[MD] Tuukka's letter to Robert Pirsig

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

All,
here is what could to be the final letter, after feedback from Mary.



Dear Mr. Pirsig,
you might be interested of my work on the Metaphysics of Quality. In 
order to separate my work from yours, I call it Sets of Quality, or SOQ.



Dynamic and static

Nowadays many philosophologers regard their discipline as diseased. I've 
spoken with some, who have confirmed the criticism I have given as an 
outsider. There is a general problem regarding the academy's failure to 
produce philosophy, or even text that's pleasant to read.

Students of philosophy are required to define the concepts they use, yet 
the great names are not. Then problems like the problem of induction are 
approached as if their essence is, that they are poorly defined. In 
fact, a big part of that problem is that concepts like Quality are 
included in the problem without realizing, that they cannot be defined.

Maybe you would like to read "The Problem of Induction: The 
Presuppositions Revisited" (2001) by Eintalu just to get a glimpse of 
how desperate the prospects of defining the concept of "relevance" have 
turned out. This doctoral dissertation shows various philosophers, 
spanning four centuries, using the concepts of "relevance" and "original 
objective" in what seems to be an attempt to define Quality as 
equivalent to rationality. Rescher's "Rationality" (1988) shows, that 
scholars might seriously believe in succeeding in that, as one of the 
central themes of that work is that rationality is equivalent to 
"virtuousness". In the probable case that "virtuousness" is "aretê", it 
follows, that if something doesn't make sense, yet it is good, it must 
be rational. Bye bye, coherent notion of rationality.

These people don't know Quality can't be defined, and that it's not a 
problem - therefore they have run into endless problems themselves.

I've spent eight years with the MOQ. In 2006, my friend Timo Kiviluoto 
joined the project. He is a mathematician. We have created a logical 
treatise, in which a concept similar to Dynamic Quality is defined with 
formal rigour. This concept is called "nonrelativizably used predicate". 
The name is obscure, but due to the technical nature of the treatise, it 
is not expected to appeal to the layman. It is only intended to satisfy 
the concerns of academic skeptics. Our treatise shows, that the worst 
case scenario of using a predicate nonrelativizably in a statement is, 
that the statement turns out to be a contradiction.

Even if the worst case scenario does not occur, the meanings of 
nonrelativizably used predicates are random, from a logical point of 
view. If we want to write unambiguous text that may be rationally 
understood, we may not use such predicates. Religious texts, tentative 
speculations, poetry and many others are exempt from this limitation, 
because they do not need to be understood in a purely rational manner. 
But we are inclined to discourage the nonrelativizable use of predicates 
in the kind of text academic or scientific investigations are expected 
to produce as their end product. By "end product" I mean, for example, 
an article published in a prestigious journal, or a textbook.

However, there is one exception. We cannot have a discussion of 
nonrelativizability, if we ban all references to nonrelativizably used 
predicates. If we may not use the predicate "nonrelativizably used 
predicate", we also may not allege, that a certain predicate in a 
certain discussion is used nonrelativizably. Therefore our language does 
not permit us to state the reason, why cessation of the use of that 
predicate would help us avoid ambiguity.

This means we are to have, at most, one nonrelativizably used predicate. 
In other words, we are to assume that all nonrelativizably used 
predicates are equivalent. If the nonrelativizable use of predicates is 
assumed to always lead to the worst case scenario of contradiction, the 
equivalence already follows from the axioms of most well-known systems 
of formal logic. In these systems, all contradictions are equivalent.

This has an interesting relationship with the MOQ. From a set theoretic 
point of view, it seems very awkward to declare that everything consists 
of static quality and Dynamic Quality, because it seems to call for a 
set of Dynamic Quality, yet Dynamic Quality cannot be encapsulated in a 
set. But it's not awkward. In fact, this "categorization" amounts to the 
rule, that there should be, at most, one nonrelativizably used predicate 
in the end product of any serious or "academy-worthy" work.

In other words, there are no semantic differences between "relevance", 
"virtuousness", "excellence" et cetera - they all are just Dynamic 
Quality. Admittedly, in the traditional context of the MOQ, these 
concepts are equivalent to Quality rather than Dynamic Quality. But from 
a logical point of view, Quality and Dynamic Quality cannot be 
demonstrated to differ.

