impressive in any other way than providing an alternative 
for creationism. That is a significant feat, but that happened 200 years 
ago. The metaphysical merits of the theory of evolution are now taken 
for granted at large. Therefore, that theory is mostly interesting just 
as a subset of the MOQ concerning the biological level. See? Evolution 
is a metaphysical theory, but its scope is much smaller than that of the 
MOQ.

> Mark: I am not
> sure how you would consider science to be outside the realm of
> metaphysics.

Tuukka:
I never said that nor believed so. If I did, it was a mistake. Science 
is subordinate to metaphysics. Did I really say something stupid like 
that earlier?

> Mark: I operate in such a realm every day, and believe me it
> is a metaphysics.  Are you perhaps speaking of a layman who thinks
> that science is somehow more than that?  It's function is to provide a
> structure of "what is", which is no different to MoQ.  Since you are
> not a scientist, I cannot think that you really know what you are
> talking about.  Don't you think that we try to put things together in
> a reasonable way?  Isn't this what MoQ does?  Please explain to me the
> differences between science and MoQ, besides that one has been worked
> on by many in this modern world.
>
>
>> Tuukka:
>> Ugh... what do you mean? "Quality" is not equivalent to "these levels"?
>> "These levels" are not a subset of Quality? What the hell... I know what
>> you mean, but it can't be said. Don't try to say it (just advice).
> Mark:
> Of course it can be said, Quality can be presented in any number of
> ways.  And indeed it has.  Just look at the Tao Te Ching, the Buddhist
> philosophy, the Hermetic philosophy.

Tuukka:
Sure, theoretically. But how are these presentations relevant to what 
I'm doing right now? I mean, I take that Eastern philosophical approach 
already for granted - the theoretical approach to speaking of Quality. 
But I don't know what the word Quality is intended to specifically mean 
in the context of this conversation. The very message of those 
aforementioned works of Eastern philosophy is, that Quality is a figure 
of speech (Diamond Sutra chpt. 30). It has no defined meaning. That's 
what Pirsig says, too.

This means I don't understand what you mean by saying Quality is not 
equivalent to these levels. I thought you should have said, that Quality 
neither is equivalent nor is not equivalent to these levels.

> Mark: Ask
> yourself why Zen was part of the title of Pirsig's first book.  Ask
> yourself why Pirsig saw Tao and Quality as being the same thing.  The
> levels are simply a paradigm.  My other advice is for you not to get
> too rigid with these levels, they will only lead you astray in your
> understanding of Quality, imo.

Tuukka:
I don't know what it means to have problems understanding Quality. And 
I'm fine with that. Problems understanding the MOQ are another thing. 
You are speaking to me as if I were someone I don't, personally, even know.

My levels are much less rigid than Pirsig's. Pirsig's failure to express 
them as formulae is not such a bad thing, because had he been too 
precise, LS would not have formed, and maybe MD would also be inactive, 
with MOQ being studied in the academy, instead - or even forgotten, 
because it never appeared in a best selling novel.

But why are you discussing the MOQ, if you don't want to know more about 
it? How could you know more if you insist on all knowledge being vague, 
so that you can't tell the difference between one thing and another? I'm 
not trying to tell the mutual differences between all things. I'm only 
trying to increase the amount of differences we can tell.

I don't even know what is "all things". Of course "all things are 
Quality", but what is "Quality"? Does Lila have Quality?


>
>> Tuukka:
>> Ugh... I don't give a damn about how Pirsig saw the world. To be sure,
>> "world" is definitely the only static thing he saw in LILA -- not
>> "reality". If the MOQ has no significance except that of being the
>> opinion of a certain Mr. Pirsig, it's obviously not enough.
> Mark:
> Well, I believe it would be prudent for you to learn from what Pirsig
> experienced first hand.  You only understand Quality as some concepts,
> you have not taken yourself to where it is real at the expense of
> normal reality.  Therefore, it is more than his opinion, it is his
> reality.  Can you say the same thing?  Perhaps you are talking about a
> different kind of quality.  Is this the case?

Tuukka:
I am well aware of what Pirsig experienced. I meant I do not consider 
something interesting just because Pirsig thought so. It also has to be 
a good idea, which makes me want to play with concepts. You see, I don't 
need metaphysics to attain happiness, because I'm already happy. But I 
need to have something to do. And I love playing with concepts and 
logic! I've been doing this for seven (?) years and you wish to 
familiarize me with the basics. :D Nice going... I don't need that kind 
of help, thank you.

What I would like to have is answers to questions and links to useful 
articles such as the one Marsha provided. As a reminder, my aim is to 
provide the MOQ in a format that an academic person would find 
intelligible. I'm doing it because it can be done, and nobody has yet 
done it. You can't know I'm mistaken before you actually study my work, 
which you can do. This is probably something you're already familiar with:

http://www.moq.fi/recursive-patterns/recursive-patterns/

This, on the other hand, is a stub of the English translation of the 
relativizability article, but it doesn't yet have explanations on what 
it has to do with the MOQ.

http://www.todellisuudenomistaja.net/suhteutuvuus-ja-sen-seurauksia/#comment-802

The point of the article is, that DQ is a nonrelativizably used 
predicate, which means it doesn't have a defined meaning. From a logical 
point of view, Pirsig's insistence that reality is sq/DQ seems 
nonsensical at first, because it's hard to figure out what's the logical 
meaning of mentioning DQ in the first place. Make no mistake, it is 
intuitively compelling, but why? What is the beauty we see in that 
statement?

I will argue that the metaphysical statement that reality is sq/DQ 
amounts to a declaration, that there should be, at most, only one 
nonrelativizably used predicate within any given discourse. This is 
because the worst case scenario in having a nonrelativizably used 
predicate in academic text is, that if the truth value of a contingent 
proposition depends on that predicate, the proposition is a 
contradiction. Therefore, Pirsig's metaphysical statement of reality 
consisting of sq/DQ amounts to the declaration, that all 
nonrelativizably used predicates are equivalent. That is, there is only 
one DQ.

It is already well known, that any contradiction is equivalent to any 
other contradiction. But RP uses MOQ to expand that notion in such a 
way, that it is more useful to philosophers. Many philosophical problems 
have remained unsolved for centuries, because the academics researching 
them are stuck trying to define multiple nonrelativizably used 
predicates in terms of each other. They are doing this, because they 
don't have a coherent notion of "nonrelativizability". They'd probably 
do something more useful if they did.

-Tuukka



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