[MD] D i a l e c t i c

[david buchanan]

dmb said:
Pirsig favors pragmatic truth as a species of value, asserting that they (plural) are invented to serve human purposes. Pirsig values an expanded rationality (appealing to logic and the affective domain) and the art of rhetoric as the proper means of persuasion, excellence in thought and speech. To Pirsig, truth, intellectual quality, is the highest of static values, and is subordinate only to Dynamic Quality itself, which is what guides all static values, including our pragmatic truths.


Ron replied:
In an attempt to distill the similarities and the differences: It seems both Socrates and Bob value rationality as the proper means of persuasion (the meaning of the term rhetoric seems to simply serve to redundantly restate this). It also seems they both value intellectual excellence and which is only subordinate to the good. (Socrates compares the good to the sun and intellectual excellence as our visual ability to percieve.)

dmb says:
I think you are overlooking the very important differences between Socrates and Plato, which was the point of my little paragraph. For Socrates, the affective domain corrupts the truth. We see the same attitude in scientific objectivity. But for Pirsig, value-free science has got to go and including the affective domain of consciousness is central to Pirsig's expansion of rationality. This is the difference between dialectic and rhetoric too. The rhetorician doesn't operate without logic and rationality but, unlike the dialecticians, his view says that excellent thought and speech must also include values, the emotions, the passions, a feel for the work, etc. The rhetorician thinks the dialectician is trying to do the job with half a brain tied behind his back, so to speak. And, perhaps most importantly, Pirsig does not put "Truth" above all. It is the highest form of static quality, yes, but it is subordinated to DQ. That is a very big difference, one that can't be glossed over without undoing the MOQ. As I tried to show you before, Plato's Good was taken from the rhetoricians and - if you don't look very closely- it does seem to be the same. But it's not. Platonic forms are nothing like DQ. They are almost exact opposites, in fact. 


Marsha mis-quoted Pirsig: 
"Truth is a (singular) static intellectual pattern within a larger entity called Quality. ...  What Phaedrus saw was that the Metaphysics of Quality avoided this attack [of James] by making it clear that the good to which truth [singular] is subordinate is intellectual and Dynamic Quality"


Ron replied to Marsha's distortion:
I think when you add the term (singular) you are making an interpretive assertion that Pirsig is just not making. When you read into a term with this assumptive-ness you are bringing a whole host of prejudices that will only serve to breed misunderstanding and bolster blind prejudicial rejections of meaningful and useful concepts.   In fact, I find it difficult to pin down EXACTLY who...concieves of truth as a singular, eternal, changeless entity except maybe the christians (God) or the Positivists (objective reality and corresponance theory) who reject knowledge gained from introspection (dialectic as an example) and instead rely on direct scientific observation and mathematics which is used to predict these direct empirical observations. ...


dmb says:

By adding the term "singular," Marsha isn't just making a dubious interpretive assertion that is unsupported by the quote she's misusing, she is directly contradicting Pirsig on the topic of pragmatic truth. Pirsig explicitly rejects "a single exclusive truth"

“Unlike subject-object metaphysics the Metaphysics of Quality does not insist on a single exclusive truth. If subjects and objects are held to be the ultimate reality then we're permitted only one construction of things - that which corresponds to the 'objective' world - and all other constructions are unreal. [This is widely known as the correspondence theory of truth, which is rejected and replaced by the pragmatic theory of truth even outside of the MOQ.] But if Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute 'Truth.' One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until something better comes along."



Ron continued his reply to Marsha:
 ...THE ATTACK is ON JAMES by the Positivists regarding the assertion of the idea that the true is what is useful. Pirsig could avoid this attack on James by the Positivists by making it clear that Truth (singular since we are responding to Positivists) is subordinate to intellectual excellence (which holds inorganic, organic and social excellence as that which is necessary for intellectual patterns to hold the highest value) ie the intellectual justification for a moral system of values. Therefore the true is not simply what is useful it is also what is best morally (intellectualy speaking). Intellectual values MUST support social, organic,and inorganic values, their test in experience is their satisfaction THAT is what James lacked in his explanation of Pragmatic truth, moral responsibility.



dmb says:
James's critics were certainly people who held to a single exclusive truth, including the earlier form of positivism (Auguste Comte, 1798-1857) and the Absolute Idealist of his day (Bradley, Royce). James's pluralism was very upsetting to these guys. But the "hot water" Pirsig is talking about (in the quote so badly misused by Marsha) is a result of James's attempts to make pragmatism "intelligible to the man in the street". James's descriptions of truth as a "practical" matter were misunderstood and misinterpreted to mean that truth is just a matter of expedience. But this really is just a misunderstanding. For James, "practical" did not just mean whatever is doable, sensible or affordable but rather it meant that ideas are only true insofar as they work in practice, as opposed to being merely theoretical or verbal or abstract. This emphasis on what ideas actually do in practice is an assertion empiricism over abstractionism or rationalism. Science, for example, is a practice wherein ideas are tested against experience. This is very far away from truth as "whatever is expedient or profitable for me". This latter, crude misinterpretation is what Pirsig fears. The NAZI get their hands on that and you can bet your bottom dollar they'll use it to serve their own hateful, anti-intellectual purposes. Sophomoric relativists are doing exactly that even as we speak, I'm sure. Every class I took had one or two of these characters and I could see the professors rolling their eyes and shaking their heads over it. 
And so Pirsig is saying that the MOQ's distinction between social and intellectual values is very helpful is precluding such a misunderstanding of pragmatism. Cash and expedience are social level values whereas truth is not. Truths are an intellectual species of value and this is not only distinguishable from social level values but sometimes even opposed to them. "Selling out" is contemptible for exactly that reason. When truths are for sale or created to make a profit, then they aren't really true at all. Or maybe the truth will be hidden because it would negatively effect somebody's bank account. That is degenerate even if there are no NAZIs involved, you know? Likewise, it would be just as degenerate to distort the truth in order to project one's ego, which is also a social level concern trumping intellectual values.