[MD] Quality as the fundamental building block of reality

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Mark,

>>> Mark:
>>> This has nothing to do with phenomenology, although it can be used to
>>> explain phenomenology.  Quality generates experience.
>> Tuukka:
>> Okay, but the smell of food is something phenomenology would be about.
>> So how come it has "nothing" to do with phenomenology? Isn't that an
>> exagerration?
>>
>> Basically, you seem to be saying only that besides "being" Quality, the
>> smell of food is also "caused" by Quality. Now, why you want to say so?
> Yes, this is the problem with analogies.  MoQ can branch off into
> phenomenology, so I suppose you are right.  What I was trying to say
> is that MoQ should not be placed within the rubric of phenomenology.
> However, Intention does play a big part.  In a nutshell, we can be
> considered as "Intent".  This would fall along the lines of Toltec
> Wisdom.
>
> Back to the analogy, I was using the smell of food as an example of a
> stimulus.  Consider the following analogy:  After years of studying in
> a Zen temple, a koan comes around at the right time and place, and
> suddenly everything becomes very clear for you.  You become
> enlightened, as it were.  Now this can be considered phenomenology as
> epistemology.  However, instead of asking how did this happen, we ask
> what happened.  What is this clarity?  Something has appeared where
> before there was nothing.  The stimulus was the koan, but what did it
> do?
>
> In the same way, we can say "this is reality", but rather than create
> a mechanism for it, we ask what is it in its entirety?  On presenting
> what it is, we create an ontology.  That ontology then loops back and
> creates more epistemology which becomes a snowball of sorts.  We can
> get there through epistemology and start by asking for causes, or
> fundamental building blocks.  However, there must be a cause which is
> either recursive (as you say), or a cause that is not a cause.  By
> this token, we can state that Quality is actually the removal of
> cause.  From cause removal we get all things.  In this way,
> phenomenology does not apply.
>
> Quality begets Quality.  This is a tough one that I stumble through in
> my explanations.  For although I know it to be valid, the logic is
> somewhat far out.  However, in truth it is not disimilar to Wheeler's
> presentation.  We could also see it as the opening of a lotus without
> end.  I am working on yet another presentation of this, although I
> have dealt with this in the past.
>
> The reason I would say so is to provide a self consistent metaphysics
> which explains all and more.  Just a little hobby of mine while I am
> not saving the world from cancer...:-)
>

Tuukka:

You say: "there must be a cause which is either recursive (as you say), 
or a cause that is not a cause. By this token, we can state that Quality 
is actually the removal of cause. From cause removal we get all things. 
In this way, phenomenology does not apply."

Yeah, well, I agree with what you mean but I don't want to say so except 
in a religious or spiritual ceremony. And I'm dead serious about that. I 
don't want to say that in some mailing list, just like that.

The ontology I'm giving is not like that, because it's static. Yes, it's 
a context-free language, at least in a metaphorical sense - with respect 
to it's structure. But it's still static, no matter how recursive it is. 
And even the definition of undefinability, which I wish to publish soon, 
is static. It's a bunch of formulae and one can read the same thing from 
chapter 30 of the Diamond Sutra in a language that is vastly more vague. 
But it can also be expressed as a bunch of logical formulae.

You say: "However, instead of asking how did this happen, we ask what 
happened. What is this clarity? Something has appeared where before 
there was nothing. The stimulus was the koan, but what did it do?"

I'll cite the book I'm writing. A publisher is already interested.

BEGIN PASTE

3.6 Does the Metaphysics of Quality Account for Classical Ontologies?

If an ontology includes the concept of Dynamic Quality, the scope of the 
ontology is not completely defined. Such an ontology cannot be shown to 
fail to account for something that exists, and thus does not share a 
flaw common to the most notable classical ontologies (eg. materialism, 
idealism... ). Metaphysics of Quality is that kind of an ontology. But 
any reference to something that contains Dynamic Quality is not 
completely defined. Having such a reference would be contrary to the aim 
of conceptually isolating diffuse vagueness to Dynamic Quality. (Earlier 
I argue this is necessary for solving a certain philosophical problem 
that is not related to the MOQ and is millenia old.) Therefore, because 
I believe in the Metaphysics of Quality and don't want a meta-theory, I 
cannot make a correct static reference to the Metaphysics of Quality.

 From now on, I will omit all unnecessary references to the Metaphysics 
of Quality. But in order to maintain the readability of my writing, I 
will refer to a certain tradition of discussion as "the metaphysics of 
quality", without the capitalization.

The metaphysics of quality permits static discourse in general, if all 
undefinability is conceptually isolated as Dynamic Quality, and the 
Metaphysics of Quality is never mentioned. It also allows references to 
other ontologies in the form of Dynamic Quality.

