[MD] Can you teach an old dog, new tricks? (Part 2)

[Hamilton Priday]

Ant --

First, let me apologize for posting my 5/20 message off-line.  (Your 
previous message appeared to be duplicated in my mailbox, and I 
inadvertently picked the one bearing your personal address.)  I didn't 
repost my message to MD in case you had decided not to involve the group in 
our discussion.

It is difficult bumping heads with someone who is intransigently attuned to 
another philosopher's view.  My idea of a "forum" is more open than 
following the "official doctrine" of a single author.  When we dedicate our 
thoughts and ideas to so narrow a purview, it stifles intuition and 
conceptualization, forcing original ideas into a fixed paradigm where they 
will not be noticed.   This is why I've ceased participating in the MD 
except for selected discussions which capture my fancy.

Most of the arguments you are using in defense of the MOQ are semantic red 
herrings.   Here's a typical example . . .

"Ham, you’re begging the question yet again!  For instance, where does this 
notion of 'objective' experience come from?  Why is it 'objective' not 
'subjective'?  By 'pre-qualifying' experience as 'objective' you’re already 
relying on the assumption that there are objects 'out there' which create 
experience for a subject.  Northrop (1946 & 1947) dismissed this particular 
SOM fiction nearly 70 years ago."

Ant, as it is my thesis that ALL experience is that of "otherness", I use 
the terms "other" and "object" synonymously.  The only exceptions to this 
are conscious awareness which defines the identity of a subjective agent, 
and sensibility which defines the agent's capacity to realize value.  Thus, 
conscious agents (subjects) and experienced otherness (objects) are passing 
events in my ontology.  They account for our finite "existence", not 
ultimate Reality.

"Out there" is your phrase (or Pirsig's), not mine.  Insofar as 
value-sensibility creates our existence, "out there", like "before" and 
"after", are rationalized dimensions based on the human processing of 
experienced data.  What is "other" to us -- I call it the 'essent' of 
existence -- is nothing more than a finite construct of our individuated 
value-sensibility.  So, instead of saying that the universe "is composed of 
value", I am saying that Essence Value "includes the universe as the order 
of actualized existence."

"Moreover, when Pirsig states 'it flies outrageously in the face of common 
experience' it is the assumption that the universe is composed of only
subjects and/or objects that Pirsig is complaining about here; not the MOQ! 
This shows quite clearly that you’ve completely mis-read this section of 
Chapter 8.  This can be seen by (carefully!) reading these two paragraphs in 
full:

“The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what is called empiricism.  It 
claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the senses or by 
thinking about what the senses provide.  Most empiricists deny the validity 
of any knowledge gained through imagination, authority, tradition, or purely 
theoretical reasoning.  They regard fields such as art, morality, religion, 
and metaphysics as unverifiable.  The Metaphysics of Quality varies from 
this by saying that the values of art and morality and even religious 
mysticism are verifiable, and that in the past they have been excluded for 
metaphysical reasons, not empirical reasons.  They have been excluded 
because of the metaphysical assumption that all the universe is composed of 
subjects and objects and anything that can't be classified as a subject or 
an object isn't real.  There is no empirical evidence for this assumption at 
all.  It is just an assumption.

“It is an assumption that flies outrageously in the face of common 
experience."

Okay, if that's the order in which Pirsig's argument is stacked, I'll 
concede that I misread the quotation.  However, since you are pushing 
specifics here, I do not understand the sentence "They regard fields such as 
art, morality, religion, and metaphysics as unverifiable."  Does this mean 
they (the empiricists) do not acknowledge the existence of these fields?   I 
also take exception to the notion that value is something hanging around in 
the universe waiting to be "verified".  The only value we can know is value 
that we have realized (i.e., verified).  And even that value is relational, 
inasmuch as not all persons judge it by the same standard.  Experience may 
be "the cutting edge of (our) reality", but Value comes first because it is 
the only reality we know.

If you'll excuse me, I'm going to cut off here, since dinner awaits, we're 
running long, and I'm really more interested in the points you'll be 
addressing in the next epistle.

Thanks for the analysis, Ant.

Essentially yours,
Ham


________________________

It can be seen that jettisoning the idea of reality being composed of
only subjects and objects, and instead using the MOQ (with its four static
levels and a recognition of Dynamic Quality), brings us a fuller, and
therefore, more useful description of the world.