At first glance, one might be inclined to define Quality as a set, whose 
subsets are static quality and Dynamic Quality. But like I said, Dynamic 
Quality cannot be reduced to a set, and Quality is not equivalent to 
static quality. Therefore, Quality cannot be reduced to a set, either. 
If Quality cannot be reduced to a set, any possible difference between 
Quality and Dynamic Quality is beyond the grasp of set theory.

Having no more than one nonrelativizably used predicate improves the 
elegance of our discourse. For the same reason of elegance, we prefer to 
write 5n instead of n + n + n + n + n. The superior elegance of the 
former is apparent to us, and could perhaps even be proven by resorting 
to Kolmogorov complexity. I contend elegance is, for many practical 
applications, a sufficient criterion for "truth".



Emergence

After the most fundamental division of MOQ is sorted out, we can focus 
to the other categorizations. The next step is to explain emergence is a 
way that is theoretically more precise. I came to the conclusion that 
emergence can be modelled with the power set function. The power set of 
set S contains all subsets of S. That is, the powerset P(S) contains all 
combinations of the elements of S, and it contains those combinations as 
sets. I will try to illustrate this with the following depictions of the 
levels in LILA.

A biological pattern differs from an inorganic pattern in that it 
maintains internal processes, can change its own structure, can 
reproduce and so on. From an inorganic point of view, biological 
patterns are unstable structures that persist for a surprisingly long 
time, change location surprisingly often, and so on. This is why the 
biological level is a power set of the inorganic level - it easily 
allows for greater inorganic complexity than what is found on the rest 
of the inorganic level.

Strictly speaking, defining life as complexity probably means that even 
stones and such are, to some extent, alive - after all, they are not 
perfectly simple, but at least slightly complex. And stellar bodies 
could be seen to regulate their structure, even if they were not alive 
in other ways. But the degree of their complexity is comparatively small 
with regards to the amount of matter involved. Therefore, in everyday 
conversations it's usually not useful to perceive rocks or stellar 
bodies as living things. They live too little.

There is no scientific consensus on exactly what is life. In some 
contexts, viruses are considered as living things. In others, they are 
not. I have never cared much about that debate, because I've seen it as 
a matter of arbitrary agreement. In real life, we usually just end up 
using the agreement we find more practical. There need not be an 
absolutely clear-cut border between the inorganic and the biological, or 
between the other levels, either.

Let us carry on to the social level. It consists of combinations of 
biological things. Typically, patterns of social quality facilitate 
division of labor, which permits more biological diversity. Not everyone 
has to specialize in hunting and gathering, or even farming, but 
instead, people may specialize in manufacture, sports, intellect, 
political affairs et cetera. Different people can cooperate, with each 
doing what he excels in, and they function together as an effective 
social organism. The fact that social quality permits more biological 
diversity illustrates, why social quality is a power set of the 
biological level.

The intellectual level consists of combinations of social patterns. A 
society guided by intellect may have its flaws, but it tends to have 
more Quality than a society guided by blind obedience to social 
tradition. Intellect makes the social structures adapt to circumstances, 
and to evolve. This ability to increase social diversity again 
demonstrates, why the intellectual level is the power set of the social 
level.

The previously described "intellect" is not necessarily the 
mathematical, abstract kind of intellect. It is not necessarily abstract 
symbol manipulation. Rather, it is the ability to make plans. 
Mathematical intellect can be perceived as a different thing, which we 
will examine later in this letter.

Strictly speaking, my set theoretic approach models "potential quality" 
rather than "actual quality". Whenever a level emerges from another, the 
entire power set does not actually come to existence - at least, not at 
any one time. But the power set includes every emergent product of a 
lower level that could come to existence on a higher level.

Dynamic Quality is an exception from this. By way of Dynamic Quality, 
anything could come to existence at any level at any time.

Modeling "potential quality" is appropriate, because after all, we are 
now speaking theoretically. We are not trying to model all actual value 
patterns in the world. There are so many of them it seems impossible. 
Such models are also subject to logical problems related to the notion 
of the set of all sets, that also contains itself. In traditional set 
theories, the existence of such a set leads to contradiction. Some forms 
of set theory, such as New Foundations by Quine, actually permit that 
kind of a set, but let's not go there now.



