[MD] The first cut.

[Ham Priday]

Greetings Joe --

On Tues, 1/24/12 at 3:26 PM, "Joseph Maurer" <jhmau at comcast.net> wrote:

> Hi Horse and All,
>
> There is a difference between a Man and a Woman.  Pirsig suggested
> there is a difference between indefinable reality and definable reality.
> I would suggest that "difference" can be a metaphysical concept.
> Evolution defines existence in levels in reality, not just physical
> differences between male and female.  How many levels in an evolution
> in existence?
>
> Pirsig suggests that DQ, indefinable, like creation, be interpreted
> metaphysically not mathematically.  DQ is indefinable.  For a long time
> I accepted evolution as a difference in kind rather than a difference in
> existence.  Is there an order in existence?  Using male and female as
> foundational concepts which gender is more closely allied to DQ,
> to SQ?  Adam was described as naming things.  Eve ate the apple.
> At least one was more practical for continuing existence than the other.

I'm responding to your post, among numerous others in this thread, because 
your thinking more closely follows my approach to this topic, which is not 
surprising, judging from past discussions we've had.

Yes, Difference is indeed a metaphysical concept.  And I assume the "the 
first cut"
alludes to the initial division or primary difference that defines 
existence.  Unlike you though, Joe, I don't see levels of evolution as 
primary any more than gender is primary.  Levels, degrees, or advancements 
of a particular kind are intellectual conceptions.  Time and space are both 
analyzable as increments that may be conceptualized as levels--"before and 
after", "here and there", for example.

With due respect to RMP and Marsha, his current interpreter, I submit that 
the primary difference by which any definition is possible is that which 
separates Self from Other.  More precisely, "the first cut" is the ability 
to REALIZE difference; for without that division we would be incapable of 
experiencing a relational world.  Note that this metaphysical axiom puts 
experience ahead of the objects defined, which is also consistent with the 
MoQ.

The capacity to define is what I call Sensibility; and because it embraces 
empirical, emotional, and intellectual values, I refer to it as 
"value-sensibility" and consider it the essence of man's selfness.  So that, 
instead of describing Value (i.e., DQ) as something indefinable that we 
"latch onto" as "patterns and levels", I explain experience as the 
objectivization of Value by the sensible "agent" or self.

Thus, if Selfness=Individuated Sensibility, the objects of experience 
(finitude) represent "otherness", or what the sensible agent is _not_.  This 
idea has its parallel in Cusa's theorem that the First Principle (i.e., God) 
is Not-Other.  It offers an epistemology that simplifies conscious awareness 
by avoiding the analytical problems that invariably arise when we try to 
express subjects and objects as a metaphysical construct of undifferentiated 
Quality.

I hope this analysis shares some of your thinking, or at least points in a 
similar direction, Joe.  If so, perhaps we can once again have a productive 
dialogue.

Essentially speaking,
Ham