[MD] Definitions.

[Hamilton Priday]

Hi Ian --

On Wednesday, 2/27, at 4:05 AM, Ian Andersson wrote:

> The main difference is if there are processes that are reproduced or bound 
> in some kind of loop. Hydrogen atoms for
> example are vere stable processes while what we know about the life of 
> this planet or some economic policies
> doesn't seem to be very stable. Hydrogen is Hydrogen, if the structure of 
> the actual lump of energy is changed
> then it will be called something else than Hydrogen.
>
> The four levels of static quality, which is one of RMP's most important 
> contribution to human knowledge,
>shows the difference between levels of stable processes that have about the 
>same conditions, and processes
> that are dependent on others that are not dependent on the first. The 
> biologic processes that are dependent
> on the inorganic matter while inorganic processes doesn't bother about 
> biology at all for example.
> An intellectual thought can be hold by any human.
>
> Static quality is how something can be stable, repeated and reproduced, 
> while dynamic is how just anything
> stable can change into just anything else. That is why it is impossible to 
> exactly define dynamic quality,
> just because static patterns are some, but not the complete series of, 
> possible examples of what DQ can do for you.

You are much too materialistic for a philosopher, Ian.

Static is not a synonym for "stable", nor is the stability of a process what 
I was addressing.  Even a hydrogen atom has a single negatively charged 
electron spinning around its positively charged proton, not to mention 
quarks and other subatomic particles that are dynamically involved in the 
process.  Existence itself -- every last bit of it (to quote a familiar 
author) -- is the appearance of matter and energy in a constant state of 
flux.  The fact that an object is defined as a "stable event" does not 
exclude it from existential process.

The only "static" factors in human experience are abstractly rationalized 
precepts, by which I mean formulations, principles, axioms, mathematical 
equations, lingual systems, and the like.  Everything in our relational 
world properly qualifies as "dynamic" with respect to everything else.  And 
that includes those problematic "patterns" which make Quality (Value) 
realizable in relative terms.   In fact, it is our ability to differentiate 
Value that actualizes experiential  reality.

All of the above hinges on a Primary Source and a "value-sensible agent" 
which is the cognizant individual.  Value is primary to the experience of a 
differentiated world.  But without a metaphysical Source there can be no 
such agent, hence no value realization.  So, while Pirsig is right that 
Quality (Value) is primary to experience, he hides (obscures?) the Source in 
a void of "indefinability".  This, for me, is the critical flaw in his 
Metaphysics of Quality.  It's unfortunate that "static" and "dynamic" are by 
now thoroughly ingrained in his ontology, for the orientation of these terms 
is an obstacle to those of a mystical persuasion (such as Marsha), as well 
as others here who hold to a more conventional epistemology.

Thanks for the elucidation, Ian.  I hope this more clearly explains what I 
was getting at in yesterday's message.

Essentially yours,
Ham