[MD] Tweaking the emergence

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Mark:


> Mark:
> What is empirical about string theory?  This is something we will
> never be able to measure.  The variables presented are "by definition"
> not measureable.

Tuukka:
String theory is a particular instance of physics, that is considered 
physics mostly because of seemingly similar subject matter. It's not 
very empirical, but on the other hand, it's scientific value is 
considered dubious at large. So the issue is not whether string theory 
is physics, but whether it's good physics or not. Not being currently 
empirically verifiable makes us wonder, whether it ever will be. If 
never, then it's not good physics, but we don't yet know.

> Mark:
> I do not have a problem with it. You are the one with a distaste for 
> physics and the manner in which it is presented :-). Why do you have a 
> problem with physics as a metaphysics? Are you saying that physics is 
> somehow more or less real? 

Tuukka:
This is really sidetracked. I love science, particularily physics, and 
physics is the discipline that got me interested of science in the first 
place. I do not mean science has low Quality or anything like that. I'm 
just saying that logically, it is more elegant to define various 
scientific disciplines as subsets of metaphysics, because that's the 
only way the metaphysical theory can be used to explain them. I am not 
banning other kind of definitions, but I'm pointing out that this 
definition is very essential, if we want metaphysics to explain science.

> Mark:
> I am not sure about the practicality of which you speak.  Why is it
> more practicle?  I find it more practical to see it as a metaphysics,
> perhaps as one of the many bodies of metaphysics, but no more a subset
> than MoQ.  For that is indeed what physics is, by definition.
> Explaining the "what is"

Tuukka:


Huh? So you are a physicalist, metaphysically? You believe everything 
consists of emergent products of quarks, leptons, forces and such 
physical phenomena?

> Mark:
> I do not think it is advisable to based a metaphysics on the semantics
> of language, as I have tried to stress to you in previous emails.  I
> am not suggesting we use physics as a metatheory.  Neither is it
> advisable to use metaphysics as a metatheory of metaphysics.  This is
> what Hegel did, as in "the final conclusion of all philosophy".  Of
> course philosphy was far from concluded, and such a statement simply
> came from personal pride (the deadliest of the sins).
>
> Pirsig brings in physics as have I.  Read some of my posts equating
> Quality to the Higgs Field for example.  There are countless posts of
> mine which bring in physics.  Check the archives.  I do this with
> common sense rhetoric rather than some contrived formulas.  Formulas
> can be used to prove anything you want, but are such proofs useful?

Tuukka:
Formulas cannot be used to prove anything I want, because RP is not a 
formal theory despite including formulae. Likewise, physics is not a 
formal theory despite including formulae. RP's all formulae are not 
tautologies, but contingent, and their contingency depends on 
observations - namely, that one specific kind of observation is 
possible. Would you like to hear more? Is this relevant to you?

> Mark:
> Yes, and I have brought all those subjects into my posts.  I have also
> included , psychology, anthropology, chemistry, biochemical physics,
> politics, economics, archeology, empiricism, the science behind
> consciousness, and so forth.  I do not think it is possible for all of
> these to be combined into a simple explanation, but you may be
> successful.  Such simplification leaves so much out that MoQ cannot
> progress, in my opinion.  But, I will follow your metaphysics with
> interest, and not without some comments :-).  I am not speaking of
> metatheories by the way.

Tuukka:
I don't think they can be combined into a simple explanation without 
omitting important detail. I'm not competing with your work or trying to 
put it into a nutshell. I'm trying to create a better framework for such 
work than canonical MOQ by Pirsig, and it's up to you whether you want 
to use it. Basically, the framework will probably increase the amount of 
stuff you can do. You didn't mention mathematics in your list, and you 
didn't mention Jungian psychology in your list either. I'm pointing this 
out because those two disciplines are very difficult to meaningfully 
express within canonical MOQ. They fare better in RP. But like I said, I 
haven't written the explanations. What I'm trying to do is to describe, 
what are the rules according to which all such explanations - such as 
the ones you made - relate to each other. That's a different thing than 
making the explanations themselves.

>
> I assume you are referring to Pirsig with RP, if not please let me
> know.  It does not make sense for something to manifest with an
> individual.  An individual radiates meaning towards the outside.  So
> you must be referring to something else.  It would help me if you
> presented the full name of an acronym if there may be some confusion.

Tuukka:
Huh? NO! RP means Recursive Patterns (the name of my theory) in my 
lingo. This is probably a very confusion-prone way of speaking. Maybe I 
should use a different abbreviation.

> Mark:
> I think that the metatheory approach may be difficult since it
> inherently contains a self-destructive nature, like the set of all
> sets, or the psychology or psychology.  But, please carry on since I
> know only a litte.

Tuukka:
True. I guess the only metatheory of RP I might want is one that allows 
references to RP, and even that only for rhetorical purposes.

I think we managed to communicate something here.

-Tuukka