[MD] Is the MOQ static, or a static pattern?

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Arlo,

> [Tuukka]
> I did not understand what part of the MOQ do you find as recursive, and how.
>
> [Arlo]
> Recursiveness is not a function of a 'part' of the MOQ, it is a unavoidable feature of all symbolic systems. A language (formal or informal) sufficiently powerful enough to describe experience will necessarily contain self-reference/recursion. This was the problem Pirsig found when he "made the scientific method the object of analysis itself", and what you are finding when you 'apply the MOQ to itself'.

Tuukka:
Ahh, so this is something like the Chomsky universal grammar thing.

>
> Your specific difficulty in saying the MOQ can't be an intellectual pattern because it describes a level called 'intellectual patterns' is this exact same form of recursion. You seem to think you need to 'back out' or 'back up' and this will make the recursion go away. It won't. What it leads to is simply endless regress.

Tuukka:
My argument is not that the MOQ can't be an intellectual pattern. I may 
have changed my argument at some point during this discussion, but it 
was earlier than one message ago.

>
> I think this is what Goedel was saying when he said (paraphrased) "All consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions". In this case, the question could be paraphrased using Russell's paradox, "Does a set containing all sets contain itself?" (which is exactly your stated problem).
>
> Hofstadter is great here because not only is he a mathematician, but he ties this inherent recursion to multiple forms of 'art'; painting, music, koans, and storytelling. You can't avoid it. You can't define it away. You can't invent more and more powerful formal systems in hopes of creating one that is not recursive.

Tuukka:
I've read a bunch of Hofstadter. Thanks for telling me this, although I 
didn't yet learn anything new - maybe a new way of expressing something 
I already knew, though.

> Arlo:
>
> For example, if we start with the axiom that the fundamental division of experience is DQ/sq, and we subdivide sq into i/b/s/i patterns of value.
>
> Then we say, as you propose, that this description is not part of the initial system (DQ/sq), so we redescribe the system as DQ/sq/MOQ, then we can ask, on what level is this new description? It can't be on the "MOQ" level, since it contains the MOQ! So we call this new description mMOQ (metaMOQ) and now we have redescribed the system as DQ/sq/MOQ/mMOQ. Of course now we can ask, on what level is this meta-MOQ? It can't be on the meta-MOQ level since it contains the meta-MOQ level!
>
> As soon as you redefine the system to add a 'back up' container, you've in effect just created a definition that 'contains' that container!

Tuukka:
I see what you mean quite well. It doesn't apply to my work. I know 
exactly what you're talking about, and that it's a stupid thing to do, 
and that's not what I'm doing. I just found it misleading that Pirsig 
said the MOQ is an intellectual pattern, as if it were nothing besides 
that. The problem is not that the MOQ is an intellectual pattern. The 
problem *was* (but is no more, as it is already sorted out) that I 
interpreted Pirsig to mean the MOQ does not manifest on the other 
levels. But by this I don't mean the MOQ is a metatheory of the levels 
or some ontological category of its own.

>
> In saying that the MOQ = sq, you are committing a second error, as I've said, and that is conflating the description with the thing-described. Its akin to saying "the menu = the food because it describes the food". The MOQ-menu (intellectual pattern) is not the Broccoli-SQ (biological pattern) because it describes it. By saying that "the MOQ manifests on every level", you directly confusing "the metaphysics OF Quality" with "Quality". You continue this error below.

Tuukka:
I never claimed the MOQ = sq. Chill out, man. You're reading all sorts 
of things into my messages.


>
> [Tuukka]
> A potato does manifest as inorganic value (chemical compounds), biological value (taste, nutrition), social value (see van Gogh's "Potato eaters" - potatoes were the food of the poor back then) and intellectual value (biological taxonomies regarding potatoes, the evolution of the potato plant, etc.) So there's no reason to insist, that potatoes are exclusively biological value.
>
> [Arlo]
> Here you've conflated, say, the economic value (social pattern) of a potato with the organic construction (biological pattern) of the potato. This is not the potato manifesting as a social pattern, this is a social pattern (economics/trade) controlling a biological pattern (potatoes).

Tuukka:
Why would you like to think like that?

>
> You are correct in saying that "Quality" is manifest on every level, this is the "inorganic pattern OF Quality", "biological pattern OF Quality" and on that note you could say that the potato is a manifestation of Quality and the economics around distribution are manifestations of Quality, and the taxonomies we create are manifestations of Quality, but they are NOT manifestations of "the MOQ" nor are they manifestations of a potato.

Tuukka:
I never said Quality manifests on every level, and I find that statement 
to convey no analytic meaning, as Quality cannot be determined to have 
any definite properties. While I agree that the inorganic pattern is not 
a manifestation of a potato, I never said that either.

What do you mean by saying a taxonomy is not a manifestation of the MOQ? 
What would the negation of that statement mean? Would it mean the weird 
sq/DQ/MOQ thing you already refuted?

> Arlo
> I'm going to back out a bit and let others chime in as they wish here. I think I am just going to be repeating myself, maybe someone else will have something useful to add.

Tuukka
Well, you are a bit. But the first few messages were good.

> Arlo
> And as you mentioned, you may be talking about your own metaphysical system, in which case I have no familiarity to comment. If you want to define a potato as a social pattern (among other types of patterns), you most certainly can.

Tuukka
Gee, thanks.

Tuukka