If a materialist wants to refer to mind as the fundamental ontological 
category, he can call it Dynamic Quality. Such a reference cannot be 
determined incorrect, which is an improvement to having an incorrect 
reference. But the reference cannot be determined correct either. That 
would either contradict the assumptions of materialism, or require the 
reference's extension to be empty. In the latter case the extension 
wouldn't be what idealists consider mind as the fundamental ontological 
category.

Within the metaphysics of quality, it's possible to take any classical 
ontology as a static philosophical stance, and it's also possible to 
change that stance while staying within the metaphysics of quality. In 
no instance of the metaphysics of quality can there be something, to 
which it is demonstrably impossible to refer. But some references cannot 
be determined correct or incorrect.

Therefore the metaphysics of quality can account for all the classical 
ontologies. The classical ontologies cannot account for the metaphysics 
of quality, because they do not include Dynamic Quality. This makes 
their scope decisively smaller. As ontological theories, they are not 
only different in content but also in kind.

3.7 Dynamic Quality and the problem of induction

In order to determine, whether a metaphysical theory is true, we would 
need to place it to a context in which it can be verified or refuted. 
But that would only beg the question, for we could then ask, is this 
context true. Consequently, metaphysical theories cannot be true in any 
static meaning of the word. Instead, they can be used to define what we 
mean by truth.

In the future, cognition scientists could perhaps make a detailed 
theoretical model of what happens in the brain, when a person adopts or 
rejects a metaphysical theory. Then the experience of changing a 
metaphysical stance could be referred to as a physical observation. I 
suppose descriptive references to such changes can already be obtained 
within social sciences.

But we are now in the normative realm. Here, no demonstrably correct 
reference to such a change exists, because the change transforms the 
normative reality of the one experiencing it. And if there's no 
demonstrably correct reference to such a change, there are no 
demonstrably correct criteria for determining, what kind of a change is 
desirable. Simply put, there is no demonstrably correct justification 
for a person to use normative rules to determine, which normative rules 
he should be using.

Consequently, using an ontology, which cannot refer to itself, does not 
preclude the possibility of using demonstrably correct rules to 
determine, which ontology should be used. There never was such a 
possibility in the first place. Hence, no useful property of ontology 
appears to be missing when using an ontology, which cannot refer to 
itself. For the practical purposes of having a discussion, ontologies 
can be distinguished from each other by referring to the tradition of 
discussion to which they can be seen to belong.

END OF PASTE

I hope that made sense and was expressed decently.

Basically, I'd say anything a "system builder" (whatever that is. I use 
the expression constantly, though) could be interested of in the MOQ, or 
in any ontology that I know of, would be phenomenology (because the 
phenomena are romantic quality and the -logy is classical quality) and 
normative quality, which includes the definition of undefinability. 
SNIP. AFTER THIS A SYSTEM BUILDER IS NO LONGER INTERESTED. The 
definition of undefinability includes Dynamic Quality. DQ also has a 
recursive relationship with static quality.

I mean, I already got my shit together. I don't need the MOQ to attain 
happiness, because I am already happy, and whatever I use of MOQ is an 
integral part of ME and not something I possess and use as an instrument 
in my attempts of becoming happy. I want to do this system building 
thing and I just honestly don't think I need to contemplate DQ even 
though my life has a lot of it. I just don't believe I need or even can 
give it any special attention by means of conscious effort. So I wanna 
do this fun system building thing. It's fun for me at least!

And no, I haven't said before on MD that I'm writing a book. I told so 
on LS and Skutvik even told me to not write the book despite admitting 
he doesn't understand what the book is about. He seemed to think the 
book was just generally suspicious, and I thought it would be cowardice 
of me to not write the book because of the suspicion of someone who 
doesn't understand what it's about. We were both disrespectful towards 
each other back then but apparently got over it. I guess I liked the 
challenge... I mean, I was so angry at him, but eventually I felt I had 
become stronger than I was when I began.

I was angry because back then I felt my friend in Northern Finland and 
the LS group are the only places in the world where I can talk about 
stuff that interests me and become understood. I mean, the Uni has 
seemed all but worthless for that, and I know a lot of academic people 
considering I'm not one of them myself. So then the "boss of LS" begins 
telling me my book is probably a load of horse dung, or that's how it 
felt. It felt so threatening that I did become very angry. But things 
seemed to turn out fine despite me being a bit upset.

Obviously, I do feel well understood here at MD now. But at LS I got 
that spark of creativity, that the MOQ can be changed, and that the 
things I've dreamt of can be done, and I wouldn't be here now if it 
weren't for LS.

-Tuukka