[MD] aggregates of grasping

[Ham Priday]

Hi Dan --

[Previously]:
>> Robert Pirsig was responding to the charge that the MOQ
>> is a form of emotivism.  By equating morality (or within the
>> MOQ, value) with sentiments and feelings, reality becomes
>> as you like it.

[Ham]:
>> The mistake Dan has made, and it's a trap of Pirsig's hierarchical
>> scheme, is reducing Value to a "biological" function, thus
>> denigrating its "intellectual" significance.

[Dan]:
> No, no, no... you've completely mis-read what was written, both the
> quote and my subsequent comment... I don't know how on earth
> you've come to such an interpretation of my words or of Robert
> Pirsig's words. In fact, the RMP quote is saying quite the opposite...
> it is specifically DENYING that value is entirely a biological function...
> that is what emotivism means.
>
> I'm not going to waste any (more) of my valuable time in explaining
> this further as I suspect you are quite blind to my words, as you have
> proven in the past. I don't think you "get it" and I cannot for the
> life of me understand the reason... but so be it.

I apologize for misinterpreting your statement, Dan.  I hadn't been 
following your discussion with Mark and Joe closely, but when I spotted the 
phrase "equating morality (or within the MOQ, value) with sentiments and 
feelings," I instinctively reacted as if feelings were being reduced to 
"biological responses."

Anyway, the point I wanted to make (to the group) is that we DO make our 
reality
correspond with our proprietary value orientation.   Our valuistic sense of 
what is good or bad, just or unjust, admirable or trite, virtuous or immoral 
"colors" our experienced world to represent these sentiments.  And, although 
Value is not seated in the emotions but comes from our relation with the 
Primary Source, it is realized emotionally, aesthetically, morally, and 
intellectually.

Hopefully, this epistemology is closer to what you had in mind.

Respectfully,
Ham