Subjective quality is absent from LILA

We shall assume, that both romantic quality and classical quality are 
static quality. There is no need for duplicate concepts: it is 
unnecessary to define "romantic quality" and "Dynamic Quality" as 
synonymous expressions, even though they might appear vaguely similar. I 
am not exactly sure, what is your position on this issue, but in any 
case, I just stated mine.

Also, like you write in ZAMM, we shall assume that subjective quality 
and objective quality are forms of classical quality.

The next step is to explain the differences between ZAMM and LILA. This 
has been a hotly debated issue, but I have not participated in any 
debate in the MOQ community until recently. Like you, I don't understand 
SOL by Bodvar Skutvik.

It seems to me that subjective quality is omitted from LILA. All 
evidence in favor of the four-level monistic emergence - the theory of 
four static value patterns - is objective in nature.

Subjective quality is "mythos". It includes the cultural archetypes we 
learn by growing up in the middle of culture. I'm not speaking of social 
value, like wealth or reputation. I'm speaking of the symbols people use 
for thinking and personal judgment. Such symbols as the characters of 
the Bible or other religious texts, or of folklore, which are ingrained 
to us at an early age. These are not subject to empirical science, 
which, by the way, may be the reason why Jungian psychology did not 
become as prevalent as Freudian psychology. We are conditioned to think 
empirically - ecspecially in the academy.

In the future, sufficiently sophisticated brain scanners could perhaps 
analyze the subjective make-up of a human, that is, decipher his 
linguistic experience of being human. These brain scanners would have 
been built according to the results of empirical scientific experiments. 
Yet even the most elaborate objective analyses, they could produce, 
would not be the things they describe. They would be analyses of those 
things, but not the things themselves.

Those things are subjective quality. But subjective quality is not some 
"Ding an sich", which cannot be grasped by language. Metaphysics can 
also be applied to subjective quality - even metaphysics with a stack of 
levels emerging from each other, like the one in LILA. But that system 
has to be a different system than the one in LILA. All justification for 
LILA's system is objective.

I have developed a four-level emergence system for subjective quality, 
that is structurally similar to LILA's system, and compatible with my 
interpretation of emergence as the power set function. In order to do 
so, I first split romantic quality into patterns.



Romantic quality

Initially, it seemed like romantic quality cannot be split into 
patterns, because it is direct experience, which does not belong to the 
realm of language. For example, the word "joy" is a reference to a 
certain emotion we know. But a person does not necessarily experience 
joy when looking at a reference, that is, the word "joy" written on 
paper. This is because the reference is separate of the referent. The 
latter is pure romantic quality, whereas the former is an instance of 
classical quality - a semi-successful attempt to encapsulate the latter.

In spite of the negative first impression, LILA's patterns arguably do 
correspond to certain types of direct experience.


1. Inorganic quality is about sensory experiences, including vision and 
hearing. Sensory experiences are the source of our belief in a physical 
world, that exists and has continuity regardless of whether we are 
observing it.

2. Biological quality is about needs, including eating and reproduction. 
These needs will guide us to procreation and survival, if we have 
nothing better to think about.

3. Social quality is about emotions, including shame, pride, guilt and 
surprise. Emotions are the measure of how acceptable we find ourselves 
to be. We all have to relate to each other in life. Even in solitude, we 
are aware of the existence of other people, and experience emotion in 
relation to our social patterns.

4. Intellectual quality is about planning and deliberation. It includes 
the ability to imagine the outcomes of choices and actions, and to do 
what can rationally be expected to result in the most favorable outcome.


Splitting romantic quality into patterns apparently is possible, despite 
the fact that things of romantic quality may not be expressed in 
isolation - that is, they may not be referred to without the reference 
being classical quality and thus diverting attention from the referent. 
In the same way, the finger pointing at the Moon diverts attention from 
the Moon - at least in the eyes of a fool. As a sidenote, academic 
writing is often so dull, because it's intended to be foolproof.

These patterns of romantic quality could be called sense-data, needs, 
emotions and deliberation.



