[MD] Tweaking the emergence

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Mark,

>> Tuukka:
>> Hmm. We are probably talking about subtly different things here. I'm
>> saying that metaphysics is intended to be, from a logical point of view,
>> the ultimate metatheory of the human linguistic experience, which has no
>> further metatheories. It is /possible/ to speak of physics as a
>> metatheory of metaphysics, but I find that cumbersome and unelegant. The
>> Kolmogorov complexity of a metaphysical theory is reduced, yet its
>> features apparently remain the same, if physics is expected to belong to
>> a certain slot within a metaphysical theory. I would like to be proven
>> wrong, but as I haven't, I find my choice justified due to its
>> simplicity. I intend RP to have the minimum amount of information that
>> is necessary to convey its message. Elaborate meditations on physics as
>> a metatheory of metaphysics are possible, but they are /undesirable/,
>> because they complicate the theory while apparently adding nothing to
>> it. This has nothing to do with /creation/ of truth. It is about
>> categorization of truths.
> Tuukka, it would seem that you are taking the same tact that
> Wittgenstein took.  He had to abandon that, and confine his
> metaphysics to specific cases in the end.  he also thought metaphysics
> to be trivial since it was simply an excercise in semantics.  Is this
> where you are going with your metaphysics?  Read Tractatus, perhaps
> what you are writing has already been written.

Tuukka:
No! Tractatus is the /young/ Wittgenstein! That's not where Wittgenstein 
confined his metaphysics in the /end/. The old Wittgenstein is 
completely different. He finds out the same thing as Aristotle did - 
that rhetoric ("persuasion") comes before everything else - but he also 
found out a bunch of problems Aristotle didn't pay so much attention to. 
Read "On Certainty" by /old/ Wittgenstein.

In the proposition 5.6 of Tractatus, Wittgenstein says things pretty 
right, or at least seems to mean them pretty right, but the conclusion 
of the book ("Wovon Mann nicht spechen kann..." ) is an exagerrating 
interpretation of the meaning of that proposition.

> Mark:
>
> It seems that you have proven yourself wrong by using mathematics to
> expound on your metaphysics.  Interesting that you would choose the
> concept of metatheory.  This would be like the set of all sets, or the
> psychology of psychology.  I will be interested to see how you apply
> this to MoQ.

Tuukka:

Look... there are certain requirements for "proofs". Nobody has ever 
presented a proof that I contradict myself here. Would you like to be 
the first? Be my guest, but you haven't /yet/ done it.

> Mark:
>
> How is it that you intend RP to do anything?  I do not quite
> understand what you are saying here.  Is this a Master and Puppet kind
> of thing?

Tuukka:

I don't know what's a "Master and Puppet kind of thing".

RP doesn't do anything? What do you mean by "RP doing something"? Do you 
mean it has an added algorithmic side, or do you mean it produces a 
revelation like Pirsig's books did? The former is on the to do -list, 
the latter already done, but this revelation is not accessible to people 
who don't like maths.

> Mark:
>
> If you do not want to complicate your theory, then stay away from
> formulas, and follow your own advice.
>
>

Tuukka:
What an oxymoronic advice.

-Tuukka