Hamilton Priday continued May 5th:

Then [Pirsig] goes on to posit a "second principle":  "A thing that has no 
value does not exist," from which he concludes that "value has created the
thing", as opposed to the other way around.



Ant McWatt comments:

Well, this “The other way round” is how SOM metaphysicians see the
world.  It sounds to me that you’re still under the illusion that human 
constructs are  more than working models for how the universe operates.  The 
reality is (as it where) is that you pick one or two postulates that you 
assume to be true (e.g. the universe is composed of unpatterned and 
patterned value) and, if in practice it works better than older models (such 
as the traditional SOM one that you are still holding i.e. that things or 
subjects create values) then you go with that.  And, by the way, while you’re 
still under this metaphysical illusion, you’ll be well and truly trapped in 
an SOM prison.


Hamilton Priday continued May 5th:

Mind you, I happen to agree that value sensibility is what creates
(i.e. actualizes) our empirical reality.
My criticism here lies in the rhetoric by which he argues the case.  He
talks about "substance" as a "subspecies of value"; yet he offers no 
epistemology to support this thesis.  It's no wonder that the Pirsigians are 
confused about what SOM means.


Ant McWatt comments:

Ham, that confusion is largely derived from the pre-existing SOM based 
philosophies and
languages (of the Western world). Anyway, for those who care to read DiSanto
& Steele’s “Guidebook to ZMM” or Chapter 1 of my PhD, the various notions
of “subjects”, “objects”, “subjective” and “objective” can be unpicked.  For 
instance, from the latter:




“It is apparent that for SOM the notions of ‘subjectivity’ and
‘objectivity’ are assigned as metaphysical terms (referring to types of 
reality
such as mind and matter) in addition to being assigned as epistemological 
terms
(referring to ways of knowing; as in the ‘spectatorial’ accounts of knowing
criticised by Heidegger).  A further SOM
semantic construction of note is that being a ‘subject’ (for instance, being 
a
centre of consciousness) is not usually considered problematic but (with the
simple addition of a seemingly neutral suffix) being ‘subjective’ (as a
criticism of being engaged in conscious activity that will lead to an 
incorrect
relation with an object) is.  On the
other hand, it is considered problematic to treat people like objects but
unproblematic (in most contexts) to treat them ‘objectively’ (i.e. without
prejudice).  In this context, to treat
people ‘objectively’ entails that they are not treated as ‘objects’.  On the 
other hand, it can be argued that it
is only by subjectively identifying and empathising with their subjects that
anthropologists, for instance, can arrive at fair-minded, informed and more
‘objective’ accounts.  Yet, this shows an
ambiguity in SOM as we observe ‘subjective’ knowledge (gained through 
empathy
and identification) mysteriously becoming ‘objective’.”

“Furthermore, the term ‘subjective’ can be employed pejoratively in two
distinct contexts.  In one context, to
assert that a certain statement is ‘subjective’ is to suggest that the
statement is ‘unrealistic’ and ‘non-empirical’.
For instance, a lack of support in non-mental reality for a statement
could be considered by an empiricist as an instance of poor thinking.  In 
another context, to state that a certain statement is ‘subjective’ is to 
suggest that the statement is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unreasonable’.  For instance, 
a rationalist would possibly use the term in this context to suggest that an 
opponent keep to logical patterns of thinking in an argument rather than use 
intuition or feelings.  It is apparent, therefore, that in the empiricist 
view, you are ‘objective’ when your statements correspond correctly to 
non-mental reality while, for a rationalist, you are ‘objective’ when your 
statements cohere together through employing the correct procedures for 
analysis, categorization and drawing inferences.”

“Moreover, it is apparent that the terms ‘subject’ and object’ are
usually complementary, in that a knowing mind is a ‘subject’ insofar as it 
is
aware of an ‘object’ while an object is termed an ‘object’ insofar as it 
stands
or, at least, can stand, in a certain relation to a subject.  On the other 
hand, the terms ‘subjectivity’ and objectivity’ are usually perceived as 
being opposed, in that as one increases, the other decreases.  Finally, as 
noted above, an ‘object’ can be an object of thought, a grammatical object 
or a physical object.  It should be noted that the above illustrations are 
by no means exhaustive so, in consequence, pinning down the meaning of 
particular SOM terminology can be often like catching the proverbial 
‘greased pig’.”