Patterns of subjective quality

Patterns of subjective quality are constructed by connecting four 
classical patterns into four romantic patterns in the inverse order than 
that used in the objective system of LILA. In other words, the bottom 
level of the subjective emergence system must be connected to 
deliberation, yet it still has to be the bottom level, from which the 
other levels emerge. And the top level has to be connected to sense-data 
in spite of it being the top level. The levels, from bottom to top:


1. The belief level (connects to deliberation)

Belief patterns include our axiomatic beliefs about the external world. 
For we do not act solely according to observations we receive as 
sense-data. In order to act, we also need to have rules we believe to 
apply to those observations. Those rules reside on this level. But they 
are entirely unscientific and unobjective. They just are there - because 
they are how we happen to perceive the world. I'm talking about beliefs 
like "Cheese is good", "Avoid violence", "I'm good at math" and so on. 
The beliefs are not permanent, and I don't intend them as knowledge "a 
priori". But during the time we hold any belief at the belief level, it 
belongs to the basis of our conscious activity.

2. The consideration level (connects to emotions)

At the consideration level, beliefs are evaluated according to the 
emotional responses they create. Beliefs, that feel good or appropriate, 
are favored over beliefs, that don't. Other people are important factors 
in consideration, because they can introduce new beliefs, and also 
induce new emotional responses to existing beliefs. The consideration 
level is a power set of the belief level, because the faculty of 
consideration grants us the possibility to have any belief we deem 
appropriate.

3. The calculation level (connects to needs)

At the calculation level, we evaluate beliefs according to their 
suitability for fulfilling our needs. We temporarily postpone thinking 
about beliefs that are neither relevant for satisfying a need nor useful 
for avoiding peril while doing so. The calculation level is a power set 
of the consideration level, because calculation patterns help us avoid 
situations where we would be deprived of our ability to consider. By 
fulfilling our current needs we maintain ourselves in good enough 
condition to keep making various considerations instead of, for example, 
panicking and behaving completely intuitively.

4. The action level (connects to sense-data)

At the action level, we actually tell our limbs to move instead of 
deliberating it. The lower levels of subjective quality compose our 
subjective judgment, but this highest subjective level is more like the 
outcome of us excercising judgment. The action level is a power set of 
the calculation level, because the faculty of acting grants us a 
primitive, almost empirical trial-and-error method for evaluating, 
whether our calculations were successful. In addition, we could starve 
upon refusal to move our limbs in order to feed ourselves.


The inorganic level in LILA emerges from the aforementioned action 
level. The ability to perform actions with our bodies gives rise to the 
observation that not all of our sensory experiences are under the direct 
control of our nerves. This way we manage to differentiate our bodies 
from the rest of the physical world.



MOQ and Cartesian dualism

In SODV, you have attempted to explain Cartesian dualism in such a way, 
that inorganic and biological quality are Cartesian matter, and social 
and intellectual quality are Cartesian mind. This does not work, because 
the empirical evidence you present for LILA's emergence system is solely 
objective in nature.

Social quality is objective. When archaeological evidence is used to 
determine, whether an entombed body is that of a ruler, a social 
assessment is being made. If someone claimed, that the carefully 
embalmed body placed inside the largest pyramid at sight is the body of 
an expendable slave, most people would think he's wrong. Instead, 
empirical evidence is considered to provide objective justification for 
the assumption that such a body belonged to a ruler.

The objectivity of social quality is not nullified by the fact that 
social quality is relative to cultural context. Also biological quality 
is relative to circumstances. For a hedgehog, it is desirable to have 
spikes. For a dolphin, they would be an impediment for swimming.

Likewise, there seems to be no justification for the view that 
intellectual quality is subjective. A great deal of intellect belongs to 
the realm of science. I understand that according to Quine's 
confirmation holism, scientific theories cannot be tested in isolation. 
Hence, science is "subjective" in the sense that scientific truth is 
relative to already established scientific truth, but the body of 
science is not demonstably relative to some kind of an absolute truth. 
But again this does not make scientific theories subjective within the 
context of science, or a particular field of science.

Subjective quality is a form of quality, which other people are not even 
expected to perceive similarly. It is a solipsistic form of quality - 
perhaps "personal quality" in the same sense as one can have "personal 
belongings". Objective quality, in contrast, is created with the 
expectation that it's the same for everyone. We do not usually consider 
it a matter of personal opinion, whether Akhenaten was a pharaoh or a slave.

