[MD] Being a Pirsigian

[Ian Glendinning]

Hi DMB, Matt, my take is this:

"Cobbling together one's own philosophy" is simply an aspect of
learning. Saying in your own words what it is you believe you now
understand. Whether those statements are "any good" is a pragmatic
question. How original they are depends what other sources you
researched, and what you synthesised with the various gaps and
overlaps you found.

"Being" a Pirsigian is a matter of self-identification (having done
the above exercise)

Not sure I would say truth is central to pragmatism - but that would
just be embarking on another debate on what we mean by truth.

I would however agree totally, that the key to being Pirsigian is DQ -
not just understanding / appreciating it, but it, being it. Almost
every other aspect is some re-working of assorted perennial
philosophies - many a recursive loop.

Ian

On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 5:39 PM, david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> dmb says:
> As I see it, Matt has raised at least three different questions.
> One of them asks if it's kosher to cobble together a philosophy of one's own; to take a little from this and a little from that as ingredients in some unique blend. Sure. Of course you can do that. The only question is whether or not it's any good to anyone else and all that.
> The second question is about the limits of "pragmatism" as a philosophical label. There are at least two major schools (classical and neo) and that debate is going on right now in the academic world. It comes up in this forum, usually, as a clash between (my) William James and (Matt's) Richard Rorty. BUT, I also think that pragmatism is centrally about truth, which is a static and intellectual species of quality, and as such only constitutes something like one quarter of one half of the MOQ.
> And that brings us to the third question. What is so central to the MOQ that one cannot rightly claim to be a Pirsigian without it? Quality, of course. If one doesn't understand or appreciate DQ, (the mystic reality, the primary empirical reality, the source and substance of everything), can one rightly be called a MOQer? No. Of course not. What would be left it we took Quality out of the Metaphysics of Quality? Not much, obviously.
> If you're putting together a philosophy of your own and Pirsig is one of your sources, I think you still have to deal successfully with the second and third questions. I mean, it's quite alright to borrow bits and pieces but you still have to get them right. And it would probably indicate some kind of conceptual error or incoherence if the borrowed pieces were used in the construction of something that's hostile or opposed to the loaner. You know, if you use the pacifist's ideas to defend the cause of war, you're probably abusing his ideas and he's certainly not going to be happy about it even if you didn't distort the borrowed elements (assuming that's possible).
> The idea that Rorty and Pirsig agree about pragmatism isn't exactly crazy. It's plausible. But we know that Pirsig identifies with James in particular and he was prompted to explore the similarity by a Harvard reviewer, which is where James spent most of his intellectual life and is presently home to the William James Society. And of course I recently finished my thesis about the similarities between James and Pirsig. I found absolutely no reason to doubt Pirsig's claim that the MOQ fits into the mainstream of American Pragmatism. The research has totally convinced me that the MOQ fits James's radical empiricism too. But James and Dewey only flirt with Pirsig's central term. Maybe I'd say that even they need a little nudge to rightly be called MOQers. Everything about the MOQ built around DQ and James gets very, very close with his "pure experience". James would be something like the most ideal and excellent introduction to the MOQ. You'd have first down on the five-yard line
>  , but it takes DQ to score. That's what it takes to be a Pirsigian or a MOQer, I think.
>
>
> Matt said to Tuukka:
> (Whether or not this particular heresy gets me thrown out of the Church of Pirsig is something I disagree about with other disciples.  I can't see that Pirsig would throw me out for it.)
>
>
> Matt clarified that statement for everyone:
> ..., I have to clarify--for everyone because of my own history and the history of the MD--that I was not speaking about the MD as an instrument of discussion, but about this nebulous category called "being a Pirsigian."
>
>
> I was, rather, speaking of the prerogative of people who self-identify in a conceptual grouping of some kind to revoke the license of others who also _want_ to identify in that group, but have displayed some kind of activity that the revoker thinks is impermissible for such identification.  Three examples might be, "I'm a Pirsigian," "I'm a pragmatist," and "I'm a Democrat."   If we think of the first two on analogy with the last, we can get an idea of what I mean.  For if a self-identified American Democrat always votes for the Republican party in elections, what kind of Democrat is he?  Say he's a politician and always votes in the direction the Republican party votes--then the Democratic party would likely take steps to revoke his ability to take advantage of things such identification gets him.  ....However, identifying in an intellectual tradition, or as a follower of a certain philosopher, is a lot more nebulous than even this.  There is no determinate authority to kick
>  someone out (and what's the "out" in this case anyways?).  However, the idea is that should a conflict like this arise, the revoker tries to argue that the illegitimate self-identifier shouldn't be taken seriously as a mouthpiece for the group both identify with.  That's how a conceptual group manages itself over time (in very broad outline, and from my own philosophical perspective).
>
>
> So, in my little parenthetical, I was merely making light of the fact that some participants in the MD have made claims that, in these terms I've specified, I should have my charter as a Pirsigian revoked. Dave Buchanan is one, but merely, I think, the most outspoken.  I'm not trying to open the case, but it is rooted in the claim that the parts of Pirsig I show distaste for, if you will, are central to Pirsig's philosophical program in such a way that to not want to defend them would be to abdicate what Pirsig is, centrally, as a philosopher with a philosophical position.  This is a perfectly legitimate claim on Dave's part.  We just disagree over the details (specifically, about what is central to Pirsig).  (It's also part of a larger struggle over the philosophical tradition known as "pragmatism," as Dave wants to follow Pirsig in including Pirsig in it, but also exclude another of my philosophical heroes, Richard Rorty, who self-identifies as a pragmatist, though a large
>  enough sector of pragmatists wish to revoke his charter.)
>
>
> Further, I should own up to the fact that I have a penchant for inflaming this situation with the kind of rhetoric in the parenthetical.  I once, somewhat infamously, wrote that I was, "with heavy heart, relinquishing my place in the sanctuary" in a piece called "Confessions of a Fallen Priest."  As should be plain from the parenthetical, I've changed my mind somewhat.  (Though some would object to the analogy entirely.)  I don't deny that there are things in Pirsig's texts that I'm suspicious of, but I don't think those suspicions are beyond the pale.  "Heresy" is rooted in the Greek word for "choice," and grew out of the notion of "dogma" (the Greek word for "opinion") as it solidified in Catholic theological practice.  So I'd like to own to the fact that I do self-consciously choose what I want and don't want from other people's philosophies for my own, but I'd still like to think that there is a center that I'm not violating in some of them.
>
>
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