[MD] Step two

[John Carl]

You think?


On 8/24/14, Craig Erb <craig_erb at ymail.com> wrote:

> "There is an independent reason - grounded in the diachronic organization of
> our temporally extended agency - to see planning structures as basic to our
> individual agency. Once these planning structures are on board, we can
> expect them to play central roles in our sociality." [Bratman]
>
> What I think Bratman is saying is that what makes us individual agents is
> our individual plans and what makes us social agents emerges from the plans
> of individuals.
>

I see nothing there about individual in his explanation of where
individual agency comes from.  "planning structure" is the operative
term and that's a far cry from independent reasons.    In fact, I'm
sure you'll find those being formed and informed  socially, rather
than  individually.  And I'm not saying this because of any system
other than purely empirical.  But in addition to the plain experience
I find, the self=derived self suffers from logical errors of an
ontological sort.

I'd like to know what he means by "diachronic" because in the passage
all he describes is mono.

John

John.


>
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>
>>Craig
>>>
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-- 
"finite players
play within boundaries.
Infinite players
play *with* boundaries."