[MD] Dewey's Zen

Sun Mar 25 15:54:16 PDT 2012

Horse, DMB,

"...experiences come whole, pervaded by unifying qualities that demarcate them within the flux of our lives. If we want to find meaning, or the basis for meaning, we must therefore start with the qualitative unity that Dewey describes. The demarcating pervasive quality is, at first, unanalyzed, but it is the basis for subsequent analysis, thought, and development. Thought starts from this experienced whole, and only then does it introduce distinctions that carry it forward as inquiry."

I'd say this means romantic quality is prior to classical quality. I know some would put Dynamic Quality in place of romantic quality, but I don't think that's proper. DQ cannot be defined, and this seems to define too much.

"It is not wrong to say that we experience objects, properties, and relations, but it is wrong to say that these are primary in experience. What are primary are pervasive qualities of situations, within which we subsequently discriminate objects, properties, and relations."

Same as previous, illustrations for the same point.

"Dewey took great pains to remind us that the primary locus of human experience is not atomistic sense impressions, but rather what he called a "situation," by which he meant, not just our physical setting, but the whole complex of physical, biological, social, and cultural conditions that constitute any given experience—experience taken in its fullest, deepest, richest, broadest sense."

This seems profound enough to refer to Dynamic Quality, and it is indeed true, that reducing the human experience to interplay of classical and romantic quality is a too narrow way of thinking, if the MOQ is used as a context.

"Mind, on this view, is neither a willful creator of experience, nor is it a mere window to objective mind-independent reality. Mind is a functional aspect of experience that emerges when it becomes possible for us to share meanings, to inquire into the meaning of a situation, and to initiate action that transforms, or remakes, that situation."

Seems to call for abandoning SOM. I've had a lot of problems trying to define SOM, or the subject-object-problem, in a way that I understand. I've eventually come to define SOM as the doctrine that everything is either deterministic or random. There is a third option, which the MOQ certainly seems to choose. That is called relativism in Buddhism (Marsha knows about this - we had a debate on what's the right word for that) and self-determinism in the CTMU.

"The pervasive quality of a situation is not limited merely to sensible perception or motor interactions. Thinking is action, and so "acts of thought" also constitute situations that must have pervasive qualities. Even our best scientific thinking stems from the grasp of qualities."

Thinking is action. This is pretty interesting. It is clearly formulated in MCT that the act of thinking is a specific form of romantic quality, but canonic MOQ is, I recall, more ambiguous about that issue. I think the MCT stance is compatible with canonic MOQ, but Pirsig doesn't emphasize _exactly_ that point very much, only something quite similar but more vague.

"The crux of Dewey's entire argument is that what we call thinking, or reasoning, or logical inference could not even exist without the felt qualities of situations: "The underlying unity of qualitativeness regulates pertinence or relevancy and force of every distinction and relation; it guides selection and rejection and the manner of utilization of all explicit terms."

Go tell that to Rescher, the author of Rationality (1988). He says rationality is equivalent to virtuousness. :D No wonder they haven't solved the problem of induction yet... then Rescher introduces this funny concept of "evaluative reasoning", which appears to be the same thing as Dynamic Quality. But Rescher seems to skip the point that it can't be defined, which doesn't make him much of a philosopher.

"The underlying unity of qualitativeness" seems to be intended to be equivalent to Quality.

Actually this was a fun game. I'm sorry for being a butt hole at first.

