[MD] Fw: relative.

[Ham Priday]

Evening, Mark --


On Friday, 1/13, at 6:34 PM, "118" <ununoctiums at gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Ham,
> Thanks for the response.  I have a couple of comments below:
>
[Ham, previously]:
>> Because philosophy, especially metaphysics, deals with
>> conceptions and ideas beyond experience, language is critical
>> for the philosopher.  That's why I have always stressed the
>> importance of the concept over words or definitions.  If we
>> let terminology get in the way, its purpose is never achieved.
>> (Which is also probably why Pirsig shunned metaphysics,
>> and why Bo placed so much emphasis on intellection.)
>
[Mark]:
> Yes I will agree with this, Wittgenstein went as far as to propose
> that philosophy IS semantics.  Then I think he realized that he had
> painted himself into a box (my opinion).  As I see it, concepts are
> objects which can be manipulated in meaningful ways.  In this way we
> are still dealing with an objectified world.  The point I was trying
> to make was that language is the result of us seeing the world in a
> certain way, as well as something with perpetuates that seeing.  If
> instead we saw "objects" not as something external, but as something
> projected (we do create objects with our brains), we get a different
> way of seeing.  The quote I provided at the end of that post, did just
> that.  No longer do we see a man riding a horse, but we are the man
> riding the horse.  This form of communication is much more revealing
> than the picture variety, for the riding of the horse is much more
> than just the picture.

A philosopher who uses words to argue that his philosophy is all words, as 
Wittgenstein did, surely puts him in a box of his own making.  I don't 
agree, however, that "concepts are objects" to be manipulated.  Concepts are 
intuitive ideas about reality developed intellectually by reflection on 
one's experience.  Unlike objects, which are universal, conceptions are 
unique to the individual who originates them.  They don't become "universal" 
until they are comprehended and accepted by others.  This, incidentally, is 
the stage at which you and I currently confront each other.

>> I tend to discourage "creative wordplay" as a means of
>> developing a philosophy.  Indeed, if a concept can't stand on
>> its own as a cogent premise, no configuration of words or
>> symbols will correct the inadequacy.  As for the alleged
>> "SO infatuation", I have no wish to "step out and experiment"
>> with semiotic theories which can only distract from the
>> concept I'm articulating.  (You may want to consider this caveat
>> before submitting your long-awaited outline to me.)
>
> I would agree with you.  There is creative word play within a specific
> contextual format.  There is also the possibility of changing the
> contextual format.  That is a very different thing.  But, I can stick
> with your articulation, it brings me to good places.  My long-awaited
> (by you) outline will be in your format.  I have been presenting some
> media leaks in the mean time.  Seems to work in politics.

I'm glad my articulation has brought you "to good places"; let's hope those 
places coincide, or are at least compatible, with the conception I have in 
mind.  For example, on 1/12 you said:

> Indeed, I am arguing against a semantic reality.  I am arguing for
> an experiential reality.  My point was that a language which
> deemphases objects or nouns is much more useful.  An experiential
> reality does not contain objects or subjects, so it is possible to
> get away from SO.  That is all I am saying.  SO is not a done deal
> as you claim.

I don't understand how you can say that experiential reality does not 
contain subjects and objects?  Since it is the subject who experiences the 
appearance of objects, it would seem that you are opposed to experiential 
reality and are arguing (as I am) for a reality that _transcends_ 
experience.  (I assume we are in agreement that these appearances are our 
intellectual objectification of experience.)  Could you kindly explain your 
reasoning here?

Thanks, Mark.

--Ham