[MD] Dewey's Zen

[Ant McWatt]

On March 25th David Buchanan wrote:



> This might be fun but it's also a kind of experiment. I was reading a
paper and saw many parallels to Pirsig, which wasn't very surprising because
it's titled "Dewey's Zen". But I wonder if others read it the same
way I do. In certain passages it seems like one could plug Pirsig's terms into
the sentences and they'd still mean the same thing - almost exactly. Telling
you more than that - like which terms I had in mind - it would ruin the
experiment. How about if I just post a bit of it and let everyone take a shot
at it? Maybe it would be fun to put in Pirsig's terms wherever you think they
would fit. Take your pick or play with them all, but please be explicit enough
to let me know if you're seeing the same thing that I'm seeing.

 

Ant McWatt replies:

 

Here’s my take on this experiment Dave.  To make it a little more interesting, I’ve
also introduced one of F.S.C. Northrop’s terms. 
Anyway, my changes are marked by [square brackets]:



> ...[Experience] come[s] whole, pervaded by unifying qualities that
demarcate them within the [Dynamic] flux of our lives. If we want to find [useful
intellectual static patterns], we must therefore start with the qualitative
unity [or, to use, Northrop’s terms, the “aesthetic continuum”] that Dewey
describes. The [“aesthetic continuum”] is, at first, unanalyzed, but it is the
basis for subsequent analysis, thought, and development. Thought starts from
this [Dynamic] experienced whole, and only then does it introduce [static] distinctions
that carry it forward as inquiry.





> It is not wrong to say that [static patterns], [their] properties, and
relations [are experienced], but it is wrong to say that these are primary in
experience. What [is] primary [is the aesthetic continuum], within which we
subsequently discriminate [these static patterns].



> Dewey took great pains to remind us that the primary locus of human
experience is not atomistic sense impressions, but rather what he called a
"situation," by which he meant, not just our physical setting, but
the whole complex of [inorganic], biological, social, and [intellectual
patterns] that constitute any given experience—experience taken in its fullest,
deepest, richest, broadest sense.



> Mind, on this view, is neither a willful creator of experience, nor is it
a mere window to objective mind-independent reality. Mind is a functional
aspect of [intellectual and social patterns] that emerges when it becomes
possible for us to share meanings, to inquire into the [value] of a situation,
and to initiate action that [improves] that situation.



> The pervasive quality of a situation is not limited merely to sensible
perception or motor interactions. Thinking is [Dynamic but] could not even
exist without the felt qualities of [the aesthetic continuum]: "The
underlying unity of [Quality] regulates [static patterns of value, their distinctions
and relations]; it guides [the] selection [and] utilization of all [useful] terms."






 

ORIGINAL TEXT:

 

...experiences come whole, pervaded by unifying
qualities that demarcate them within the [Dynamic] flux of our lives. If we
want to find [static patterns of value]… we must therefore start with the
qualitative unity that Dewey describes. The demarcating pervasive quality is,
at first, unanalyzed, but it is the basis for [the] subsequent [intellectual
patterns of] analysis, thought, and development. Thought starts from this
experienced whole, and only then does it introduce distinctions that carry it
forward as inquiry.



It is not wrong to say that we experience [static patterns], [their]
properties, and relations, but it is wrong to say that these are primary in
experience. What [is] primary [is the aesthetic continuum] within which we
subsequently discriminate [static patterns], [their] properties, and relations.

 

Dewey took great pains to remind us that the primary locus of human experience
is not atomistic sense impressions, but rather what he called a
"situation," by which he meant, not just our physical setting, but
the whole complex of [inorganic], biological [and] social [patterns] that
constitute any given experience—experience taken in its fullest, deepest,
richest, broadest sense.

 

Mind, on this view, is neither a wilful creator of experience, nor is it a mere
window to… mind-independent reality. Mind is a functional aspect of experience
that emerges when it becomes possible for us to share meanings, to inquire into
the meaning of a situation, and to initiate action that transforms, or remakes,
that situation. 

 

The pervasive quality of a situation is not limited merely to sensible
perception or motor interactions. Thinking is action, and so "acts of
thought" also constitute situations that must have pervasive qualities.
Even our best scientific thinking stems from the grasp of qualities. 

 

And perhaps my favorite....

 

The crux of Dewey's entire argument is that what we call thinking, or
reasoning, or logical inference could not even exist without the felt qualities
of situations: "The underlying unity of qualitativeness regulates
pertinence or relevancy and force of every distinction and relation; it guides
selection and rejection and the manner of utilization of all explicit
terms."

 

 

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