[MD] pure experience (DQ)

[MarshaV]

Greetings,

Has anyone ever had direct conscious awareness of the upside-down data presented to the eyes, let alone any awareness to what the data might be before the visual apparatus transforms/translates it?  We get the after-patterned product, and no direct access to the process.  Percepts are as much a part of static (patterned) value as concepts.  Dynamic Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable, it is undifferentiated; it is pre-concepts and pre-percepts and pre- any other attributes that might make up static patterns, an emotional component for example.   Think about it, using 'pre-conceptual' as an indication of Dynamic Quality cannot be right.  It's much too short-sighted an interpretation.  

I do think dropping the narrative conceptual function, like in mindfulness, gives one a more immediate perceptual experience.  Mindfulness is one of the practices that puts you on the road towards nirvana, or so I've heard.


Marsha
 


On Jul 9, 2012, at 3:19 AM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:

> 
> dmb,
> 
> Not the quote or the article even used the word 'undifferentiated' except the Zen quote that you presented associating it with nirvana.  I take 'undifferentiate' to mean lacking difference or distinction.   My statement still stands that if Dynamic Quality is undifferentiated, it cannot be about perceptions (smells, sounds, tastes, visions, and feelings) which are differentiated; which require a spacial-temporal framework; and which are dependent on human sense apparatus?   Dynamic Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable; it is undifferentiated; it is not perceptions - not smells, not sounds, not taste, not visions, and not feelings.  
> 
> 
> 
> Marsha 
> 
> 
> On Jul 8, 2012, at 5:20 PM, david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> Marsha said:
>> I am saying if Dynamic Quality is undifferentiated, it cannot be about perceptions (smells, sounds, tastes, visions, and feelings) which are differentiated, which require a spacial-temporal framework; and which are dependent on human sense apparatus?   Neither you nor the paper that you were unable to explain, addressed this issue. 
>> 
>> 
>> dmb says:
>> Yea, I know what you're saying and I've already explained that you have misunderstood the scope and meaning of the term "undifferentiated". You're simply  using a lot of conceptual descriptions from ordinary sensory empiricism, which are products of reflection and not phenomenal experience as such, and then projecting them back onto pre-conceptual experience. It's only after the fact, remember, that we can talk about stoves and heat and pain and the like. 
>> There are lots of articles and books about this stuff, much of which I've mentioned here. If you have further questions, please consult them. I was answering Ron's questions before you butted in and I just don't enjoy your company.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Marsha 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Jul 8, 2012, at 11:57 AM, david buchanan wrote:
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Marsh:
>>>> 1) If you were genuinely interested answers, you'd take the time to CAREFULLY read the paper. 
>>>> 
>>>> 2) Since it is Pirsig's published work that tells us that James was saying the same thing as the MOQ, your objection to James's thought has no merit at all.
>>>> 
>>>> 3) Your point (that direct perception can't be pure experience or DQ because perceptions are differentiated) seems to rest entirely on simply denying what the textual evidence repeatedly says. To add yet another, for example, how do you suppose that Northrop's "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" could be aesthetic without some kind of perception? How could Pirsig's "primary empirical reality" be empirical without some kind of perception? Jumping off hot stoves is going to involve some kind of perception, some kind of phenomenal experience. I would have thought this was quite obviously derived from the meaning of the terms employed, terms like "aesthetic" and "experience" and "Quality" and "flux of life", etc.. I mean, "undifferentiated" does not mean experience is a blank void or black empty space. It just means that the situation has not been divided CONCEPTUALLY. "Unverbalized sensation" and "undivided experience" are both descriptive phrases that should give you a c
> lear sense of what "undifferentiated" means. 
>>>> 
>>>> 4) This would be the third or fourth time in a row in which you asked a question that was just supplied in the quote to which you're supposedly responding. Do the explanations really demand further explanations? The section seems pretty clear to me and it was selected specifically to answer your question? Why is that not good enough? James and Pirsig are both denying that "all thinking and experience involves concepts". They are both insisting not only on the reality of pre-conceptual experience but also on its central importance. "James instead argues that the phenomenal content of embodied experience as experienced outstrips our capacity to conceptually or linguistically articulate it. In other words, James insists that many of our basic experiences harbor non-conceptual content." That is the sense in which DQ or pure experience is undifferentiated, is undivided. It's all about the difference between the conceptual and the non-conceptual.
>>>> 
>>>> 5) I think good, solid answers have already been given - repeatedly. You asked. I answered. Take it or leave it. Take it from somebody else. Read Krueger's paper. Read Northrop, Kitaro, James or Dewey or any of the scholars who write about any of them. ...But I'm done answering every question two or three times in a row. Jeez. Don't you see how lazy and obnoxious that is? 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> From: valkyr at att.net
>>>>> Date: Sun, 8 Jul 2012 10:08:51 -0400
>>>>> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>>>>> Subject: Re: [MD] pure experience (DQ)
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> dmb,
>>>>> 
>>>>> I agree that direct perceptual (the particular) experience is more immediate than reflective conceptual (the generalized) experience, but direct perceptions still cannot be Dynamic Quality or pure experience, which is undifferentiated.  That is my point.  The paper you offer might reflect what James thought, but I am interested in how these are best handled in the MoQ, and if you cannot explain this I don't see the value to be gained by reading it.  I also acknowledged that static (patterned) value represents all that human being's can know.  But I still have a problem with connecting direct perceptional experience with Dynamic Quality as I explained.  
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Marsha
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
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