[MD] Un-Pure Experience

[David Thomas]

On 10/23/13 3:17 PM, "David Buchanan" <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:

> D. Thomas said:
> 
> "All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. ...All knowledge
> originates in perception of the objective external world through man's
> physical sense organs." [Mao tse-tung from On Practice (1937)]
> Despite being firmly under the sway of SOM this snippet pretty clearly
> describes the nature of direct and indirect experiences with the only possible
> quibbles being about "correct" way of interpreting those experiences.
> 
> dmb says:
> Red-baiting? Really? You're like the Joseph McCarthy of mysticism here, bud.
> It's ugly, low and it's also a very bad reading of the content. He's obviously
> declaring his loyalty to SOM and it's quite clear that the "direct experience"
> he's talking about is just the common sense notion of first-hand experience,
> as opposed to second-hand news. For both reasons, leaving aside the silly
> McCarthyism, the quote is in no way relevant to Pirsig's DQ or James's pure
> experience. 

[Dave]
Was I baiting you? Just a little bit. But you must admit that Pirsig, from a
philosophical perspective, is not much on providing definitions.  And this
has caused over the years much wrangling what he meant by such words as
"intellect," "intellectual," "social," and others. "Direct experience" is
not a commonly used phrase in everyday American speech. But this phase is
very common, if not essential to Buddhism. Turns out it is similar to the
process James used called, introspection. Observation of the self by the
self, even if Buddhism deduces from that, that there is "no self". Here's
just one of a jillion Buddhist's pieces defining "direct experience.", note
the last sentence.

"The entire field of mind and matter-the six senses and their respective
objects-have the basic characteristics of anicca (impermanence), dukkha
(suffering) and anatta (egolessness). Buddha wanted us to experience this
reality within ourselves. To explore the truth within the framework of the
body, he designated two fields. One is the material structure: the corporeal
structure, the physical structure. The other is the mental structure with
four factors: consciousness; perception; the part of the mind that feels
sensation; and the part of the mind that reacts. So to explore both fields
he gave us kayanupassana (observation of the body) and cittanupassana
(observation of the mind)"

So when you say," the [Mao] quote is in no way relevant to Pirsig's DQ or
James's pure experience."

"Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to intellectual
abstractions." [Pirsig from Lila]

"All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. ...All knowledge
originates in perception of the objective external world through man's
physical sense organs." [Mao tse-tung from On Practice (1937)]

>From the way that Pirsig uses "direct experience" in his axiom; How can you
be sure which way he is using it? Is it internal observation of one's own
mind and body or is it Mao's external observation of one's environment, or
both ? How do you know? I surely can't make the distinction.

> Dave Thomas said:
> James', Jung's, and modern science's psychological take on "abstraction",
> while differing in the details, in general follow Jung. Pirsig says all
> "thinking" does not rise to the intellectual level. From that can we concluded
> that the only type of "abstraction" that is excluded from the direct
> experience of Dynamic Quality is the single type, "intellectual thinking or
> abstraction?"
> 
> dmb says:
> I think you are comparing apples and oranges here. I mean, these takes on
> "abstraction" are very different from each other and it seems unfair to hang
> this jumble on Pirsig. Mostly, I'd object to your conclusion: "that the only
> type of "abstraction" that is excluded from the direct experience of Dynamic
> Quality is the single type, "intellectual thinking or abstraction". Pirsig
> makes it pretty clear, I think, that all static patterns are excluded from DQ.
> In fact, "unpatterned experience" is another name for DQ. The entire mythos is
> excluded from DQ. In that sense, even to see shapes and colors is to
> intellectualize. Sure, "Red" communism is a far more complex and abstract idea
> than a simple thing like the color "red" but they're both static patterns in
> the mythos. The four levels of static patterns are just a way to sort the
> mythos, right? All of that sits in contrast to DQ, the generator of the
> mythos.

Apples and oranges? Here's Pirsig's axiom again:

"Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to intellectual
abstractions." [Pirsig from Lila]

He uses the term "abstraction" with a the qualifier "intellectual." Why?
One of the definitions of "abstraction" is: "the process of formulating
generalized ideas or concepts by extracting common qualities from specific
examples." So why not just use "abstraction?"

Because he want to exclude it from the "jumble" of other abstractions (that
I posted before) that nervous systems (of both human and other animals)
regularly do in the course of their operations. So when you claim,"even to
see shapes and colors is to intellectualize" it flies in the face of the
scientific facts (or values) and all accepted definitions of "intellect" or
"intellectual." Your interpretation is not a species of good. Not true.
Which leads right into the whole mythos, everything is an "analogy"
business.

Pirsig says,"Anthropology tries to be a science of man, not a collection of
gossip and intuitions about man. Lila pg 27

Then you say, "The four levels of static patterns are just a way to sort the
mythos, right? All of that sits in contrast to DQ, the generator of the
mythos."

What this does is reduce all human knowledge to the status of myth, "a
collection of gossip and intuitions about man." Myth, "A traditional,
typically ancient story dealing with supernatural beings, ancestors, or
heroes that serves as a fundamental type in the worldview of a people, as by
explaining aspects of the natural world or delineating the psychology,
customs, or ideals of society." So all human knowledge is initially
relegated to "social level" where fairy tales, Bible stories, and Newton's
theories are all of equal value. No, no you say, What about the intellectual
level?

Well the problem as I see it is that there is no mechanism, no criteria
internal to the MoQ to rationally sort between what is "social" and what is
"intellectual." And the Pirsig example that I go back to again and again is
his claim that "capitalism" is a social pattern, while "communism" is an
intellectual one. First it is an apples and oranges comparison with
"capitalism" being an economic theory and system "in which the means of
production and distribution are privately or corporately owned and
development is proportionate to the accumulation and reinvestment of profits
gained in a free market." While "communism" is a political theory and system
of governance which contains the economic theory and system,"characterized
by the collective ownership of property and by the organization of labor for
the common advantage of all members."

But even if we restrict the definitions just to their economic theories, by
what criteria can a rational and reasonable person make this
"social/intellectual" distinction that Pirsig makes? I don't believe one can
based on any of the "laws or rules" of the MoQ.

You might point to James "radical empiricism" and "pragmatism" to do this
work. And it could make the distinction "which is better", but if the MoQ
does not square with James' work, and I don't believe it does, then no
method is available.

Sorry,

Dave