[MD] philosophology

[david buchanan]

"Definitions are the FOUNDATION of reason. You can't reason without them." (ZAMM 214.)

"A metaphysics must be divisible, definable and knowable, or there isn't any metaphysics." (Lila 64.)

"The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience, and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Qqulity satisfies these." (Lila, chapter 8.)


Dan said:
.... Rationality and logic do not depend on subjects and objects. The MOQ makes use of patterns of quality to interpret the world, expand rationality, and improve logic.

Ian replied:
OK, but you are now expanding the definition of logic as well as the definition of rationality - a logic that is about more than objective relations. (I'm more than OK with that.)   ... I honestly still believe the whole long-running argument is simply a SOMist language communication problem - that we ALL share since Aristotle - particularly if we take the "critical" stance with those we are arguing "against". Being more charitable I take a more "fluid integrative" view of those I am debating "with". Critique against - is inherently SOMist. Me vs other.


dmb says:
Your first victim was logic, Ian, and now you're saying that critique and argument are inherently SOMist too? That is an especially absurd brand of anti-intellectualism. I don't see any reason why the rejection of SOM should also mean the rejection of logic, of criticism or making arguments.

According to Pirsig, definitions are the foundation of reason, a metaphysics much be definable and knowable, and the MOQ is supposed to be an economical, empirically based, and logically consistent truth. None of these criteria are rejected even after you've rejected SOM in favor of the MOQ. And that is what we are here to discuss, hopefully in a logically consistent way. In this case, of course, logic has nothing to do with the relations between objects (whatever THAT means?), but rather the relations between terms. That's why definitions become the foundation of reason, why we can't reason without them.

To misuse the MOQ's central terms is to reason badly. It's really that simple. If you equate opposed terms, you are being logically inconsistent. Thus my complaints about Marsha's description of static patterns as ever-changing. That's just nonsense in any language and regardless of one's metaphysical assumptions. It's contradictory and so of course the consequence is to mess up the MOQ. It's just bad thinking; words with no intellectual quality. It's not very fancy or complicated. 

I know that Marsha would like to dismiss this criticism as just someone's opinion or "interpretation", one she doesn't care about. And others would like to dismiss it because they think it's just personal or too mean. But actual content of this criticism has hardly been addressed and, as far as I can see, stands undefeated. I really don't see how any reasonable person could deny that it's simply contradictory to say that static patterns are ever-changing. 

"The Metaphysics of Quality itself is static and should be separated from the Dynamic Quality it talks about. Like the rest of the printed philosophic tradition it doesn't change from day to day, although the world it talks about does."

It's really quite simple. Static patterns are so called because they are stable while reality itself (Dynamic Quality) is ever-changing. Since metaphysics must be definable and definitions are the foundation of reason, isn't it totally fair and reasonable to ask that participants be logically consistent in the use of these terms? C'mon, of course it is. It's so obvious that I should even have to make an argument. Why would anyone join a discussion group if they thought otherwise? Because they enjoy a babbling tower of confusion so much more than an actual conversation about Pirsig's philosophy?