[MD] The hard question.

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Anthony --

Ham Priday stated May 25th:

> For your benefit, let me repeat here what I said about value.
> (Are you listening, Mark?)

[Ham]:
> Value is man's sense of virtue, worth or excellence.  It is derived
> from the uncreated Source from which man is separated as a
> newborn individual, and it is objectified in his experience of a
> relational universe.  Thus, the amount of value realized by mankind
> at any time in history is limited to the space/time perception of the
> human organism.  Unless the value-sensibility of that organism is
> somehow enhanced in the process of evolution, the value perceived
> remains unchanged.

Ant McWatt comments:

> Ham,
>
> This is a lovely summary of one particular SOM position about
> Value. I nearly feel nostalgic.
>
> Anyway, where is this "sense of virtue" actually located?

I must have touched a responsive chord to hear from you, Ant.  This 
analysis was in answer to Mark's question: "Why cannot the whole expression 
of the universe be one of learning value?"  I was trying to convince him 
that value isn't something "learned" like history or math, but rather an 
emotional response to something beyond himself.  Value- sensibility is 
identified with a particular human being in the same way that consciousness 
is the locus of one's awarness.  Since sensibility is an 'essent', not an 
'existent' like the physical body, it has no empirical location.

> If you're saying the mind (as it appears you are), how does
> your system deal with the charge of relativism (between different
> societies) or, for that matter, the various metaphysical problems
> that Pirsig takes us through in Chapter 8 of LILA that such
> a position entails?

First of all, unlike Pirsig, I don't subscribe to the view that "the world 
is composed of nothing but moral value," nor do I believe that the sense of 
Value is necessarily "moral" in nature.  Value is relative to the observer, 
to the space/time perspective of the individual subject.  That means what is 
valued -- whether it is morality, aesthetics, or truth -- will differ from 
one culture or society to another.  I don't claim valuism to be an 
"empirical" view as Pirsig claims for his brand of "qualityism", and I never 
understood how subject/object experience qualifies as a "metaphysics".

> God knows why you haven't yet found a more suitable
> philosophical discussion group to introduce your Essentialist
> ideas to but you're undoubtedly sincere in your beliefs and
> you at least deserve credit for that.

Well, I do have a website on the subject, and published a book in 2008. 
Unfortunately, neither appears to have elicited much interest.  Do you get 
many requests for your doctorial thesis?  Perhaps you can offer some useful 
marketing suggesions.

[Mark]:
> DQ is not an absolute source in the Essence-like way.  It is not a
> sum total of all being.  It is more like a pallet of colors that are
> mixing in combinations to create colors.  It is like the sum total of
> all your knowledge and experience mixing to form coherent thoughts;
> it is what thoughts are made of.

Ant McWatt comments:
> I'm glad someone cleared all that up then... DQ isn't like a pallet of
> anything.  It isn't helpful to conflate it with intellectual static 
> patterns
> either!

Let me ask you this, Ant, now that I have your attention: If the terms DQ 
and SQ didn't exist, how would you define the Value that Pirsig equates with 
Quality?  For if the universe is "composed of value" as Pirsig says, it 
would have to be parceled out on some fashion for humans to realize.

[Ham to Mark]:
> I'm disappointed that you would revert to MoQ terminology
> in order to refute Essence.

Ant McWatt comments:
> Ham, I found this a rather strange comment. I'm disappointed
> that you are disappointed about the use of MOQ terminology
> on MOQ Discuss!
>
> Isn't such a use at least helpful in bridging what Essentialism is
> all about and what the MOQ is about?!

Yes, that's true as an overall objective.  However, in order to grasp an 
author's ontology sufficiently to make a comparison, the fundamental terms 
must be understood as the author intends them.  Mixing the metaphor and 
terminology of two theorists (as Mark was doing) only compounds the 
confusion.  There's enough of that already in this foum.

Anyway, I'm pleased to have gained your interest, Ant, and appreciate the 
vote of confidence in my sincerity.

Respectfully yours,
Ham