For Akhenaten himself, it surely was a matter of subjective quality, 
that he is a pharaoh. He lived like a pharaoh, did things that are 
expected of a pharaoh, and surely felt like a pharaoh. But we are not 
Akhenaten and cannot even talk with Akhenaten - therefore we may 
experience Akhenaten mostly objectively. Of course, we may find his 
unconventional reign inspiring, and that would be subjective quality. 
The point of such feelings would not be to make everyone feel the same 
way, but simply to experience them.

We could even perceive Akhenaten as a servant of the people, in spite of 
being a pharaoh. Archaeologists wouldn't even bother to object to that, 
because they would understand, that we are subjectively assigning the 
cultural archetype of the servant to Akhenaten instead of making 
objective archaeological statements. From an objective archaeological 
perspective, it makes no sense to suggest that Akhenaten's social 
occupation was anything else than pharaoh.



Normative quality

When I initially realized, that I can turn the patterns upside down with 
regards to romantic quality, I also realized that I can eliminate their 
direct connection to romantic quality altogether. This resulted in what 
I call normative quality. That is the realm of mathematics and logic, 
and of abstract symbol manipulation.

I soon realized, that normative quality, too, has to connect to some 
kind of romantic quality. Otherwise it would be too aloof to make sense. 
But it connects to other forms of romantic quality than the ones 
previously mentioned. These forms of romantic quality compose the human 
normative intuition - the intuitions on how abstract entities relate to 
each other. Next, I will introduce the additional patterns of normative 
quality and illustrate, what kind of romantic quality do they connect to.


1. Syntax level

The syntax level emerges from the intellectual level in LILA, as 
meta-analysis of that more practical kind of intellect is the first step 
in creating abstract entities. In the context of LILA, it is the fifth 
level, but in the context of SOQ, it is the ninth level, as levels 1-4 
are subjective and levels 5-8 are LILA's objective levels. At the 
normative level of elementary syntax, we are figuring out the most basic 
rules of a normative system. We recognize the equation 5x + 7 = 5 as a 
valid mathematical statement, even if we haven't yet solved it. We don't 
recognize x7+=+ as meaningful, because the syntax of that statement is 
unidentifiable.

2. Axiom level

This pattern of normative quality builds on syntax patterns' ability to 
deem expressions well-formed or badly formed. Axiom patterns can be used 
to relate syntactically valid statements to each other. In its most 
extreme form, it is used when constructing logical systems such as 
predicate logic or lambda calculus. In less extreme forms, it is used 
for simple tasks such as checking, whether two statements are meaningful 
within the same context. x = 4 and x = 2 * 2 are compatible, but x = 1 
and x = 0 are not. The axiom level is a power set of the syntax level, 
because it makes it possible to understand statements with different 
syntax as equivalent. 3 + 4 in infix notation is the same thing as + 3 4 
in Polish notation.

3. Proof level

At the proof level, we prove axiom patterns by means of other axiom 
patterns. The difference between the axiom and the proof level is that 
while axiom level only recognizes compatibility of statements, proof 
level predicts, what kind of initial statements might be most suitable 
for proving a certain axiom pattern. For example, if we make a 
mathematical hypothesis, we might attempt to prove it with the proof 
pattern known as "reductio ad absurdum". In this proof pattern, the goal 
is to prove that the negation of the hypothesis leads to a contradiction.

Proof patterns have applications also outside the context of formal 
proving. They can be used to calculate, that a spring is powerful enough 
to move a lever, and other things like that. The proof level is a power 
set of the axiom level, because at the proof level, it becomes possible 
to use axiom patterns to state why some two axiom patterns are 
compatible. At the axiom level, things like that can only be intuitively 
"seen", but they cannot be justified.

4. System level

At the system level, proof patterns are used to identify general 
properties of the formal system itself. Gödel's incompleteness theorems 
are a canonical example of proving, that a system (Peano arithmetic in 
this case) has a property (incompleteness) that we know another system 
(eg. classical logic and Euclidean geometry) does not have. Systems may 
also have other properties, such as whether they permit quantification 
over predicates, or whether they are first-order or higher order, and so 
on. The system level is a power set of the proof level, because it is 
capable of making very broad generalizations of what kind of proof 
patterns are possible in a given system.



Infinite patterns

First we constructed the patterns of subjective quality by inverting 
LILA's patterns' connections to patterns 1-4 of romantic quality. Then 
we constructed normative patterns by removing this connection 
altogether. And then we found out, that the normative patterns connect 
to patterns 5-8 of romantic quality.

