[MD] just fishing

[david buchanan]

This is an example of how our assumptions tumble out of us, beckoned or not. We enter into a situation, assess it from our own personal worldview, and generously offer suggestions for improvement that were never invited in the first place. In The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge writes: “Mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions that influence how we understand the world and how we take action. We do not “have” mental models. We “are” our mental models…The discipline of working with mental models starts with turning the mirror inward; learning to unearth our internal pictures of the world, to bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to scrutiny.” (Phillips, Jan, 'The Art of Original Thinking – The Making of a Thought Leader')

Marsha:
I see "mental models" very close to "static patterns of value".  The last sentence in the above also sets forward a working solution. 


dmb says:
The last sentence is the solution?  "The discipline of working with mental models starts with turning the mirror inward; learning to unearth our internal pictures of the world, to bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to scrutiny.” Hmmm. Hold them rigorously to scrutiny. Yea, I think that is exactly what I'm trying to get you to do and exactly you are not doing. If you'd just take a good look at your own assertions, you should be able that you're still making the same mistake. You're still rejecting the solution as if it were the problem. You are confusing the NAIVE reality accepted by human beings (the problem) with the pragmatic theory of truth (the solution). 

Marsha commits the same old error once again:
It is not to merely accept the thoughts flowing through our consciousness as 'real' or 'true', (whether that be a "creative self", "the pragmatic theory of truth" or  "truth is an idea which represents experience beautifully").  That's the NAIVE reality accepted by human beings that Lila points to in Chapter 14.  I'll take holding static pattens of value as hypothetical (supposed but not neccesarily real or true) any day of the week, rather than be one that would act destructively to prove their world-view to be the "correct one" and use foece to have everyone else accept it.  It's analogy, boys, merely analogy; you do not hold some objective truth.  You talk about the MoQ's new conception of truth, yet defend it like it is absolute.


dmb says:
Somehow you've misread the pragmatic theory of truth so that it is indistinguishable from "some objective truth", from naive realism, from absolutes, from the belief that there is only one correct world view. Somehow you are unable to distinguish the old notion of a single exclusive Truth (the problem) from the MOQ's provisional and plural truths (the solution). And so once again you have taken a critique of the problem and senselessly used it to attack the solution. 

Apparently, you're oblivious to another important distinction, although it doesn't depend on Pirsig's work nor is it even particularly philosophical. I see this error in your last sentences: "It's analogy, boys, merely analogy; you do not hold some objective truth. You talk about the MoQ's new conception of truth, yet defend it like it is absolute."

Wouldn't want to speak for all the boys but I've certainly been defending the MOQ's conception of truth - but not like it is absolute. There are two basic questions to ask about the MOQ's conception of truth. I'm answering one of them but you think I'm answering the other. The first question merely asks what that conception is and the second one asks if that conception is true. I'm only trying to show you that you have the wrong conception. 

One can't even begin to ask the second question until the first question has been answered. Obviously, nobody can determine the validity of a claim unless they understand the meaning of the claim. I think you are confused about the MOQ's conception of truth, that you don't understand Pirsig's claim. If you ever do understand it, then we can talk about whether or not it's absolutely true. (Here's a hint: It's not. It would be contradictory for a pragmatist to make such a claim.)

Ironically, I think your position takes a pretty big hit from your own textual evidence. Take a few moments to reflect and compare what you say to Peter Senge's assertion. You say you have nothing to say about truth, that you're not interested, and more or less dismiss it all. By contrast Senge writes: "We “are” our mental models…The discipline of working with mental models starts with turning the mirror inward; learning to unearth our internal pictures of the world, to bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to scrutiny."

If we "are" static patterns and the only one who doesn't "pollute" the world with metaphysical understandings is yet unborn, then having a world view is avoidably part of what we "are". The only question is its quality. Since everyone must have a world view, must have a truth of some kind, we can just passively inherit a hodge-podge of what ever was handed to us or we can engage in reflection, self-examination, rigorous thought and otherwise take an active role in scrutinizing that world view. Some people will even tell you that the unexamined life is not worth living. And yet you say you just don't care about truth. That's a deeply nihilistic position and it's based on sloppy "thinking". I think you took a lousy road to a very nasty place. That's just how it works. Faulty thinking lead to bad conclusions.