“Considering the ambiguities surrounding subject-object terminology, it
comes as no surprise to discover that Pirsig (2002h, p.530) was considering 
a
complete jettisoning of SOM terms when constructing the MOQ: ‘My earlier 
view, when I was concentrating on the confusion of subject-object thinking, 
was to get rid of them entirely to help clarify things.’”  (McWatt PhD, 
2004, Section 1.1.)


Hamilton Priday continued May 5th:

The reminder of this 10-page chapter is mostly a play on the "platypus" 
analogy as a means of deriding substance, science, causation, the Big Bang, 
and cultural evolution…


Ant McWatt comments:

Ham, God, you love misconstruing Mr Pirsig.  To be honest with you, it 
starts to get rather irritating after a while.  Anyway, at best, yes, Pirsig 
derides the notions of causation and material substance but if material 
substance is understood as being in continual existence then it has never 
existed.  As Pirsig
points out towards the end of Chapter 8, quanta can’t fulfill this 
definition
because, of course, they disappear and appear at random!

I also think Pirsig is quite correct to deride the (SOM) idea of
causation.  This is supported by Karl Popper (with his theory of 
propensities) and, more recently by Bart Kosko and his idea of fuzzy logic. 
Both Popper and
Kosko are examined at length in my PhD and both wrote extensive texts about
their areas of concern for anybody who cares to read them.

Regarding cultural evolution, the MOQ supports this notion.  Likewise the 
Big Bang paradigm lies behind the moral hierarchy of the four static levels 
that Pirsig uses in the MOQ so God knows where you get the idea that Pirsig 
derides these two particular notions.  (“Galen Strawman” time, eh?)

To be fair to you, Pirsig’s relationship with science is a little more
complicated but between the religious priests and the scientists, Pirsig’s
sympathies lie far more with the latter.


Hamilton Priday continued May 5th:

Don't you find it inconsistent that, despite the author's need to denigrate 
these concepts, he fills 24 additional chapters explaining experiential 
reality in terms of "static patterns" while romancing us with a cosmology by 
which Dynamic Quality continually evolves toward moral "betterness"?


Ant McWatt comments:

No, essentially because the alternatives are rather pathetic.  It either 
means you have a pre-determined teleological universe (where, for instance, 
you say goodbye to any real notion of free-will and, moreover, you have the 
problem of an omnipresent and omniscient God – or creator - who lets evil 
things happen) or a nihilistic universe (where, for instance, there can be 
no real sense of right or wrong, or better or worse.  It entails relativism 
and seeing morals as purely subjective human constructs).  Both these 
(SOM-based) options don’t ring
true and will never be reconciled within a purely SOM paradigm.  It’s just a 
pity that forests of paper have already been lost on these metaphysical dead 
ends.


Hamilton Priday continued May 5th:

Good? Bad?  Better?  --all subjective criteria that do not exist
in the absence of conscious awareness…


Ant McWatt comments:

Ham you’re begging the question yet again!  The fact you can’t see this or 
refuse to see this, leads me to think, you’re wasting your time and 
everybody else’s at this Discussion group.  (Maybe trying to teach old dogs, 
new tricks, is indeed a pointless exercise?)


Hamilton Priday continued May 5th:

yet are purported to be that ultimate, essential Reality which, the
author still insists, is indefinable.


Ant McWatt comments:

In the sense that there is a knower and a known, yes, Quality is
essentially indefinable.  If Pirsig’s Quality is equated to the Tao or the 
Buddhist’s notion of “no-thingness” (an identity which I think 
metaphysically “holds” especially as you can’t have more than ONE ultimate 
mystic reality in the universe!), then you just need to read a half-decent 
text from either of these traditions to understand where Pirsig is coming 
from here.


Part 3 of this post (largely about Ayn Rand) to follow soon,

Best wishes,
Anthony





---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Hamilton Priday concluded May 5th:





Incidentally, I noted that your response to my Apr 14th message was
largely

a diatribe against my "right wing" views, including the
'Wicked Witch of Westminster' snippets and characterization of Ayn Rand as a 
"hippie".  So, perhaps this assignment was directed toward my conservatism 
as much as it was a request to provide a position statement of my 
philosophy viz-à-viz Pirsig's MOQ.  If you had a metaphysical purpose, 
however, I'll be most happy to elaborate on any aspect of Essentialism you 
don't understand.


.