[MD] Descriptions of Quality

[Ham Priday]

Mark, Andre, and All --


On 6/28 Mark Smith introduced the question "Is Quality a monism?" with this 
provocative statement:

> By describing Quality as the cause of results, we are not left
> with anything static to hold on to.  One can personalize such
> Quality by describing it as an Intention, or a Relationship. A 
> relationship exists between two things (for example), but is
> NOT either of those things.  In fact, one can simply turn the
> logic and say that the relationship CREATES the two things.
> I have brought this in to the discussion a number of times;
> one time poetically by describing Quality as "the golden
> threads" that lie between, create, and hold together.

Since then the "monism" question has dominated the MD, eliciting over 30 
posts in less than a month's time.  Clearly this marathon indicates general 
confusion over just what this indefinable thing called Quality is and how it 
functions in creating reality.

Today Andre saw fit to chastise Mark for suggesting that Quality could be 
discussed "descriptively":

> You keep on wanting 'thoughts on Quality'. You think the MoQ
> is one 'description' of Quality. Jeez man, what is there to say
> about Quality?  A 'nothingness within which there is great
> working'? (a la Katigiri Roshi?)

But is that a fair criticism in a forum whose very purpose is to discuss the 
Metaphysics of Quality?  I suspect the author himself would be appalled by 
such dismissal of his central concept.

As a free-thinker with a different approach to Value (which Pirsig equated 
with Quality), may I offer some clarification that may help to resolve this 
dilemma?

What do the words "love", "desire", "admiration", "beauty", and 
"fulfillment" have in common with positive Value or Quality?  Answer: 
they're all indefinable "nexotic" terms that allude to the linkage or bond 
between two modes of reality.  When reality is posited as a bipolar 
modality, ontologists call it a "dichotomy".  The dichotomy I specifically 
refer to is Otherness divided by Sensibility and it represents what we call 
Existence.  Obviously, both contingents of this dichotomy are connected; 
otherwise reality would be a dualism.

I submit that what binds Sensibility to Otherness is the relational Value
between them.  That Value is made sensible (realized subjectively) by the 
experience of otherness as differentiated Being.  Once that happens, we have 
the appearance of a pluralistic reality in which a multitude of entities 
arise, change, and disappear in the dimensions of time and space; that is to 
say, Existence as commonly experienced.

I further submit that Pirsig's ontology scrupulously avoids mention of any 
other reality, dealing exclusively with the multi-dimensional, historical 
universe and its evolution of human society.  As a consequence, the Quality 
he presents has no copula or "monistic"? referent, leaving readers to 
determine for themselves the nature of this Value as a metaphysical 
principle.  In other words, the MOQ fails to posit an Ultimate Reality which 
would complete his thesis and make Quality the nexus that binds the sensible 
self to other-being.

We won't find a cure for this omission in the writings of James, Roshi, or 
the Tetralemma.  Ultimate Reality is strictly a metaphysical issue, and 
without acknowledging the sensible agent's relation to the ultimate source, 
life has no meaning or purpose beyond empirical utilitarianism.

Thank you for allowing this interjection.  I can only hope it proves 
helpful.

Essentially yours,
Ham