[MD] The hard question.

[MarshaV]

Ham,

Not provable, but intuitive and pregnant with ever-changing possibility, surely.  ;-)
 
 
Marsha






On May 25, 2012, at 12:03 PM, "Ham Priday" <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:

> Hi Marsha --
> 
> On Fri, May 25, 2012, 5:13AM, "MarshaV" <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
> 
> 
>> Greetings Ham,
>> 
>> "Ham Priday" <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:
>> 
>>> Of course I can't "prove" this to you any more than I can prove
>>> to Marsha that she is a proprietary self.
>> 
>> It cannot be proven empirically, and not logically; got anything else
>> up your sleeve?
> 
> Only that we can prove and describe things empirically when they are empirical (i.e., experienced objects),  But selfness is not a "thing" or object.  The self, like Value and Sensibility which are its essential components, is self-evident.
> 
> You share the problem of semantics with your fellow MoQists, Marsha.  You all tend to forget Pirsig's caveat that verbal descriptions ruin the concept.  This doesn't mean that the conception is untrue; it simply means that the fundamentals are indefinable in empirical terms.  That's why some here resort to mathematics and logic as an alternative way to explicate them.  But since numbers and logical propositions are relative, that doesn't work for metaphysics either.
> 
> So, when we deal with metaphysical concepts, we are left with "intuition" as our guide.
> Although it has credibility only for the author, I like to consider metaphysical concepts "intuitive".  The bottom line is that "true meaning" is self-revelatory ... another reason for believing in the self.
> 
> In other words, don't discredit what you truly believe on logical or empirical grounds.
> Follow that principle, Marsha, and at least you won't be accused of being incredulous.
> 
> Essentially yours,
> Ham 
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