[MD] Intellectual level of MOQ

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[John]
I am the author of "Quality and Inspirationality (Part 1)"

[Arlo]
Welcome, John.

[John]
If I understand correctly, according to MOQ, intellect evolves from the social level, not from the biological.  He seems to be saying that we are born with a blank slate, and concepts get written on it entirely from our social interactions. 

[Arlo]
This is correct. And it is a point of contention for some in this forum who would prefer an "inorganic-biological-intellectual" trilayered MOQ with "social" existing as an "interference field" outside of these. In any event, you'll hear from them, and they will share your lament that the "individual" is not given asocial/non-social primacy in Pirsig's MOQ.

Personally, I do not use the "blank slate" metaphor. Instead, I'd say its better to say that our neurophysiology enables the unintended (biologically) consequence of social potential. Like other primates and all animals, there is an "innateness" that is likely genetically 'programmed' into our biological patterns (fight/flight, search for food, care for young, etc.) that would be evident in unsocialized, isolated feral humans.

[John]
But I can't get it through my head that our brain would be no different from an ant's brain in that respect: both blank, with nothing inherent in the biological architecture.

[Arlo]
Well, the similarity is that both neurophysiologies enable certain innate abilities. The difference is that the ant's brain lacks the potential for social engagement beyond the innate activity. I will admit here that I disagree with Pirsig on the point of all sociality being restricted to humans. Personally, I think it makes sense to include, to varying degrees, non-human activity as social. But I am comfortable saying that's not Pirsig stance, and want to be clear about that. 

I would recommend to you the book "The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition" by Michael Tomasello. Like Pirsig, he restricts social/intellectual activity to humans, and like Pirsig he advances the notion that intellect emerges from social activity, not directly from biology. He makes no mention of Pirsig, but he does examine the biological-social border quite intently, and I think the ideas he offers may help you understand the idea of a biological->social->intellectual trajectory.

[John]
I feel that I'm not allowed to think of myself as an individual self, because that would be forbidden SOM thinking.

[Arlo]
I'm not sure what "forbidden" means here, you can think of yourself as anything you'd like. The question is, do you agree with Pirsig. It would seem that you may not. Several here do not agree with him on this point at all. I would say, above all, just be clear about where you and Pirsig agree and disagree, and where you disagree make sure you offer a supportive argument. 

In any event, I'd recommend here looking into the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin and Lev Vygostsky. These are two authors who reject entirely the 'collective/individual' distinction and instead propose a 'Yin-Yang' duality to social and intellectual activity. I think Pirsig, as well, is not arguing for a complete denying of the usefulness of the 'self-concept', but instead a caution that it is a social-intellectual construction that has value in organizing experience. 

The key to this is that as biological 'individuals' appropriate social and intellectual patterns, they retain a unique 'boundedness' that assures that each biological individual will continue to interpret and experience the world to certain unique degrees. Thus, collectivity does not equate to absolute uniformity, and individuality does not equate to unrestricted freedom. You may also want to look into Bourdieu, Archer and Giddens who have written extensively about the nature of the relationship between an appropriated culture (structure) and the activity of the uniquely bound biological 'being' (agency).

All neurophysiological creatures have a demonstrated awareness of the extent of their bounded 'bodies'. This is likely a biological-innate pattern, as several studies have shown that rats with brain trauma may begin eating their own bodies when hungry. So in this case, yes, you have an awareness of the extent and bounds of your 'body', and this is often the catalyst for ideas of "the self". The thing to keep in mind is that depending on where you were born, what language(s) you appropriate, and the cultural attitudes to "self", your sense of "self" in this culturally-developed way will vary. 

You "think" you are who you are (with a certain range) because of the culture you were born into. "If Descartes had said, "The seventeenth century French culture exists, therefore I think, therefore I am," he would have been correct." (LILA) But, of course, before that, the feral 'Descartes' would have a neurologically-rooted sense of 'his body'. One sits on top the other. 

Hope this helps.