[MD] Putting SOM back into the MOQ by excluding SQ, let's not do that say some of us

[David Morey]

Hi Dan and all

Let me actually try and explain what I think instead of being misrepresented:

There is experience, in experience we find flux and change, DQ, and we find a lack of change, patterns, SQ. Without any concepts or theory we cannot start on the SOM form of dualism, we can't divide experience into objects and subjects, it is all one, there is not world meeting self, there is a wholeness, Heidegger calls it being-in-the-world, a single word, the whole of reality, where no self and world is being separated out. So the flux we experience and the patterns are all us, except there is no us as we are not in SOM, the world is us, except no SOM, so no separate us and world, just a one. Now we can introduce MOQ reasoning and concepts. Let's make some sense of all this SQ. Now we can introduce theories about SQ, understand how SQ persists when you are not looking at certain patterns, eg your mum still exists when she leaves the room and you don't need to cry every time. And so does the cosmos keep existing before and after your life you can reason. Now you can do all this reasoning I say only if you can experience pre-conceptual patterns and through culture and concepts make sense of these. If as Dan claims there are no patterns to make conceptual sense of, there is nothing but flux to make sense of, nothing to hook us out of change to see there are patterns and persistence. SOM claims that this persistence is due to objects. MOQ says no, we must first experience and conceptualise pattern, which is persistence, before we introduce theories about what causes persistence. MOQ says look at the reality of experience before you fall into the problems of the theories attached to SOM. That is what I think. There may be better ways of explaining it, but I hope that helps. I thought I made it clear I do not want any SOM in this explanation, but so-called MOQers want to keep suggesting I do, which is crazy, so I have tried to spell it out, not spelling it out seems to have confused people, but I was assuming that people round here understood some MOQ basics. Sure I am challenging how SQ is understood, Dan and DMB assure me that Pirsig shares their questionable view of SQ, I am not so sure, but all I am doing is questioning the understanding of SQ, I am not question the overall framework of the MOQ, claims that I am only seem to be raised because the real issues I am raising are too difficult to address, if they cannot be addressed then maybe the denial of pre-conceptual SQ is simply wrong, you decide.
But please do not let this squabble cast any doubt on the fact that both sides support the overall MOQ and we should share solidarity over this, and not act like an exclusive members club that chucks people out if they suggest something new. The real enemy are the SOMers. Got it?

Regards
David M

Dan Glover <daneglover at gmail.com> wrote:

>Hello everyone
>
>On Wed, May 1, 2013 at 4:46 PM, X <xacto at rocketmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gentlemen,
>> I think what Dave Morey is trying to say, mostly out of the conversation
>> he and
>> Dan were having, where Dan had stood fairly stern about static patterns
>>  not being
>> experienced. (Dan was coming from the point of view of the
>> concepts\experience
>> distinction I believe (please correct me if in err)) IS  understanding
>> that distinction
>> as given, begin asking the question of what we mean when we say that
>> pragmatic
>> truth is verifyable in experience.
>>
>
>Dan:
>You seem to be asking about the correspondence theory of truth: "Narrowly
>speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is
>correspondence to a fact."
>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/
>
>Ron:
>What do we mean  when we say concepts "agree"
>with "experience"?
>
>Dan:
>It appears (to me) that you are using the term "experience" in its obvious
>way... we (as subjects) experience the world (of objects) that exist
>separately and apart from us. Robert Pirsig explains this quite nicely here:
>
>RMP Annotation 57
>
>In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter
>is a deduction from experience.
>
>DG:
>
>Could you elaborate on what you mean by “independently of matter”? I can
>see that time is dependent on experience but am having a difficulty with
>the rest of your first sentence, especially in the context of your second
>sentence.
>
>RMP:
>
>I think the trouble is with the word, “experience.” It can be used in at
>least three ways. It can be used as a relationship between an object and
>another object (as in Los Angeles experiencing earthquakes.) It is more
>commonly used as a subject-object relationship. This relationship is
>usually considered the basis of philosophic empiricism and experimental
>scientific knowledge.
>
>In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a preexisting
>object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or
>object. Experience and Dynamic Quality become synonymous. Change is
>probably the first concept emerging from this Dynamic experience. Time is a
>primitive intellectual index of this change. Substance was postulated by
>Aristotle as that which does not change. Scientific “matter” is derived
>from the concept of substance. Subjects and objects are intellectual terms
>referring to matter and nonmatter. So in the MOQ experience comes first,
>everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to
>scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects,
>is not really so pure. I hope this explains what is said above, “In the MOQ
>time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a
>deduction from experience.”
>
>DG:
>
>Yes, this does help, thank you. What bothers me slightly—I am sure I am not
>seeing it in the proper light yet—is how experience can be synonymous with
>Dynamic Quality? Isn’t experience that which we define?
>
>RMP:
>
>Dynamic Quality is defined constantly by everyone. Consciousness can be
>described is a process of defining Dynamic Quality. But once the
>definitions emerge, they are static patterns and no longer apply to Dynamic
>Quality. So one can say correctly that Dynamic Quality is both infinitely
>definable and undefinable because definition never exhausts it.
>Dan comments:
>
>This is what the discussion between David H./David M. and myself has
>centered upon. Both Davids insist that we experience pre-existing pattens
>of value. This is the common way of using the term 'experience' as Robert
>Pirsig states: a subject/object relationship. It would appear to me that
>the correspondence theory of truth uses this same definition of experience.
>
>In the MOQ, however, experience becomes synonymous with Dynamic Quality.
>There are no pre-existing patterns of value, or a pre-existing
>subject/object relationship.
>
> Ron:
>
>> I think what Dave M is asking, and deducing, is that there must be a sort
>> of relatedness
>> our concepts MUST share with DQ in order for Pragmatic truths to exist.
>>
>
>Dan:
>Well, if you have followed me so far, it is clear that concepts emerge from
>experience, which in the MOQ becomes synonymous with Dynamic Quality. So to
>say our concepts MUST share with Dynamic Quality is to misunderstand the
>nature of the MOQ. Dynamic Quality is pre-conceptual.
>
>This is why I have been a bit 'stern' (as you put it) in holding to this
>notion. By introducing pre-existing concepts, patterns of value, objects,
>what have you, to the MOQ we are effectively landing right back into a
>subject/object relationship.
>
>I understand it is common knowledge that the world has existed before our
>experience of it. Perhaps that is why this is so hard to wrap one's mind
>around. It pisses people off to be told everything they know about the
>reality of the world is mistaken. How can that be? they holler. They make
>all manner of arguments to uphold their cherished ideals. They will clutch
>at any straw twisting it for their own benefit.
>
>But if a person carefully considers this, they will come to the conclusion
>that it can be no other way. It is a high quality idea to believe the world
>exists before experience and will continue to exist afterwards. But this is
>an idea, nothing more. It cannot be verified one way or another.
>
>
>> Ron:
>> Or else what the heck are we really saying about precision and clarity.
>>
>
>Dan:
>If the past is any indication of precision and clarity, I expect you will
>now call me all manner of foul names and tell me how ignorant I am. I am
>not at all sure why I am answering this post other than to perhaps
>enlighten those who are on the fence here.
>
>Thank you,
>
>Dan
>
>http://www.danglover.com
>Moq_Discuss mailing list
>Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
>http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
>Archives:
>http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
>http://moq.org/md/archives.html