[MD] Misunderstandings are driven by what we value not by the logic we use.
Dan Glover
daneglover at gmail.com
Thu May 9 20:39:48 PDT 2013
Hello everyone
On Thu, May 9, 2013 at 8:59 AM, David Morey <davidint at blueyonder.co.uk>wrote:
> David H:
>
> And this is important for overcoming SOM precisely because it takes
>> subjects and objects as the cause of experience rather than a product of
>> reflection, rather than concepts which has been derived from experience.
>> Our radical empiricist are correcting a conceptual error, one known as
>> "reification" As Stuhr puts it, “the error of materialists and idealists
>> alike” is “the error of conferring existential status upon the products of
>> reflection” This is a matter of treating our “products of reflection” as
>> if
>> they were ontological realities instead of parts of a man-made conceptual
>> scheme.
>>
>>
> Dan said:
> Yes! This seems quite profound, actually. By saying we experience static
> quality we are conferring "ontological realities" upon them. We are saying
> static quality patterns come first and our experience of them is secondary.
>
>
> DM: I suggest static quality patterns are part of what we experience, that
> we can grant that our experience is real and can therefore confer
> ontological
> reality on them, if you expel SQ/patterns from experience (like Dan/DMB)
> then you think that if you give them ontological status you are projecting
> this status into a real that is outside of experience, if you keep
> SQ/patterns
> as part of experience you can use this to give them ontological status.
>
Dan:
No one is saying static quality patterns are not part of experience... they
are a memory of it. But they are experience itself. Bodvar Skutvik went
round and round with the same argument you are using. If static quality is
experience, then of course the MOQ is experience since it is a collection
of static intellectual patterns.
But the MOQ is NOT experience. It is a way of ordering reality that is more
expansive than in a world where only subjects and objects exist.
> It is then a good idea, based on the metaphysics of experience, that SQ
> has ontological status, it is then a secondary aspect of your
> experience-realist
> philosophy to grant SQ a realist status, that SQ/patterns can also exist
> whilst you are not experiencing them, that's why they can be re-experienced
> when you turn your back and cease to experience certain patterns and
> then turn to face and re-experience them.
Dan:
Damn these run-on sentences.
Anyway, no, the MOQ is NOT a metaphysics of experience. Again, that is a
huge mistake, one that leads to all manner of nonsensical notions as
witnessed by your twisting and turning above.
> Experience is entirely primary,
> we can base our SQ and DQ ontology on it, but we can also 'work out'
> that DQ and SQ can exist independently of our experience, and even
> historically prior to human experience, although not philosophically prior,
> as we base our metaphysics and ontology on experience as primary,
> but, in a secondary move, our reason can go beyond experience and
> work out the value of realism and the pre-dating of patterns and change
> prior to our primary human experience. This may be too complicated for
> some people to handle but it makes a lot more sense of experience than
> pretending realism does not work or there was not a time prior to
> human experience.
Dan:
I am not at all sure we are even discussing the MOQ here. I don't even know
how to begin to answer it. Your thinking is based on what? Not the MOQ,
obviously.
> Of course, there is no thinking and no working
> out of such conceptions prior to human experience, this is a dialectical
> reality of course,, interlinking human experience and our human reality,
> but this human reality can recognise realism and pre-human history.
Dan:
The MOQ does not deny evolution nor does it rewrite history in any way,
shape, or form. You seem to have gotten your panties into a twist over
nothing here. As I said, I am not at all sure we are discussing the same
thing here.
> dmb:
>
>> This attack on subjects and objects is really why we want clarify the
>> distinction between concepts (sq) and pre-intellectual experience (DQ).
>>
>
> DM: Problem is it banishing pre-conceptual experience that is not
> just DQ, i.e. a DQ with emerging with patterns, and saying all patterns
> have to involve
> concepts may work for rhetorical protectionism, but ends up embracing the
> disaster of non-realism, the same disaster that afflicts post-modernism.
>
Dan:
I do not believe you understand what dmb is saying here, nor does it appear
you are the least bit familiar with the tenets of the MOQ. Or perhaps your
sentence construction needs some attention. I don't know. Anyway, he is not
saying we banish pre-conceptual experience. He is pointing out the
distinction between (static quality) concepts and (pre-intellectual)
experience (synonymous with Dynamic Quality).
“The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what is called empiricism. It
claims that all LEGITIMATE KNOWLEDGE arises from the senses or by THINKING
> about what the senses provided. ” (LILA 99).
>>
>
>
> DM: Quite, the senses provide DQ and SQ, if DQ is undefinable, then we need
> some SQ in our experience that we can define, and build concepts on, would
> DQ provide anything for concepts to work with, DMB and Dan seem to
> talk as if DQ can provide some hint or trace that concepts can latch
> on to, but why not call such hints or traces SQ?
Dan:
What you are asking is: why don't we just say there are pre-existing
objects in the world that provide hints so our concepts of them can arise.
But David, that is what the MOQ is meant to counter... it provides a
framework for an expanded viewpoint where subjects and objects are NOT
primary.
Dan:
Yes again. Dynamic Quality (experience) and static quality (memory of
experience) are both necessary to make sense of the world. Once experience
has been defined, it is no longer experience but a concept, a memory, a
static quality pattern that makes sense of that experience. The hot stove
example in Lila is a great example.
DM: So Dan do animals and babies experience SQ and concepts do you believe?
Dan:
This is such a broad question that I have no idea how to answer it. So far
as I know, human beings are animals too. If you are talking about such
critters as otters, penguins, and turtles, then how would I know that? I
am not an otter, penguin, or turtle. And do you mean human babies? What
age? If you mean new-born, I am quite sure Robert Pirsig has answered this
question in Lila.
Have you bothered reading Lila? If not, you really should. Great book. If
you have read it... take my word for it... you need to read it again. Were
I a teacher, like Ant, I would hand out some homework. I am not. So either
do it or leave me alone.
Thank you,
Dan
http://www.danglover.com
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