-Tuukka

26.3.2012 0:33, Horse wrote:
> Tuuka
>
> Read this to play :)
>
> Horse
>
> On 25/03/2012 06:19, Dan Glover wrote:
>> Hello everyone
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 10:37 PM, david 
>> buchanan<dmbuchanan at hotmail.com>  wrote:
>>> This might be fun but it's also a kind of experiment. I was reading 
>>> a paper and saw many parallels to Pirsig, which wasn't very 
>>> surprising because it's titled "Dewey's Zen". But I wonder if others 
>>> read it the same way I do. In certain passages it seems like one 
>>> could plug Pirsig's terms into the sentences and they'd still mean 
>>> the same thing - almost exactly. Telling you more than that - like 
>>> which terms I had in mind - it would ruin the experiment. How about 
>>> if I just post a bit of it and let everyone take a shot at it? Maybe 
>>> it would be fun to put in Pirsig's terms wherever you think they 
>>> would fit. Take your pick or play with them all, but please be 
>>> explicit enough to let me know if you're seeing the same thing that 
>>> I'm seeing.
>> Hi David
>> Been editing one of my books most of the evening... I love the
>> writing... the editing, not so much... but since I cannot afford to
>> pay someone to do it, it falls to me. Anyway, I thought I'd throw out
>> a few ideas to chew on...
>>
>>>
>>> ...experiences come whole, pervaded by unifying qualities that 
>>> demarcate them within the flux of our lives. If we want to find 
>>> meaning, or the basis for meaning, we must therefore start with the 
>>> qualitative unity that Dewey describes. The demarcating pervasive 
>>> quality is, at first, unanalyzed, but it is the basis for subsequent 
>>> analysis, thought, and development. Thought starts from this 
>>> experienced whole, and only then does it introduce distinctions that 
>>> carry it forward as inquiry.
>> Dan:
>> The author seems to be saying the same thing that RMP says when he
>> talks about Quality coming first, and how ideas arise from 'it'. The
>> qualifiers the author uses seem contradictory on the surface though it
>> is possible I'm not seeing things properly.
>>
>>>             It is not wrong to say that we experience objects, 
>>> properties, and relations, but it is wrong to say that these are 
>>> primary in experience. What are primary are pervasive qualities of 
>>> situations, within which we subsequently discriminate objects, 
>>> properties, and relations.
>> Dan:
>> See... the author subtly shifts here into saying these qualities are
>> pervasive and the demarcation only happens later.
>>
>>>   Dewey took great pains to remind us that the primary locus of 
>>> human experience is not atomistic sense impressions, but rather what 
>>> he called a "situation," by which he meant, not just our physical 
>>> setting, but the whole complex of physical, biological, social, and 
>>> cultural conditions that constitute any given experience—experience 
>>> taken in its fullest, deepest, richest, broadest sense.
>> Dan:
>> A minor quibble here... in the MOQ, experience is synonymous with
>> Dynamic Quality. Static quality comes later... inorganic, biological,
>> social, intellectual.
>>
>>> Mind, on this view, is neither a willful creator of experience, nor 
>>> is it a mere window to objective mind-independent reality. Mind is a 
>>> functional aspect of experience that emerges when it becomes 
>>> possible for us to share meanings, to inquire into the meaning of a 
>>> situation, and to initiate action that transforms, or remakes, that 
>>> situation.
>> Dan:
>> To respond to Dynamic Quality, in other words...
>>
>>>
>>> The pervasive quality of a situation is not limited merely to 
>>> sensible perception or motor interactions. Thinking is action, and 
>>> so "acts of thought" also constitute situations that must have 
>>> pervasive qualities. Even our best scientific thinking stems from 
>>> the grasp of qualities.
>> Dan:
>> "Acts of thought" are ideas? Is that what I'm understanding here? And
>> yes, the MOQ would seem to agree that ideas are as 'real' as inorganic
>> and biological patterns... they exist on different evolutionary
>> levels, however.
>>
>>> And perhaps my favorite....
>>>
>>>             The crux of Dewey's entire argument is that what we call 
>>> thinking, or reasoning, or logical inference could not even exist 
>>> without the felt qualities of situations: "The underlying unity of 
>>> qualitativeness regulates pertinence or relevancy and force of every 
>>> distinction and relation; it guides selection and rejection and the 
>>> manner of utilization of all explicit terms."
>> Dan:
>> I should think that in the MOQ, culture is the regulating force of
>> distinctions and relations... remember how Phaedrus read about the sun
>> flashing green before he actually looked up and 'saw' it?
>>
>> Thank you,
>>
>> Dan
>>
>> http://www.danglover.com
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