[MD] Fwd: Re: Static Patterns Rock!

[David Morey]

Hi Ron

Your quite right that this stuff has a lot of history,  I've read a lot of this stuff in 30 years of study, but where I used the white moon in a black background I am trying to indicate the differences is percepts that allow us to latch on to something in experience to base all our responses on,  placing this before all consideration of universals and particulars or things or externals to experience,  that is the very heart of my point about pre-conceptual experience of difference or pattern. Here for me the white of the moon is the experience itself,  same as the experience of actually tasting a banana,  also a pattern that you could recognise on repeat, so not a concept. We need to see the active and not passive observing aspect of experience here,  concepts come about from the sameness in experience, dynamic newness too,  for example eating a new food with a new flavour,  nothing conceptual in such an experience,  nor in the second taste that gives you a pattern,  sure come up with a name for his new taste later to conceptualise it,  but as with the black and white expert girl who experiences colour for the first time there is something patterned and differentiating in experience  that is more than just conceptualisation,  even DMB knows this,  he has tasted a banana surely,  but he can't admit that there are patterns and difference in primary experience.  

But thanks for the useful input and contextualisation. 
David M

X Acto <xacto at rocketmail.com> wrote:

>
>
>David Morey said to Dave Buchanan:
>
>I'll take incoherent back for a second,  you say DQ is full of content,  I say it is full of pattern, let's say it is full of X, now why is content so much better a word than pattern, what rules it out? Is there a better word for X? I have tried the split between DQ and SQ as pre-conceptual patterns and conceptual patterns,  you don't like that,  what about dynamic patterns versus static patterns? 
> 
>[Ron says]
>Dave Morey, I believe Dave B. to be maintaining the arguement which centers around
>the meaning of terms within a particular context, that context being MoQ. It seems
>that you want to question if that meaning also can extend to the arguement of percept/
>concept and still maintain a high degree of explanitory power while keeping its contextual
>meaning within MoQ.
>The problem of percept/concept is an old one, it resembles the one/many problem and we
>can glean some insight into the topic by looking at what ancients have said about it as well
>as contemporary minds who have recognized the problem and then compare that to how
>Pirsig addressed the problem.
>Lets start with the premise you have supplied below.
> 
>"Is the moon (a concept) round (a concept)? Let us look and see, well it is white (a percept)"
> 
>"white" or "white-ness" is commonly understood as a concept, a universal as well as black
>and the reason why is that percepts are constantly changing, coming to be and fading away
>as the ancients stated the meaning (Heraclitus is known for this observation of experience)
> 
>Dave continues:
> but does it fill all my experience? No. The white is surrounded by black (a percept). So the moon has a shape (a pattern caused by the percepts not the concepts) and this shape is round (a concept). For you the shape-pattern of the moon is a concept,  for me round is a concept but the perceived shape in our experience is not a concept it is just a specific shape that we then come to notice and describe as round and the moon...
> 
>[Ron]
>I see that in this arguement you are making certain assumptions in regards to what you are
>presuming to be percepts and that they posses a certain unfiltered purity and that this
>purity renders form independant of the human minds ability to understand it.
> 
>Plato thought that too and that is why the theory of forms was his attempt to explain
>why things fall into kinds it was his answer to Heraclitus, it was his attempt to account
>for recurrent elements of our experience as well as such general ideas as "white" "black"
>"justice" "beauty" and "good".
> 
>Aristotle disagreed, to him universals (forms) were artistic assembly of many particular
>unintelligible percepts into wholes, that the process or the act of making distinction,in
>your example experiencing a shape, is a complex process of placing limit on the limitless.
>Aristotle asserts that the terms limit and Good become synonomous in meaning
>in this context. Which kinda boils down to the idea that experience exists because
>its intelligible, to understand is to experience. Human experience would not be
>human experience if it was unintelligible.
> 
>I think the best answer is the Pragmatic one, universals; or types or classes, (forms)
>{shapes}distinctions in experience, are not so much part of the dynamic flux but more
>part of the human framework of concepts, they suggest what possibly "is" and what may
>"be" but all distinction is part of the past, made by memory and always half emerged
>in what was or we would never be able to experience the "now" in any kind of meaningful
>way. 
> 
>Dave M. concludes:
>we can point to it before we call it the moon or describe it,  other people can see where in this common experience we are pointing and see this pattern in their experience too,  if it is not a pattern how can they turn to see something and suddenly realise it is there, if concepts are required to turn percepts into patterns how do we experience new things that come along and surprise us? Do concepts require work to make them or do you think they just pop into existence prior to culture and language? I just cannot make sense of what you think concepts mean?
>
>[Ron]
>New things come along and surprise us precisely because we are turning percepts into
>patterns, remember we are talking about meaning not what really is and is not and I can
>understand Dave B.'s frustration because you seem to insist on the primacy of an external
>independent prime creator of pattern that human concepts correspond to and mirror when
>the Pragmatic assertion is the primacy of human imposition on experience.
> 
>I think alittle backround reading on the central problems of philosophy and how philosophers
>throughout history attempted to explain them and how Pirsigs explains them would help
>tremendously in this situation and I think you would understand what Dave B. is saying
>with alittle more clarity too.
> 
>Dave Buchanan is simply framing the MoQ in context to these philosophical problems
>and how Pirsigs work answers, accounts for and explains them within that historical framework.
>That is why he hammers on the correct and accurate meaning of MoQ terms because they
>hold the most meaning in refference to this history.
> 
>It's what we all should be concerned with on a philosophy forum.
> 
> 
>..
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