In addition, we may argue, that although the normative patterns do not 
connect to the same romantic qualities as the subjective and objective 
patterns, they do connect to the subjective and objective patterns 
themselves, when those patterns are understood as classical quality. In 
other words, every subjective or objective entity can also be understood 
as an abstract entity governed by normative rules. That is a big reason 
why abstract constructs such as mathematics are relevant to our everyday 
life. Inorganic patterns and belief patterns may be understood as syntax 
patterns, biological patterns and consideration patterns may be 
understood as axiom patterns, and so on.

I found out that while each romantic pattern 1-4 conncets to two 
classical patterns, romantic patterns 5-8 connect to a total of four 
classical patterns. At this point, a mathematician can see a pattern 
emerging. I am not speaking of the MOQ-like patterns of value. I am 
speaking of observing the ascent of morality to have a regular 
structure, that goes on to infinity.

The amount of connections to classical quality, that patterns of 
romantic quality have, increases the higher we go. Romantic levels 1-4 
have two connections and span classical levels 1-8. Romantic levels 5-8 
have four connections, and span classical levels 9-16. I am currently 
working on classical levels 17 and above to find out, whether the amount 
of connections for patterns of romantic quality is always doubled after 
advancing four levels, or always squared after advancing four levels. Of 
course the result could be something else, too. The task does not seem 
very difficult, but after eight years, I thought I should write to you 
at some point even if all of my work weren't complete.

Even at this point, the exact mathematical form of the regularity is too 
complex to be described in this letter, which is simply inteded to give 
an overview of our work. But it seems possible to construct indefinitely 
many patterns on top of intellectual value, which is the point where you 
stopped adding patterns in LILA.

I might later have enough information for making formulae, which predict 
the structure of any classical pattern in SOQ no matter how high it is. 
"Structure" means, which patterns of romantic quality connect to that 
pattern, and to which other classical patterns do those patterns of 
romantic quality also connect.

It is up to us to recognize any previously unknown form of romantic 
quality in such a way that we ourselves know what it is, and can 
differentiate it from sense-data, needs, emotions and such. But SOQ 
tells us what to look for, no matter how far up we go. Understanding the 
new forms of romantic quality by way of personal experience would be an 
essential part of understanding any new classical level SOQ can find.

Currently, we are not readily able to understand the nature of the 100th 
or so pattern, even if we could decipher its structure on a theoretical 
level. But there seem to be infinitely many patterns, so we should not 
expect to understand everything anyhow. If we ever need to find out, 
what the 100th pattern is like, SOQ is probably the key.

The point is not to construct a hundred levels and obtain a weird sense 
of satisfaction upon doing so. The point is simply to illustrate, that 
we may have as simple or as complex MOQ (SOQ) as we deem fit in our 
situation. For many practical purposes, it is quite appropriate to 
reduce all of the higher levels (9 and onwards) to the intellectual level.

I intended to create a framework, in which we do not need to answer an 
awkward "I don't know" when someone asks, why does MOQ's emergence chain 
stop at intellect. To be sure, I am also interested of the formulaic 
structure of the ascent of morality, but I don't want to shove it down 
anybody's throat. I deliberately omitted a significant amount of this 
kind of work from this letter, because I did not believe it to belong to 
this kind of an introductory text.



Summary

This is a partial introduction to our work, which includes logical 
formulae and has a more rigorous approach, that is hopefully 
well-digested by the analytic philosopher. While I do think philosophy 
is for the people, the MOQ would gain more acceptance among the common 
public if the academy would understand it. A more rigorous approach 
might also discover unprecedented applications for the MOQ, possibly in 
the field of artificial intelligence.

The general response to our work on MD and LS has been, that it is 
interesting, but the more technical parts are difficult to understand. I 
have not yet composed a complete, unified account of our work. This 
letter is probably my greatest achievement in that so far, but it is 
only an overview. I would like to hear your comment of our work.

Is there any reason, why the number of patterns should be exactly four, 
as it is in LILA, and may not be anything else?

Thank you, Mr. Pirsig, for giving a purpose for my life, even though I 
already had a few of them.



Best regards,
Tuukka Virtaperko