[MD] theories of truth

Tue May 21 10:11:55 PDT 2013

There are many theories of truth, of course, but we just want to be clear about Pirsig's theory of truth, right? If we want to know what the MOQ says about truth, there are two theories of truth that we need to consider. The correspondence theory is worth grasping because that is the REJECTED theory. It is rejected along with Plato's fixed and eternal Truth and it is rejected along with subject-object metaphysics. In other words, the correspondence goes along with the metaphysical assumptions that the MOQ rejects.

As Wiki explains it, "Correspondence theories state that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of affairs.This type of theory posits a relationship between thoughts or statements on one hand, and things or objects on the other. It is a traditional model which goes back at least to some of the classical Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. This class of theories holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is determined in principle solely by how it relates to "things", by whether it accurately describes those "things". ... Aquinas also restated the theory as: "A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality". Correspondence theory practically operates on the assumption that truth is a matter of accurately copying what was much later called "objective reality" and then representing it in thoughts, words and other symbols."

And this is perhaps the most relevant Pirsig quote on the matter, wherein he rejects the correspondence theory and distinguishes the MOQ from that SOM-based theory...

“Unlike subject-object metaphysics the Metaphysics of Quality does not insist on a single exclusive truth. If subjects and objects are held to be the ultimate reality then we're permitted only one construction of things - that which corresponds to the 'objective' world - and all other constructions are unreal. But if Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute 'Truth.' One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until something better comes along." (LILA, p. 100)

21 Chapters later, Pirsig gives a name to the truth theory that fits with the MOQ, particularly the way it fits into the structure of the MOQ. Truth, he says, is a static intellectual pattern within Quality. Unlike the correspondence theory, the pragmatic theory of truth does NOT say that ideas are supposed to represent objective things or external realities at all. Instead, the pragmatic theory says that "truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice". More specifically, Wiki says, "James meant that truth is a quality, the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to practice (thus, 'pragmatic'). John Dewey held that inquiry, whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over time if openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine and/or refute proposed truths."

And this might be the most relevant Pirsig quote on the MOQ's pragmatic theory of truth...

"Phaedrus, like most everyone else, had always assumed that pragmatism and practicality meant virtually the same thing, but when he got down to an exact quotation of what James did say on the subject he noticed something different: James said, 'Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and coordinate with it.' He said, 'The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief.' TRUTH IS A SPECIES OF GOOD. That was right on. That was EXACTLY what is meant by the MOQ. Truth is a static intellectual pattern WITHIN a larger entity called Quality." (LILA, p. 363-4. Emphasis is Pirsig's in the original.)

In the MOQ, there are also strong elements of pluralism, as we see in the first Pirsig quote, and strong element of the constructivist theory, wherein "truth is constructed by social processes, is historically and culturally specific". But this latter theory is often taken up by Marxists and other suspicious radicals who put a lot of emphasis on the idea that truth and knowledge "is in part shaped through the power struggles within a community". With Quality as the generator of all these socially constructed truths, the MOQ's brand of  constructivism isn't so cynical or arbitrary. While the MOQ views "all of our knowledge as 'constructed,' because it does not reflect any external 'transcendent' realities (as a pure correspondence theory might hold)," it is far less suspicious of the motives behind their construction. But the basic idea here is just that the MOQ rejects the correspondence theory of truth and instead takes up a pragmatic theory. AND this move goes along with the rejection of SOM. You have to do both at the same time, you know? Otherwise you have a theory of truth that doesn't fit the structure of your reality and can't possibly work or even get it to make sense. 

dmb quoted RMP: 
"...the MOQ does not insist on a single exclusive truth."

Marsha said to dmb:
Okay, you, dmb, consider static patterns of value to represent truths. I consider static patterns of value to represent hypotheticals.

D.J. Harding replied to Marsha:
Do you consider this in line with what Pirsig has said about static patterns of value?

dmb says:
I wouldn't even consider it to be in line with what I have said about static patterns. As understand the term, Marsha's comment doesn't make sense. To say that "static pattens of value REPRESENT truth" is just a version of the correspondence theory. That's the theory being rejected. The pattern doesn't represent the truth. It IS the truth. In the MOQ, "truth is a static intellectual pattern WITHIN a larger entity called Quality." The idea IS the truth, the concept IS the patten and it doesn't represent some other thing. So I don't know where Marsha got the idea that I "consider static patterns of value to represent truths". I think that is a confused mixture of Pirsig's terms and SOM's assumptions. 

Once again, Marsha's inability to distinguish the disease (SOM) from the cure (MOQ) has led her to mistreat and abuse the patient. Once again, we have her endorsement of some empty-headed nihilism wherein pragmatic truth is not about the quality and effectiveness of our ideas but rather it's all truths and meanings are just hypothetical, fictional, whimsical and arbitrary. I think that sounds a lot like solipsism and not at all like the MOQ.

I think it's not very hard to see how the MOQ can reject single, exclusive, fixed and eternal Truth without also falling down the rabbit hole into vacuous relativism. That's what the pragmatic theory of truth does. It is a form of empiricism. It allows for multiple truths and for the evolution of truths but there ARE rigorous standards too. Truth is the highest quality idea available at given time in your culture's history. That's nothing to sneeze at, you know? It has to be a high quality intellectual (it has to make sense) and it exists within a larger entity called Quality (it has to agree with experience, the primary empirical reality).

As far as I can recall, none of Marsha's comments on truth or intellect have ever been in line with what Pirsig has said about them. Can you recall anything that lines up?